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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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JAPAN

Sources Reveal Plans To Curb Chemical Exports

OW2202065991 Tokyo KYODO in English 0600 GMT
22 Feb 91

[Text] Tokyo, February 22 (KYODO)—A group of 20 countries is set to restrict exports of production facilities for fertilizers, dyes, and pesticides amid mounting concern about possible use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war, Japanese Government sources said Friday.

The so-called Australia Group, whose members include the United States, France, Germany, Britain, Australia, and Japan, is to agree on the new restrictions in the forum's next meeting in May, the sources said.

The group currently restricts exports by its members of 14 kinds of materials directly used for producing deadly

gases, and puts 36 other items, which could be processed into chemical weapons, on the "warning list" to the industries concerned.

Production plants for fertilizers, dyeing substances, and pesticides can easily be turned to making toxic gases by adding related technologies in the manufacturing process, the sources said.

The group is also set to limit trade in machinery and related technology, such as corrosion-resistant metal pipes and distillation devices, according to the sources.

Fermentation equipment and devices that could be used for gene recombination experiments, as well as some types of centrifugal separators, would also be restricted, the sources said.

Japan has set up guidelines parallel to the group's restrictions but the sources said the government may move to upgrade the limits into legislation following the forum's expected May agreement.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reports on Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal, Transit

Ministries 'Ambiguous' About Transit

AU2102085591 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
16 Feb 91 p 3

[Richard Huk report: "Transferring Soviet Troops"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet units from Germany is obviously threatening our Republic with something very unpleasant. We gained this impression from Wednesday's [13 February] news conferences at the Federal Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

"So far, we have not received any request from Germany to discuss this issue," said Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman E. Lansky. He stated specifically that no official request has been brought up. Apparently, the German railroad company has already informally approached the Czechoslovak Ministry of Transportation. The Soviet Army's transit across Czechoslovakia would be technically feasible; it would take approximately four years at a rate of four to six trains per day, and the CSFR would receive around 900 million Deutsche marks in return. As E. Lansky said, various ideas are being presented on whether and how to implement the transfer.

One thing, however, is certain—the transit of Soviets across Czechoslovak territory is being discussed. Officially, there is no problem; the Foreign Ministry refuses to discuss it and refers journalists to the Defense Ministry. In reply to a question from SVOBODNE SLOVO on whether he can in any way comment on the recent statement made by Defense Minister L. Dobrovsky that the Soviet Army could resolve the withdrawal issue, regardless of Czechoslovakia's opinion, the diplomatic service spokesman said: "Minister Dobrovsky can say what he wants. You had better ask him what he meant by that."

On the same day our editor turned to Defense Ministry Press Spokesman P. Tax with a question about the kind of measures the Defense Ministry is preparing in case Soviet troops are forcibly transferred across the CSFR. "This is an issue more for the Foreign Ministry staff," replied the military spokesman, and he remarked that the official Czechoslovak point of view does not exclude the possibility of foreign units being transferred from the middle of this year. P. Tax did not provide any information that we had demanded from the military intelligence service regarding the whole affair.

The problem of 400,000 Soviet soldiers a stone's throw away from us is being tossed about like a hot potato by the Foreign and Defense Ministries. Their enigmatic silence lends credence to the view that the transit issue has, in essence, already been decided upon, and the ambiguous statements made by officials raise the

alarming issue of whether we are interested in the promises of 900 million Deutsche marks or whether Czechoslovakia can simply not afford to reject the expected request from the Soviet Union or Germany or, as the case may be, from both of them together.

Recent figures from the Institute for Public Opinion Research indicate that 40 percent of CSFR inhabitants are against the idea of a Soviet transfer across our territory, while 50 percent are not, in principle, against it under specific conditions.

Figures on Withdrawal Released

AU2202142891 Prague CTK in English 2012 GMT
20 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Prague, February 20 (CTK)— [passage omitted] All but one unit of the total of 73,000 Soviet soldiers stationed in Czechoslovakia from the 1968 Soviet-led invasion by five Warsaw Pact countries had left the country by February 19. The remaining regiment at the troops' command at Milovice, Central Bohemia, [composed of] 29 tanks, 152 infantry combat vehicles and armored carriers, and 30 artillery pieces will be withdrawn by the end of May, one month earlier than set by the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of February 26, 1990.

Update on Withdrawal, Remaining Troops

LD2702004391 Prague CTK in English 1718 GMT
26 Feb 91

[Text] Mlada Boleslav, Central Bohemia, Feb 26 (CTK)—Some 11,500 Soviet soldiers and officers (14.8 percent) and about 7,000 family members have remained on the Czechoslovak territory, Major General Svetožar Nadovic said here today. The Federal Defence Ministry administration commander for the withdrawal of Soviet troops said that almost all combat units of the Soviet troops Central Group left by February 19. There are altogether one motorized artillery regiment, one reconnaissance and one protection battalion, 29 tanks, 152 combat vehicles and armoured carriers and 30 gun and mortar barrels deployed at Milovice, 30 kms north-east of Prague. All the three units will be withdrawn by the end of May 1991, Nadovic said. Originally there were 73,500 Soviet soldiers in Czechoslovakia. An agreement on conditions of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on February 26, 1990.

Official Comments

LD2602224591 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1430 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] A mixed legislative commission supervising the withdrawal of Soviet troops visited Mlada Boleslav. During the visit, Major General Svetožar Nadovic, chief of the Ministry of Defense Directorate for the Supervision of Soviet Troops Withdrawal, drew attention to the fact that only a small percentage of Soviet soldiers now

remain in Czechoslovakia. Asked about the progress of meeting the withdrawal schedule one year after signing the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement, he noted that almost all combat units of the Central Group of Soviet Forces had withdrawn by 19 February.

World Chemical Disarmament Promoted

LD2002223891 Prague CTK in English 1545 GMT
20 Feb 91

[Text] Prague, February (CTK)—General Josef Cerny, the chief of the Czechoslovak Army's chemical units, confirmed Czechoslovakia's active share in the process of chemical disarmament in the world at a regular Army briefing here today.

Cerny recalled Czechoslovakia's document containing detailed data about the production, consumption, import and export of substances relevant to the chemical weapons convention. No other country except the USA and the USSR has so far presented such a document.

Cerny said that Czechoslovakia's approach to the talks on a chemical weapons' ban was motivated by the results of Soviet-U.S. talks on publishing data about chemical weapons, and by the opinion that countries need not keep secret their capability to produce a poisonous substance. Czechoslovakia is capable of producing chemical weapons but does not own chemical weapons and has never given or shown anybody the production technology. Cerny said these substances are produced for industrial, scientific and medical facilities, both military and civilian.

List of Chemical Warfare Agent Producers Reported

AU2602155691 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 21 Feb 91 p 2

[Josef Tucek report: "Czechoslovak Yperite"]

[Text] In the Military Repair Plant in Zemianske Kostolany in Prievidza district [Central Slovakia] is a building in which chemical warfare agents are produced. The annual production is 5.9 kg sarin, 1.4 kg soman, 3 kg tabun, and 1.25 kg of another nerve-paralyzing agent, VX. They also produce 158.77 kg yperite and 1 kg lewisite annually. As these small quantities indicate, these agents are produced for research purposes. It is because of this research that, for example, the Czechoslovak soldiers in the Persian Gulf are currently equipped with effective antitoxins to be used in the event of a chemical attack. The important part of this is, however, that our Army openly gives information about the production. During the talks on the limitation of chemical warfare in Geneva several days ago, Czechoslovakia even submitted a list of all plants in which dangerous chemicals originate. Among the enterprises listed are Rubena Nachod (0.256 kg yperite), for instance, or Galena Opava (70 kg phosgene). Our country was the first to pass onto other states a precise list of all these factories and agreed to

verifying inspections. It is a good initiative step at the disarmament talks in Geneva, which contributes to our reputation in the world.

HUNGARY

Chief Delegate Views Progress at Vienna CFE Talks

LD1102230991 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 11 Feb 91

[Interview with Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Hungarian delegation to the CFE talks in Vienna, by Istvan Kulcsar; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Kulcsar] In what mood are the negotiations continuing now?

[Gyarmati] The first and most important problem, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here, is the general worsening of the political mood in connection with the Baltic republics. Unfortunately, at the conventional arms reductions discussions, this is further undermined by the fact that, of their declared military units, the Soviet Union has simply reclassified three as navy units, thus trying to remove them from the limitations of the treaty. We think that if this Soviet interpretation remains it will open the way for uncontrolled arming outside the treaty, which cannot be reconciled with the aims of the treaty. This is the greatest problem that is depressing the negotiators.

[Kulcsar] Let us suppose you succeed in settling the question of these three units and the interested parties ratify the Paris Treaty. The limitations of what type of armament is the subject of the negotiations that started today in Vienna?

[Gyarmati] If we succeed in resolving the problem in time and there is enough time left until the Helsinki follow-up meeting next March, then first of all we would like to consider the limitation of the number of personnel. Furthermore, we Hungarians would like it if steps are also considered toward limiting the offensive military structures as well, but this very much depends on when we can begin the negotiations in substance.

[Kulcsar] My last question concerns the possible timing. When do you hope to conclude the present stage of the negotiations? You just mentioned next year's Helsinki follow-up meeting. I imagine this represents some kind of deadline?

[Gyarmati] This is a deadline in two senses. In one sense, we have to account to the European Security Conference about what we have or have not done because many countries—among them Hungary in the foreground—think this present form of negotiations, in which the negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO members countries are separated from the all-European negotiations, cannot be retained longer than till next March.

Foreign Minister Addresses UN Disarmament Commission*LD2002204691 Budapest MTI in English
1041 GMT 20 Feb 91*

[Text] Geneva, February 20 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky addressed the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on Wednesday, the final day of his visit to Geneva.

Jeszenszky pointed out that the commission's programme adopted over a decade ago covered nearly all major issues relating to disarmament, including the ban on weapons of mass destruction. "Now the time has come for considering how to develop further the current working schedule in consideration of the prevailing realities in the world," he said, adding that the commission could not yet set to discussing certain points of the programme, while in other areas it had failed to achieve satisfactory progress.

One of the new realities the Hungarian foreign minister mentioned was the conclusion of the agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe. Implementation of the accord requires every signatory to fully observe all its provisions, such as the compulsory supply of information. Last year Hungary provided comprehensive information on the structure and main data of its armed forces, its military expenditures and disarmament measures. It would be desirable for all contracting parties to follow suit, Jeszenszky said.

The foreign minister pointed out the necessity of monitoring weapons deliveries, even if transacted in a completely law-abiding manner, because they might also pave the way for excessive armament.

"Not long ago, a weapons deal, apparently a routine one conducted by a Hungarian foreign trade company, had an adverse effect on our relations with a neighbouring country. The affair has made us realize that it is a special duty of the government to control trade in arms even amidst efforts at creating a market economy and liberalizing trade, and even if this is only a negligible part of our economic activity," Geza Jeszenszky said.

The Hungarian foreign minister proposed the commission should deal with the transfer of technology of ballistic missile production and work out a global international agreement in the field. It also pressed for finishing work on the agreement pertinent to the prohibition of chemical weapons and the annihilation of stocks. On this score, he agreed with the idea for the disarmament commission to meet at foreign ministerial level to prepare the international agreement on the ban of chemical weapons and settle pending issues.

"In 1989 Hungary declared its readiness to fully comply with the agreement under negotiation. In February last year, we provided detailed information on our chemical industry, in keeping with the draft agreement. We are convinced that our move will contribute to the success of

the talks, and would welcome similar confidence-building measures on the part of the other negotiating partners as well," Jeszenszky said.

The Hungarian foreign minister spoke in detail of the contract on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, and the Vienna arms control talks.

"Hungary has a special interest in the setting up of a new European security system based on co-operation, which will put an end to the division of our continent once and for all. We are convinced that the calm and stability of the European house largely depend on the successful continuation of talks on the reduction of conventional weapons," he said.

Following his contribution, Geza Jeszenszky held talks with M. Komatina, general secretary of the disarmament conference.

With regard to his three-day visit to the Geneva headquarters of the United Nations Organization, the Hungarian foreign minister told MTI's correspondent that his principal aim had been to speak at the Human Rights Commission. He said he had conveyed the invitation of the Hungarian Government to the participants in the 1993 world human rights conference, and the response was very favourable. "My visit to the UN specialized agencies was not merely a courtesy call, but we also discussed concrete issues. At the International Labour Organization, I reiterated our wish to give a home to one of the UN organizations in Budapest. We held talks with leading officials of the International Red Cross on the preparations for the next world Red Cross congress to be held in Budapest. My decision with the newly-appointed UN high commissioner for refugees, Mrs. Ogata, covered the Hungarian aspects of the refugee problem, and I had a very useful exchange of views with UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Martensen, an authority on human rights, to whom I presented an invitation for a visit to Budapest," Geza Jeszenszky said.

Spokesman Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal Progress*LD2202144191 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 22 Feb 91*

[Gabor Bankuti report on the extended spokesman's briefing following yesterday's government session; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Bankuti] Defense Ministry Spokesman Colonel Gyorgy Keleti said that yesterday the Soviet-Hungarian negotiations between experts on the financial questions of the Soviet withdrawal, carried out with Admiral Grishin, Soviet deputy minister for foreign economic relations, had been completed. The troop

withdrawals are progressing according to schedule: 72 percent of the soldiers and two-thirds of the military technology have already been pulled out.

The Soviet experts urged immediate payment for the real estate handed over so far and did not recognize Hungarian demands for compensation for damages. The Hungarian party, according to the original intergovernmental agreement, insists on the estimation of environmental damages and a single final settlement. We are trying to make sure this takes place by the end of the withdrawal.

Progress was made on establishing a Hungarian-Soviet joint committee which, involving local governments, will try to sell the one-time Soviet establishments that cannot be utilized by the state. We learned from Balazs Laszlo, government spokesman, that the experts will start talks already tomorrow in Budapest, in preparation for the ministerial conference dealing with the dissolution of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, scheduled to begin on Monday. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Soviet Consul Explains Troop Transit

LD2202220891 Warsaw PAP in English 1734 GMT
22 Feb 91

[Text] Szczecin, February 22—After a visit to Szczecin of the commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army, General Viktor Dubynin, Soviet Consul General Nikolai Panasyutin told journalists about the details of the evacuation of Soviet troops from the Szczecin Garrison and the transit of the troops stationed in Germany via Poland.

According to earlier information released by Dubynin, the Szczecin garrison will be evacuated by the end of August this year but the future location was not mentioned.

Speaking about the transit of Soviet troops from Germany, the consul general said that the transit could proceed by four railway routes, with the total of 11,000 trains, and two motorways, 3,000 columns made up of 200 vehicles each. The USSR is ready to pay dflrs. 16,000 for each train transport and dflrs. 280 for each car.

Poland has agreed to only one road transit route in the north of Poland from Kolbaskowo via Malbork to Kaliningrad.

Apart from this, the USSR would pay Poland dflrs. one billion for the reconstruction of roads, the consul said.

Request To Inspect Soviet Bases for CW Unanswered

LD2202224791 Warsaw PAP in English 1948 GMT
22 Feb 91

[Text] Warsaw, February 22—Until late afternoon today, there was no reaction on the part of the Soviet Foreign Ministry over Poland's protest in connection with the refusal by Viktor Dubynin, the commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army, to allow Polish experts inspect Soviet military bases for chemical weapons [CW], spokesman for Poland's Foreign Ministry Wladyslaw Klaczynski said.

Earlier, the Soviet Foreign Ministry conveyed to Poland a consent to hold such inspection to confirm that no chemical weapons are stationed on the territory of Poland. The inspection was to test in practice the provisions of the Geneva Convention banning chemical weapons which has been adopted by the majority of countries.

Soviet Rail Transport for Military Arrives

LD2702131891 Warsaw PAP in English 1134 GMT
27 Feb 91

[Text] Szczecin, February 27—A transit train with military equipment and Soviet soldiers from the territory of the former GDR arrived at the Polish railway border crossing in Kunowice, Gorzow Wielkopolski voivodship, on Tuesday.

The transport, equipped with all necessary documents, was directed to the Polish eastern border railway station of Terespol, Biala Podlaska voivodship.

Polish railway border crossings in the voivodships of Szczecin and Gorzow, especially Szczecin-Gumienice and Koszalin railway stations, are expected to handle the majority of Soviet transit military rail transports linked with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, after signing of appropriate Polish-Soviet agreements.

BRAZIL**Foreign Minister Says Regional CBW Treaty Nearly Ready**

PY1902181791 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 17 Feb 91 p 12

[From the Brasilia Office]

[Text] Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek has announced that Brazil and Argentina have almost finished drafting a treaty forbidding the production and use of chemical and

biological weapons [CBW]. He believes that Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile will "probably" also sign the treaty. "There is no reason to wait for a treaty to be drafted abroad because we know very well what we want," he said.

In the foreign minister's opinion, the treaty will be finished in the next few months. The decision to write this treaty is a result of the talks held among the Latin American countries that "have never before enjoyed better relations," he said. The pacifist attitude of the Latin American countries makes the transfer of high technology from the developed countries easier. [as published]

IRAN

Chairmanship of CW Security Group at Geneva CD Noted

LD2302193191 Tehran IRNA in English 1808 GMT
23 Feb 91

[Text] Tehran, February 23 (IRNA)—Iran has been elected as chairman of the security group of the special committee for chemicals at the Disarmament Conference for 1991. The special committee has been assigned the task to compile a report for banning production, expansion, stockpiling and application of chemical weapons [CW] and present it to the Disarmament Conference [CD] in Geneva. Of the three groups of the committee, Iran will chair the security group, Poland the monitoring group and Italy the legal and organizational group. The task of the security group is to urge countries possessing chemical weapons to join the convention, convince them to destroy their chemical arsenals and producing factories and guarantee their security during the process of destruction of chemical arms. The group should also study and make up for the shortcomings of international conventions against use of chemical arms particularly the 1925 Geneva protocol, in which some

countries have the right for chemical retaliation. The last topic is especially important, in view of Washington's announcement that in case of an Iraqi chemical attack against the invading forces it would retaliate in kind.

IRAQ

Biological Weapons Plant Said Under Construction

PM2202121791 London SA... 4L-AL 38 417
4L-DL 38 4LJ1 in Arabic 19 Feb 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "It Is Said"]

[Text] It is said that four experts from the South Korean "Sangyong" company are supervising the construction of secret buildings in the orchards [basatin] of Jachdat al-Shatt village, on the Tigris between Baghdad and al-Khalis, suitable for use as a plant for producing biological weapons. It is also said that the only plant for producing that weapon, located in the Salman Park area east of the capital, has been completely destroyed and what is left of it moved to a building in Baiqubah.

GENERAL

Arbatov Writings on USSR Arms Spending Hit

91JF04924 Moscow SODIETSK 43 4 ROSSII 4 10
Russian T3 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Captain First Rank Anatoliy Andreyev: "The Use of 'Public' Protests Against the Army or the Think Tank [Director's Restructuring Hobby]"]

[Text] While on an official overseas trip to Canada, G. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute (ISKAN), had published in the newspaper OTTAWA CITIZEN (the issue for 13 December 1990) an article entitled "Obsolete Soviet Military Power Is Dangerously Draining the Economy." From the text it would seem that it dealt with the economy of the Soviet Union, but in spirit—take a broader look, reader. The venerable man of learning is well versed in the art of hints and half-tones. His wealth of experience accumulated at different times under different policies is reflected. We see him today in the ranks of those who constitute the "intellectual power" of the Russian leadership. But in recent times he shone among the retinue of the party and state elite, moved in a "narrow circle of particular persons," so to speak, and did a great deal of advising. A strict watch was kept over there on what he had to say in general. And none of it would have mattered had it not been for the excessive conceit and immodesty of the author of the above-mentioned publication in the Canadian press. Soviet people will undoubtedly familiarize themselves with this article on G. Arbatov's sooner or later. The trouble is, frankly, that foreign publications take so long to reach us! It makes sense, I believe, to keep those who are interested abreast of events.

G. Arbatov maintains that, thanks to his speech in the USSR Supreme Soviet a year ago proposing deeper cuts in the Soviet Union's military spending and the subsequent debate, Soviet citizens learned many things for the first time. I quote: "...Soviet people finally understood that it is we (the USSR—A.A.) who have superiority in the majority of types of conventional arms and a perfectly obvious superiority in strategic weapons." Further: "The Soviet public also learned for the first time that the Soviet Union's defensive doctrine is not necessarily correlated with the numbers and deployment of our armed forces." Continuing these at times categorical, at times nebulous premises, G. Arbatov extracts a sigh of relief from the Western reader with the confidential: "I do not wish to say that we intended or now intend to perpetrate aggression" and goes on to calm his soul: "I have not seen any reason why anyone would want to attack and conquer us."

After these "revelations," G. Arbatov draws the sacramental conclusion: "I never saw this clearly until I began to publicly oppose excessive military spending."

Academician G. Arbatov has chosen as his main scientific method getting at the truth by way of pronouncements in the foreign and Soviet press. It is immaterial that both the formulation of the problem and the attempts to participate in its solution imply a command of the subject and reliable source information, the appropriate methodology, competence and, finally, ethics. It is hard to find many of these elements in the hypothetical one-sided overcounting of G. Arbatov on such a complex issue as the military spending of a great power.

Unfortunately, certain military comrades have found themselves pulled into the debate with G. Arbatov. Each speech of G. Arbatov, in which he wittingly or unwittingly makes essentially unsubstantiated attacks on the Soviet Armed Forces, is necessarily followed by a response, most often from Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, former chief of the General Staff and now military adviser to the president of the USSR. It is necessary, of course, in the name of the "truth to set right, explain, bring to the notice of..." But it seems that G. Arbatov has long been astride his "favorite steed" and that for him this confrontation has become a mode of self-assertion and constant reminders of himself. The Arbatov-military slanging match is assuming a chronic nature.

It would seem to me and my service colleagues expedient to terminate the altercation with this academician. If he cares about the interests of the cause, not about the number of publications, G. Arbatov could defend his views in committees of the Supreme Soviet and the government and in the Ministry of Defense. Neither glasnost nor democracy have anything in common with groundless attacks on the Army. For my military comrades, on the other hand, the newspaper and journal duel with G. Arbatov cannot be deemed a successful application of defensive strategy.

Indeed, is it not a great honor—such constant attention to a doctor of historical sciences who has manifestly taken up what is not his field? Does anyone seriously believe it possible to solve many of our country's problems, economic primarily, at the expense of the security of the people and the state? The Armed Forces are a mold of society. Society's ills make a mark on the Army which is aggravated by the specific "ailments" of the latter. Much needs to be cured both in society and in the Army, cured by criticism, not carping, and, what is most important, specific action.

And, further, G. Arbatov is not alone, unfortunately, in his attacks on the Army. As a result of the vogue, inconceivable in civilized countries, for censuring the Armed Forces in one's own fatherland, a whole clan of abusers has formed. Some kind of "Army criticism specialists" and home-grown military reformers, who have imagined themselves adequately prepared for solving most complex questions of military organizational development. They are not probing but worming their way into military affairs and proposing, pointing out, advising, and demanding, but not ordering (yet!).

thank God. We remember that there were times in our country in which there was the same abundance of agricultural specialists.

When one frequently encounters sweeping attacks on the Army and Navy, one has the impression that the illusion that "any cook could run the state" has been insufficiently debunked. It is a pity, incidentally, that our "conservative" press (according to G. Arbatov's classification, that which publishes the speeches of his opponents, like the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, for example) and the "most popular" publications (according to Arbatov) of the OGONEK type (which kindly and without restrictions makes its pages available for the compositions of G. Arbatov himself) rarely find room for a dialogue with ordinary people. But in letters to the leaders of the Union and the command of the USSR Armed Forces these citizens are demanding a halt to the disintegration of the Army and the attacks on it and demanding a high level of professionalism, fighting capability, and combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

Finally, I suggest an end to the correspondence with G. Arbatov for the reason that it is inspiring the academician to newer and newer works against the Army. Elements of self-publicity and disinformation are encountered in this stream of information being hurled at the readers. Sometimes G. Arbatov will attribute to himself credit for having torn down the "veil of secrecy" around the Soviet military-industrial complex in having initiated open discussion of questions of the USSR's military doctrine, military strategy, and military spending. Sometimes he will impose the Christian formula of a positive influence on one's opponents by the example of unilateral disarmament....

Soviet Academician G. Arbatov has resorted to the role of enlightener of the Soviet people, addressing it from the pages of the Western press in English with explanations on military issues. For the formulation of questions and the submittal of proposals it would have been logical to have expected G. Arbatov to have availed himself of the platform of the Soviet parliament and other mechanisms of the legislature and executive of his own country, as is done by other people's deputies. This would have been comprehensible to and would only have been welcomed by the Armed Forces. Our Army and its officer corps are no less interested than G. Arbatov in the speediest extrication of the country from the crisis and realization of the principle of a reasonable sufficiency for defense. But the academician prefers other methods.

In the majority of his publications on military problems G. Arbatov employs Western data on the Soviet Armed Forces. The absurdity of such a method is obvious. The result is criticism of our Army in a foreign voice, but with the signature of a Soviet scholar. The West has always been distinguished by the artificial spurring of the so-called "Soviet military threat," proportionate to which there has been a growth in its military spending and on the pretext of which it has not as of this time abandoned major programs of the qualitative modernization of its arms.

The institute which G. Arbatov heads is frequently called in the West a "leading Soviet brains trust" (literally, "think tank"). Perhaps it is this "tank" which inspires the scholar—historian, political scientist, economist—to speeches on military matters, on which he cannot, even stretching the point, be considered a competent specialist. It is risky to associate the institute director wholly with the research institution itself, but G. Arbatov is published not as a private individual and not as a people's deputy of the USSR even but as director of the ISKAN. For this reason I have a desire at times to call G. Arbatov the director of the "American-Canadian Institute Incorporated" in the Soviet Union.

G. Arbatov's above-mentioned article in a Canadian newspaper presents a table on the numbers of arms of the Soviet Army and Navy and on the military spending of the Soviet Union (without reference to the source). If we take G. Arbatov's article at face value, we get the wrong impression of the "significant military superiority" of the USSR. Upon examination, it transpired that the table was filled mainly with figures taken from "The Military Balance, 1989-1990" (a publication of the London International Strategic Studies Institute).

"The Military Balance" appeared practically simultaneously with the publication in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (No. 288 of 16 December 1989) of a report of the USSR Defense Ministry which presents spending on defense in 1990 in general and by item, the numbers of the Armed Forces and the number of strategic nuclear weapons and the main types of conventional arms of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Both publications contain coincidences and differences in style, for which there are perfectly understandable reasons. It should be noted that, as distinct from the table in "The Military Balance" article, G. Arbatov provides more detailed and balanced information in respect of the list of arms. True, given the rounding up of individual components into a whole and into summary estimates, shape and color are confused, and apples and oranges are mixed together.

G. Arbatov prefers to avail himself not of the official data of the USSR Defense Ministry but of other sources. Although he had recently been complaining about the concealment of information on military matters from the people's deputies. See what the result of this is.

According to the report of the USSR Defense Ministry and in accordance with "The Military Balance," the Soviet Union's total military spending in 1990 constituted approximately 70 billion rubles, according to Arbatov, 138 billion dollars. Is there a difference, if we do not confine ourselves to the conversion of rubles into dollars at the official USSR State Planning Committee rate aimed at simpletons? I will show the present ruble situation by way of an example. To perform its assigned

functions it is essential that a subunit of the General Staff (the "Army brain") purchase 20 new-generation computers. The order was given to industry. However, budget appropriations under the heading of purchases of this type of equipment have been halved as a consequence of the reduction in defense spending, and the manufacturing enterprise has raised the prices of each such product threefold and does not guarantee delivery times. Instead of 20 new-type computers, the General Staff may acquire only three machines. The urgent need for the modernization of a crucial component of the safeguarding of the state's security is in danger of falling through. A mass of such examples could be cited. For what kind of economies is G. Arbatov campaigning? Who needs this and why?

The elementary decency of a citizen of one's country and of a scholar well provided for by this country presupposes that one would, if embarking on so crucial an issue, be punctilious to a degree and take account of the phenomenon's development trends. And the trends of the USSR's defense spending are diminishing. Compared with the preceding year, in 1990 this spending declined by more than R6 billion (8.2 percent). It is contemplated reducing the country's military budget in 1991 by R5-R7 billion (in real terms) (from the speech of the president of the USSR at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 27 December 1990). A boundless (according to Arbatov) reduction in Defense Ministry appropriations would not only complicate military organizational development based on the priority of qualitative parameters but would also hit painfully at the personnel. "Perhaps the Army should be disbanded altogether?" USSR President M.S. Gorbachev asked rhetorically at the congress. It seemed to me that this question was addressed primarily to G. Arbatov and his supporters.

Reading G. Arbatov's opus in the Canadian newspaper, I wanted to shout out: Don't believe it! The USSR's strategic bombers are not 630 but only 162, 97 aircraft of which are long-range cruise missile carriers (compared with 589 and 289 American bombers respectively). Whoever is interested in the real indicators of the correlation of forces, kindly take a look at the article by V.V. Korobushin, doctor of military sciences, in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 9 January of this year. The highly qualified specialist in military affairs and honest individual shows convincingly that the oceans are not churning from the propellers of Soviet submarines and that armadas of our bombers are not covering the skies.

Other factors need to be seen behind the figures of the military balance also. A reduction in strategic and conventional arms is predetermined by agreements which are being drawn up and which have been reached between the USSR and the United States and the USSR and NATO. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact military organization has left the Soviet Union in the singular in the current balance of forces with Western countries. Behind the arithmetical correlation of forces and the quantities of arms we need to see and correctly

evaluate the particular features of the military-geographic and military-strategic situation of the sides and other qualitative differences.

The USSR is the world's biggest continental power. There were until recently many who wished to test its strength, mainly in continental military theaters. Whence the Soviet ground forces and their arms, which have traditionally been developed on a priority basis. In the sea theaters our Navy's operations are fettered by numerous antisubmarine barriers and narrows controlled by the U.S. Navy and the NATO Joint Naval Forces and their superior ship groupings. Our strategic aviation lacks forward air bases on foreign territory and does not have the fleet of heavy strategic bombers and tankers necessary for offensive operations.

It is in vain that G. Arbatov attributes to himself the pioneer's laurels. The Soviet defensive military doctrine was made public and the principle of a reasonable sufficiency for defense was advanced long before his speech in the Supreme Soviet. Military doctrine, as the system officially adopted in a given state of scientifically substantiated views on the nature of possible wars of the contemporary era and the forms and methods of fighting them and also on the preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for such wars, may be amplified and formulated even more specifically in a compressed timeframe, as was the case in 1987. The more so in that serious reworking was not required. Soviet military doctrine has always been defensive in nature. Restructuring individual components of the military organism with its human and material resources just as promptly is simply inconceivable. Everything has its own timeframe and its own conditions and, once again, enormous expenditure. It is easy to criticize this and to try to be clever with unbalanced proposals.

I somehow cannot call to mind an occasion when G. Arbatov or his institute proposed any version, not an optimum one even, of the solution of the socioeconomic and other problems arising upon reductions in the Armed Forces. If only they were to share the American experience.

Defensive doctrine does not in itself serve as a panacea for all threats and dangers. Defensive doctrine complicates and in certain periods of time increases the costs of military organizational development. This might be incomprehensible merely to the schoolboy, perhaps. Military science, incidentally, has in all countries long known that any adjustments to doctrine require a restructuring of many components of the military mechanism; the real and potential threats and dangers have to be taken into consideration to the maximum extent in strategic planning. The criterion of the maximum possible danger is the sole dependable criterion for an approximation of all surprises and uncertainties and the timely preparation of the country and the Army for warding off aggression. The immediate threat of war is, to all appearances, becoming a thing of the past. But the danger of aggression and the unleashing of a war by individual states and the involvement in it of other countries persists. There is no alternative to the new political

thinking. But history teaches vigilance. The events in the Persian Gulf have taught an entirely fresh lesson.

It makes no sense going on, these are axioms of warfare. Were Academician G. Arbatov to scientifically prove the size of the military budget sufficient for the USSR, find and substantiate potential for a reduction in military spending, and advocate the elimination of obsolete arms, he would surely be paid close heed in the Army. Unspecific and unsubstantiated proposals and the indiscriminate criticism of his sympathizers in general are not allowed in the military milieu. Officers of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and of all components of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have drained in full the entire bitterness of the service difficulties and day-to-day disarray ensuing from the shortage of funds. With interest. We are individually and all together opposed to a return to the times of "cold" and "hot" war. But we are first and foremost for a situation in which we do not have to feel sorry for the state. For a strong, prosperous, independent, and peaceable state, but one that is also capable of standing up for itself, if necessary.

P.S. In the event of publication, the author asks that his fee be given to the Afghan Veterans Assistance Fund.

General Denies Arms Pact 'Backtracking' Charges

PM1902131191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Bronislav Aleksandrovich Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by observer Colonel M. Ponomarev; place and date not given: "We Are Following an Honest and Principled Line;" First Deputy Chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer's Questions"]

[Text] [Ponomarev] May I quote you something from THE NEW YORK TIMES, Bronislav Aleksandrovich? The other day this newspaper wrote: "The widely welcomed agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, which was triumphantly signed by 22 countries in Paris in November, is in jeopardy. The strategic arms talks continue to be bogged down in technical disputes." It is clear from the context of the entire article that the blame for this is being pinned on the USSR. What can you say on this score?

[Omelichev] I am familiar with this and many other, far more scathing reports which shamelessly distort our policy in the arms limitation sphere. They often contain accusations against the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, which, they allege, is backtracking on decisions made at the political level and enshrined in international treaties and agreements, throwing a wrench in the works of the ongoing talks, and slowing those talks down in every possible way. Unfortunately, fabrications of this sort can be found today not only in the Western media but even in certain publications issued in our country.

The aim of the authors of such articles is quite transparent. They are striving to undermine faith in the possibility of Western cooperation with the Soviet Union on strengthening security. They are trying to drive a wedge into the Soviet political and military leadership and to damage the USSR's state and national interests. Nor is it hard to guess the design of our homegrown experts in abuse who entertain their own political ambitions under the principle of "the worse, the better."

I can state the following quite categorically. The Armed Forces and their leaders have no interest other than the people's interests. These are reflected in the policy of the country's state leadership. This has been shown by our entire history. We are following an honest and principled line. It is aimed at averting the threat of war. And a major role is played in this by international treaties on arms limitation and reduction.

[Ponomarev] Nonetheless, there is quite widespread doubt about this, Bronislav Aleksandrovich. Let's look at the CFE Treaty. You can often hear it said that we are hiding from our partners a huge quantity of weapons that should be covered by it—more than 20,000 tanks, many thousands of armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, and so forth. At the same time, we are being accused of illegally building up our marine force. Yet there are voices of another kind—claiming that fulfillment of the treaty conditions will leave us virtually unarmed whereas the NATO countries' armed forces will not be affected by the cuts.

[Omelichev] Yes, we have been inundated with various accusations against us. It is striking that the question of the Soviet side's concealment of arms is sometimes raised by Western officials who are quite well-informed about the real state of affairs, rather than just irresponsible politickers and press organs. Let's look at the figures. They will paint an objective picture.

A particular fuss has been made about tanks. In mid-November last year we had around 21,000 of them in the European part of the country. Three years after the agreement signed in Paris comes into force it is planned to have 13,150 of them here. Consequently, around 7,500 tanks will have to be cut—and it is planned to convert 750 of them to civil use, while the rest will simply be destroyed.

This seems clear. But we are faced with the following question: The Soviet Union once announced that it had 41,500 tanks in Europe at 1 July 1988. Where have they gone? That is no secret. Under the unilateral armed forces reduction, the transfer of forces to the defensive structure, and the withdrawal of troops from the East European countries, almost 21,000 tanks were withdrawn from service in the European part of the USSR during this period. Of these, 8,000 were sent to the Asian part of the country to reequip and upgrade supplies [doobespecheniye] to the troops, 8,400 were sited at

storage bases in Western Siberia and Central Asia, and 4,100 tanks have been written off (broken up for scrap or reequipped). All this was done before the signing of the CFE Treaty, and the other countries' representatives knew this. For instance, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker was briefed by the Soviet foreign minister in September and October last year. In other words, the United States and its allies knew that the transfer of tanks (and other kinds of arms) beyond the Urals had been implemented outside of the treaty framework, and we were not bound by any treaty obligations in this area.

I will not cite any other figures. I will merely stress that the picture is the same as regards armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, warplanes, and attack helicopters. We were not bound by any treaty obligations regarding these kinds of arms, and therefore we could not break any obligations.

Nor can we accept as justified the claims that the "buildup in Soviet marines" bypasses the treaty. In actual fact there has been no such buildup. Admittedly, the USSR took measures to ensure more reliable protection for its sea lanes in view of the considerable advantage held by the United States and NATO in strike and mobile naval systems. These measures began to be implemented back in 1987. As a result, three divisions of the Ground Forces were reassigned to the Navy as coastal defense (not marine) divisions. They, like all naval forces—and by no means through our doing—were not covered by the Vienna talks and therefore cannot be viewed within the framework of the Paris Treaty.

Finally, there are fears that we will allegedly be left unarmed. This is not so. The USSR is entitled after implementation of the treaty to have 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,175 artillery systems, 5,150 warplanes, and 1,500 attack helicopters in Europe. This represents approximately one-third of all such armaments which all participants under the treaty are permitted to hold in Europe. I believe that this accords with the principle of defense sufficiency, although of course we are facing considerable difficulties, particularly given our troop withdrawal from East Europe and the virtual collapse of the Warsaw Pact's military structure.

Major reductions are to be carried out by some of the NATO countries as well. Take Germany, for instance. It will have to cut almost 3,000 of its 7,100 tanks, more than 6,000 of its 9,600 armored combat vehicles, almost 2,000 of its 4,600 artillery pieces, more than 150 of its 1,100 warplanes, and 50 of its 350 helicopters (I am giving these numbers in round figures).

Of course, the fears of a considerable number of Soviet people—and I know that there are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers among them—are understandable. Memories of the last war still haunt our hearts today. But familiarity with the real state of affairs makes it possible to ease those fears.

[Ponomarev] Can we consequently state that the difficulties on the way to ratification of the CFE Treaty are imaginary and that the heated feelings about it are being whipped up by the West on purpose?

[Omelychev] Quite so. It is to somebody's advantage. I can even say whose—those who have no interest in genuine arms cuts and would like to revive the Cold War (and all it entails) against the USSR. Hence the attempts to link ratification of the CFE Treaty with the preparation of an agreement on strategic offensive arms.

[Ponomarev] This is another question which needs elucidation too. Let's look at it.

[Omelychev] Let's. The strategic offensive arms talks have been under way for almost six years and are now in the home stretch. Virtually all fundamental questions have already been resolved. I would recall that it is planned to reduce the strategic offensive forces of each side—the USSR and the United States—to 1,600 launch vehicles and 6,000 nuclear weapons by early 1998. It has also been determined how many of which kinds of launch vehicles each side will have, and complex questions relating to long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been resolved, as have other issues.

Today there are grounds for stating that all major political problems have been resolved, including such fundamental questions as the relationship between strategic offensive arms cuts and observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. We have informed the Americans that the Soviet Union will make a unilateral statement that if one side violates or exceeds the ABM Treaty, the other side will consider its supreme interests threatened and will be able to exercise its right to withdraw from the strategic offensive arms treaty. For its part, the United States is prepared to state that it only has experience of cooperating with Britain in the sphere of arms covered by the treaty's restrictions. Currently this experience includes deliveries to Britain of Trident-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, precluding their transfer to third countries.

However, even today there are unresolved issues. We call them technical, because no special political solutions are needed in this area. But they are important and complex in themselves. I am referring, for instance, to the need to include in the treaty a definition of just what a "new type" of ballistic missile is. Agreement has still not been reached on the elements of this definition. Nor is there any definitive agreement about which mobile ICBM production facilities should be constantly monitored or how to secure access to telemetry information from ballistic missiles—both existing types and new types.

I will not go into the details, they are highly specialized. A few days ago Deputy Foreign Minister A. Obukhov and a group of specialists, including some from the Defense Ministry, left for Geneva, where the talks are under way. U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew has also arrived there with a group of experts. Their aim is to find a mutually acceptable compromise.

There is reason to believe that the work is proceeding constructively and could be completed in February. There has never been an agreement which envisaged such a major reduction—by 35 percent—in the most dangerous arms and such a comprehensive verification system.

[Ponomarev] So it turns out, Bronislav Aleksandrovich, that, in the article cited at the start of our conversation, THE NEW YORK TIMES was depicting things in the worst possible light. But this is not an isolated incident. Evans and Novak, THE WASHINGTON POST writers who unceremoniously slandered our General Staff and its attitude to disarmament problems, as well as J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador in Moscow (who was forced to indignantly refute their fabrications), were recently found out. But, you know, the slanderers have not calmed down, they have not learned their lesson. After this they wrote a new article accusing the Soviet General Staff of supplying SS-12 missiles to Iraq and of transferring—allegedly to circumvent the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—SS-23 missiles to a number of East European countries.

[Omelychev] It is not just Evans and Novak in THE WASHINGTON POST but certain other Western newspapers—the London TIMES, for instance—that have been excelling themselves with these fabrications. They are all lies.

As for SS-12 missiles (we call them OTR-22's), I can state hand on heart that the Soviet Union has never supplied these missiles to anyone—either before or after the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. All these are fabrications on the part of people who would like to present Soviet policy in a false light in connection with the war in the Gulf.

Incidentally, I would like to note that fabrications of this sort have been refuted by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker too. In a recent interview with CBS the secretary of state said that he had no information about the USSR's allegedly shipping arms to Iraq. "This information is based not only on what they tell us," J. Baker continued, "but also on what we know and on what, in our opinion, are accurate information and accurate assessments."

As for the SS-23's—we call them OTR-23's—they are dual-purpose complexes. That is, they can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads. Indeed, 24 of these missiles were given to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—long before the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. But they have never had and do not have nuclear warheads. The missiles were transferred completely to those countries and are beyond our control. Otherwise, the 24 OTR-23 missiles and four launch vehicles sited in the GDR would never have fallen into Bonn's hands, as actually happened.

I would note in passing that some people—even in our country—are trying to claim that the General Staff shipped these OTR-23 missiles without authorization

and that the Foreign Ministry knew nothing about it. They quote one of E. Shevardnadze's statements. In actual fact, of course, he did know about it. Corresponding documents exist bearing his signature.

In general it should be stated quite definitely—and this will round off our conversation—that the Defense Ministry and the General Staff do not independently make any decision on any question of arms limitation talks or weapons shipments. They do so only in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry and other interested departments. The Soviet Union has set up an interdepartmental organ to smooth the negotiating process, and all decisions are discussed and elaborated in collegial fashion—although, to be truthful, it should be noted that this often happens after stormy and protracted debate. The most important decisions are submitted for examination by the country's top leadership.

There is no substance to any other suggestions, just as there is no substance to all the insinuations about arms limitation problems and observance of the corresponding treaties, which we have discussed today in such detail.

Moiseyev Interviewed on Current Issues

PM2502153391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by correspondent Major Yu. Rubtsov; place and date not given: "Unified Armed Forces For a Unified State"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Rubtsov] Military reform. It affects hundreds of thousands of servicemen, members of their families, defense industry personnel, and pre-draft young people. At what stage, Comrade Army General, is the reform today? What are the General Staff's immediate tasks in this connection?

[Moiseyev] Military reform does not constitute some kind of one-shot act. The intention is to implement it in several stages. People are now writing and talking about it in a fairly detailed manner. To try to sum up some results, a considerable amount has been done since 1987 when our country adopted a new defensive doctrine, including the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the unilateral reduction of 500,000 members of our Armed Forces, the conclusion and implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and our troops' withdrawal from East Europe and Mongolia.

Now within the framework of military reform the General Staff has to resolve complex tasks in terms of clarifying the composition and setting up a fundamentally new defensive grouping of troops within the USSR's borders, giving the Armed Forces a new complexion, and boosting the combat and mobilization readiness of troops, staffs, and control organs. In short, a whole range of questions linked with withdrawing our troops from

East Europe, providing them with amenities and accommodation, fulfilling our Paris Treaty commitments, and resolving social questions.

A wide range of problems are linked with the formulation of proposals relating to the talks currently under way in Geneva and Vienna. This involves painstaking, responsible work. We must display tremendous persistence and initiative in upholding our interests at all levels. A statesmanlike approach, knowledge of legal questions, and consideration of the country's security interests are absolutely essential here. [passage omitted]

START TALKS

Bessmertnykh Expects START Completion in Weeks

PM2002105391 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 3

[TASS and IAN roundup report: "Treaty Will Be Signed"]

[Text] 19 February—The Soviet Union reckons that the preparation of the treaty on USSR and U.S. strategic offensive arms will be completed in the next few weeks. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR foreign minister, told an IAN correspondent.

He rebutted media reports claiming that the disarmament process may grind to a halt, specifically because of problems which have arisen during the exchange of information on conventional arms in Europe.

Obukhov: U.S. 'Inconsistency' Hampers START

PM2602221591 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 6

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Obukhov by unidentified PRAVDA correspondent; date and place not given: "February Round; Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty: Consultations Under Way"]

[Text] As already reported in PRAVDA, in mid-February USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Obukhov visited Geneva, where he held consultations with U.S. representatives on questions of preparing the strategic offensive arms treaty. In our 7 February edition A.A. Obukhov described the aims of his visit. Today he answers a PRAVDA correspondent's questions about the results of the February round of consultations.

[PRAVDA] What is your opinion of the results of the consultations with U.S. representatives?

[Obukhov] We had an extremely full exchange of opinions. A serious attempt was made to "close" all remaining questions relating to the preparation of the strategic offensive arms treaty. The participants in the consultations succeeded in making progress in some areas. Unfortunately, however, the main task—totally

getting rid of the disagreements and opening the way to officially typing up a draft strategic offensive arms treaty agreed in every detail—still remains unfulfilled.

[PRAVDA] What is the reason for this state of affairs at the talks?

[Obukhov] In my view, the main thing now is to fully implement the well known "Houston accords." The drafts that have been prepared embody a large proportion of the package agreed by the USSR and U.S. foreign ministers last December in Houston. But not the whole "package," nonetheless. Our U.S. partners' inconsistency is taking its toll here. What is more, they put forward a number of new, complex approaches at the last minute, during the final lap of the talks. This does not help maintain the high pace of discussions that is so necessary now.

It must be clear: There is no doubt regarding all the most important fundamental questions relating to the future treaty. They have been resolved. But a number of remaining essential details with respect to verification of aviation, counting missile warheads, verification of throw-weight, etc. need to be settled.

[PRAVDA] Reports have appeared in the Western press blaming the Soviet side for the holdups at the talks. There have been hints that this is the result of military circles' increasing influence on our foreign policy. How fair are these reproaches?

[Obukhov] These arguments are unfounded. The line pursued by the Soviet Union and our president is open and definite. The USSR is resolutely in favor of a strategic offensive arms treaty that would be of invaluable significance for strengthening international security and trust and for further weakening the threat of nuclear war. In its practical work the USSR Foreign Ministry firmly proceeds from these principled directives by our leadership and works vigorously to implement them.

As for our military department's involvement in formulating positions and directly in the negotiating process itself, this is a quite normal process. Vitally important military-political problems are being resolved at the talks and we cannot do without the involvement of the relevant specialists here.

For more than 20 years I have in one way or another been involved in talks with the United States on nuclear issues. Throughout this period I have maintained productive and businesslike contacts with the military. I think that military representatives also derive some benefit from their contacts with diplomats.

Are there disputes when preparing our positions? Of course. But disputes cannot be avoided, even among diplomats themselves. The truth emerges from debate.

I would say more: Discussions—comprehensive and profound discussions, moreover—are necessary, since

we are talking about questions that determine the strategic balance. A mistake may undermine the stability that we are trying to strengthen.

Interdepartmental coordination of a unified position based on the political leadership's directives and on science is, in my view, an immutable law of the talks. Departmental equality is clearly maintained in this. As a result of this coordination—which is subject to the leadership's approval—our position at the talks expresses the USSR's statewide interest in the sphere in question in light of a whole range of factors—economic, military, political, social, etc. I think that this is a¹ how people in the United States approach this question.

[PRAVDA] Our press often talks now about excessive concessions to the U.S. side at the talks. Is that a correct assessment?

[Obukhov] Concessions cannot be avoided at talks. Any agreement represents a compromise. But for an agreement to be equitable, the concessions must be mutual and reciprocal. That is what happens in real life. Things must be judged on the end result—the specific substance of the agreement. Now no one can impose unequitable agreements on one another. This is guaranteed by the involvement in the talks of large collectives of people and various departments vested with proper responsibility. The sides' legislative organs also keep an attentive eye on the negotiating process itself.

[PRAVDA] Is a fresh round of consultations with the United States on strategic offensive arms questions expected? After all, time is pressing.

[Obukhov] Indeed, time is short.

Our minister, A.A. Bessmertnykh, agreed in January with the U.S. leadership to complete work on the treaty within a few weeks. We want to keep to this deadline. This week we are going to Geneva again to "attack"—for the last time, I hope—the remaining problems with the delegations. We will expect reciprocal constructiveness from our partners. The good chance—of completing in a very short time work on a treaty on which several years have now been spent—must not be lost.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

USSR Possesses ABM Defense 'Similar' to Patriot

PM2802123791 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Reader's letter and response from Air Defense Forces Antiaircraft Missile Troops staff published under the "From Competent Sources" rubric: "The USSR Has Similar Missiles"]

[Text] U.S. troops are successfully bringing down Iraqi missiles with their "Patriot" missiles. Do our Air Defense Forces have systems of this kind?

V. Ivanov, Donetsk

According to available information, roughly 50 Iraqi missiles have been fired against Israel and at least 14 have been brought down by the "Patriot" antimissile missiles. The relatively high effectiveness of this complex is achieved by combining such elements as phased array radar, an automated control system with a high-speed computer that receives information about missile launches and computes their probable flight paths, and missiles with a semi-active homing head.

The USSR Armed Forces also have similar air defense systems.

This answer was obtained from the Air Defense Forces Antiaircraft Missile Troops staff.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Chervov Interviewed on CFE Treaty

PM2702211391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English (undated)

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, "aide to the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces," by Yuriy Lebedev; date, place not given: "Nikolay Chervov on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, aide to the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, talks to Novosti's Yuriy Lebedev about the influence of the Treaty on international security.

[Lebedev] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is being actively discussed and analysed in connection with its forthcoming ratification. What do Soviet experts think of it?

[Chervov] Most Soviet experts agree that the Treaty takes into account mutual interests and is based on reasonable compromises and the principle of equal security of the sides. I think this is indeed so.

But there are some critical remarks. It is argued, for example, that more Soviet armaments will be reduced, that our security will be damaged, and that the destruction of military hardware will call for major allocations.

[Lebedev] What do Western experts think about it?

[Chervov] They admit that NATO countries will gain more from the Treaty. They mention the fact that the Soviet Union will reduce more armaments and speak about the demise of the Soviet military threat. The unprecedented scope of inspection will enable the West to read the Soviet armed forces as an open book.

Western diplomacy is said to have won the following victories: the aggregate ceilings include paramilitary formations (troops of the Ministry of the Interior, the KGB and the DOSAAF voluntary society of assistance to the army, the air force and the navy), the limitation of shore-based naval aviation (less carrier-based aviation) and the possibility for NATO to increase the number of their aircraft in order to attain the ceiling of 6,800 combat aircraft established by the Treaty.

[Lebedev] Do you agree?

[Chervov] Indeed, we shall reduce more armaments than the West because we have more tanks, aircraft, artillery systems and armoured fighting vehicles. It is true that the scope of verification of compliance with the Treaty will be unprecedented—but equally so for either side. Thus, we shall accept one inspection daily. After the reductions are carried out, NATO will have 1.5 times more ground forces.

Some Soviet military experts argue that "proceeding from our military doctrine" this "does not contradict the criterion of minimum defence sufficiency." Such statements are highly dubitable, because the scientific criteria of minimum sufficiency have not been elaborated yet. It would be more correct to assume that the ceilings established by the Treaty for the Soviet Union, coupled with our powerful nuclear capabilities, will suffice to guarantee the fulfilment of defensive tasks in any conditions.

[Lebedev] Why did we agree to sign a Treaty that puts so much stress on us?

[Chervov] This Treaty is fully in line with the Soviet-approved strategy of liberating Europe from the mountains of weapons, dismantling fences erected by the Cold War and creating a new system of European security. The main task is to get rid of a part of the military burden which is weighing down on us, to help the country overcome the economic crisis and to guarantee normal living standards for the people.

[Lebedev] Will we attain these goals?

[Chervov] I think so. Specialists say that the economic and social consequences of the Treaty will be very favourable.

Of course, we shall not see them tomorrow. At the initial period we shall have to allocate much money to the elimination of weapons and on inspections. Disarmament costs money, too. But the end economic effect will be fantastic.

As for security, it will be strengthened through the mutual lessening of military capabilities of the sides, the elimination of the risk of a surprise attack, and the elimination of possibilities for waging large-scale offensive operations.

In a few years the military map of Europe—the number of troops, their composition, deployment, the creation of groups and the intensity of combat training—will change beyond recognition.

In these new conditions, especially after the Paris summit which passed the Charter for a New Europe and the Joint Declaration of 22 on non-aggression, security on the continent will grow stronger and our interests will not be damaged. The ratification and realisation of this Treaty is in everybody's interests.

[Lebedev] What should be done to maintain stability in Europe in the future?

[Chervov] We should keep in mind at least two conditions.

First, the disarmament process must go on, spreading to naval forces and tactical nuclear weapons.

Second, we must take practical action to materialise the decisions of the London Declaration of the NATO Council that concern the transformation of NATO and a review of its military doctrine and strategy. Since the West has agreed that the Cold War is over and there are no military adversaries in Europe, the military organisation of NATO appears as a destabilising factor of asymmetry.

[Lebedev] What should be done now that the armed forces are being reduced in order to keep up national defences?

[Chervov] We must do a great deal of work concerned with the military reform in order to keep the army and the navy at the level necessary to repel an aggression.

In particular, we should review our defensive capabilities within national borders, improve the quality of our armed forces by eliminating obsolete weapons and hardware, eliminate overlapping structures and elements in the command quarters, widely introduce computer systems, and improve the quality of combat training.

All this should be done in conditions of the maximum possible savings of resources.

Europe Institute Researcher Views CFE Treaty

*PM2702105191 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English Jan 91 pp 3-5*

[Article by USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute researcher Aleksandr Blinnikov: "Epilogue to the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] The Paris summit, which became a landmark event, was hardly noticed by the Soviet people. This serves to show that, contrary to expectations, the Soviet people, burdened by acute domestic problems, are still alienated from European processes.

Yet the agreement was a highly important achievement, if only because it is expected to facilitate a military

reform in the Soviet Union and the restructuring of the system of military development on the basis of defence sufficiency and effectiveness, as well as on the basis of principles of socio-economic effectiveness. In this context we were bound to notice Gorbachev's report on the results of the Paris summit, delivered at the USSR Supreme Soviet. The president said that in the past few months the Soviet Union had withdrawn 20,000 tanks beyond the Urals.

This action did not cause the protest, or at least disappointment, of the West (including the NATO military quarters). However, the analysis of short-term prospects shows that the seemingly "harmless" action can have serious consequences. If the Soviet Union starts building up its armed forces outside the zone of the agreement, the West will inevitably be forced to show restraint as regards disarmament and will strive to strengthen NATO as the basis of its security. As a result, the transition from bloc structures of security to common European ones, in which the Soviet Union is clearly interested, will be threatened.

At the same time, in conditions of radical changes in the military-political situation in Europe and the acceleration of the European process (in particular the creation of non-confrontational forms of security), it will be no longer vital to maintain quantitative parity with the West in all types of conventional armaments. If the European process were a two-way street, it could allow us, by the end of the century, to go over from a military balance with lower ceilings of armaments to minimal defence sufficiency of all parties to the European process, and would create conditions precluding a return to armed confrontation for political, military and economic reasons.

This renders senseless the maintenance of strike formations in the armed forces, with tank fists as their core. The Vienna agreement destroyed the Soviet superiority over NATO in conventional forces and deprived the Soviet Union of possibility to wage large-scale offensive operations in Europe. At the same time, the re-deployment of a large armoured formation beyond the Urals is bound to change the situation in the region.

In Western estimate, the Soviet Union had 20,000 tanks beyond the Urals (in the Southern and Far Eastern theatres). Now this figure will double. Is this an adequate reply to extra-European challenges to Soviet security, improbable in the near future? What would be the reaction of our Asian neighbours?

The efficiency of that action is highly dubitable, even if we assume that 20,000 obsolete tanks will be replaced with newer models with better combat characteristics. Besides, this action, undertaken in the interests of the military department, is increasing tensions on our overburdened economy. The transfer of 20,000 tanks strained the limited possibilities of Soviet railways to the utmost, to say nothing of the cost of their deployment.

The above shows that the problem of a military reform in the Soviet Union is more acute than ever. Further procrastination in the absence of constitutional control over the operation of the military-industrial complex threatens to undermine the fulfilment of programmes which were undertaken in the past few years within the framework of the new political thinking.

Future for European Security Talks Pondered

91WC00734 Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 4, Jan 91 pp 26-27

[Article by Sergey Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences, under the rubric "New Thinking": "Vienna. Paris. What Next?"]

[Text] **The Cold War ended independently of the process of arms limitation and arms reduction, which have begun to lag noticeably behind actual political life.**

It would appear that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was drawn up in just a year and a half. But the situation on the continent changed so radically over this time that the final arms levels agreed to during the course of negotiations now look absurd. Moreover, the very concept of the Vienna talks, worked out during an entirely different era, an era consigned to oblivion, has in essence been called into question. For by the middle of the 1990's, i.e., at the time of implementation of the treaty signed in Paris, transition from a bloc to a common European structuring of security should be completed in concept. But the treaty talks only about eliminating imbalances in the conventional armed forces of military alliances, and at high quantitative levels at that.

However, the massive transfer of Soviet military equipment across the Urals, the shifting of a portion of armament to Navy units, and presentation by the USSR of inadequate initial data at the negotiations place ratification of the treaty by Western partners in question.

It is finally time to make a conclusive determination—either the USSR will reject attempts from this time forward to be dominant in Europe by virtue of its military assets and will decide to participate in the common system of European security, or it will continue to rely as before primarily on military force.

If Moscow subscribes to the first version, it should realize that it is impossible to build a common European security system if the USSR continues as before to present itself in opposition to the entire international community. It is therefore at the least a mistake to record, as one of the achievements of the Vienna talks, the idea that as a result of implementation of the CFE Treaty—should it enter into force—the USSR will remain the most powerful country in Europe in military terms, retaining about 35 percent of all the armament of the European states.

At a Junction Between Eras

The Paris treaty is an unprecedented event. An unbiased, objective appraisal of it, however, is possible only in juxtaposition with the rapidly moving political changes taking place on the continent and in the world as a whole, and also with those tasks that appear on the agenda of European and world politics.

The CFE Treaty finds itself at the juncture, it would seem, of the Cold War and the newly emerging model of international relations we see. But the framework of the treaty is too narrow for this model. After all, termination of the Cold War makes the infrastructure of military force confrontation the treaty leaves behind and even "programs" politically and economically senseless. We recall that, according to the Paris Declaration, 22 European states henceforth have no enemies.

I am, therefore, not inclined to share the euphoric statements that have been creeping into our press—that as a result of the treaty "the mightiest obstacle on the path to European unity has come toppling down," "the line of military confrontation in Europe has ceased to exist," "tomorrow Europe will show no signs of military confrontation between East and West."

It seems to me that those who are excessively singing the treaty's praises do not fully realize the thoroughly radical nature of the changes taking place in Europe over the past two years. The CFE Treaty is one of the consequences of political processes that have been undergoing swift development in the USSR and Eastern and Central Europe. It is these processes that have led to collapse not only of the Berlin Wall, but of the bipolar structure of the military-political and ideological confrontation in Europe as well. In the political-psychological sense they have already converted into a heap of metal those armaments that still remain physically to be liquidated.

In a word, the Cold War has ended regardless of the process of disarmament.

Factors of Instability

But it would hardly be worth thinking that from this point "God's bounty" will automatically fall down upon our continent and "peoples, forgetting their quarrels, will unite in a single family." Moreover, certain factors that have not manifested themselves under conditions of confrontation are already beginning to introduce an element of uncertainty into the situation in Europe.

First of all, disappearance of such a powerful integrating factor as the external threat (somewhat hypothetical even before), together with democratic transformations, have presented the USSR with the real danger of disintegration of the integral state. This is perhaps the most serious problem for the new Europe. Whereas previously the West feared Soviet military might, now it is looking with even greater alarm at disintegration of the Union. And it is primarily this alarm, and not mercy or charity, that has prompted the rain of products pouring from the

West into the USSR. This also explains to a great extent the quite restrained reaction we see from the governments of the Western countries to events in Lithuania.

Second, for the West the Soviet military threat was also an effective unifying factor—it was necessary to stand up against the common enemy, suppressing nationality ambitions in a number of instances. Now national-state aspirations may again move to the foreground and provoke a geopolitical competition among certain "centers of power." And while the new balance of forces is still just being formed, history shows us this is fraught with destabilization of the international environment.

Third, a new and powerful "player" has appeared on the European scene—a united Germany. Its policy will be oriented on an energetic, all-encompassing consolidation of its positions, which will certainly elicit opposition primarily on the part of France and Great Britain.

Fourth, leaving the bipolar security structure of Europe behind will put in ever increasing doubt the role of the United States as leader of the West and, consequently, its military-political posture on the continent. Such a course of events can hardly be expected to suit the Americans.

Fifth and last, it is impossible not to take into account the factor of regional "extra-European risks" fraught with the prospect of situation destabilization, especially on the periphery of the continent where the sparks of possible conflagration have been smoldering for many years.

Will the new Europe be able to deal with all these problems?

In all likelihood, it will. But only if it moves towards a homogeneous political and economic environment. And this presupposes not only the gradual spreading of a common system of values—democracy first and foremost—to all countries of the continent, but the formation of mechanisms of transnational interaction as well. Only in this manner can we eliminate the likely "costs" of surmounting a split of the continent.

And it is to solving this very problem that the further process of European disarmament should be subordinated. The CFE Treaty's retention of a fairly high level of military confrontation in combination with the possible reemergence of manifestations of national-state egoism is capable of provoking unprecedented conflict situations on the continent. In this aspect the treaty only lays the groundwork for establishment of a truly stable military balance in Europe, which in turn constitutes one of the components of a fundamentally new system of collective security on the continent and in the world.

Questions, Questions...

It would seem we already have a forum for resolving these problems—the new negotiations that have provisionally been named "Vienna-1A." Their aim is to establish limitations on numbers of personnel and draw

up supplementary measures for consolidating military stability on the continent. Without a doubt these are necessary and important.

However, negotiations participants are now in essence merely cleaning up what they were unable to get done because of the rigid timetable assigned by the Paris "summit."

What should the "Vienna-2" negotiations be like? They are scheduled to be opened following the Helsinki-92 meeting. Already it is clear that these negotiations will be entirely different, with the participation of 34 states on a nonbloc basis, and that the chief task of this essentially common-European forum will be the implementation in treaty form of the principle of reasonable sufficiency. All the same, an entire series of highly significant issues arises.

Can we restrict ourselves during the course of these negotiations to further arms reduction within the limits of their former area of applicability—from the Atlantic to the Urals?

I believe this is hardly possible. And I am not even talking about the fact that our country simply cannot join the future European community with just one-third of its territory. I recall how the transfer of combat equipment across the Urals, undertaken by the Soviet military-industrial complex at the threshold of signing the CFE Treaty, elicited a feeling of disappointment in the treaty's effectiveness on the part of many—not only in the West, but in the East as well. In discarding excess armament on the "Asian scrap heap," the initiators of this action did not think about how this would affect military stability in Europe. After all, a major strategic reserve is now situated in Asia—a store of heavy armaments lifted from international supervision—which in principle could be transferred back. Nor were they very concerned about the reaction of the Asian countries—our neighbors.

Taking all of these circumstances into account, the disarmament process at the Vienna-2 stage should be disseminated over a broader expanse. The French concept of a region "from San Francisco to Vladivostok" may have good prospects.

Keeping in mind that armament levels following implementation of the CFE Treaty will remain excessive for the new security model in Europe, the question of deeper reductions will beyond any doubt remain topical.

The question of organizational restructuring of the armed forces of participating states on defensive principles remains unresolved. It is this that should be put at the center of attention for the future stage of negotiations.

Finally, purely quantitative reductions are being "eaten up" by a qualitative arms race that is in no way limited at present, including through the Paris treaty. New systems of highly accurate "smart" weapons are

appearing and this process threatens to acquire a destabilizing nature. Therefore, restricting the conventional arms race in qualitative terms must become one of the fundamental principles in the process of further conventional arms reductions.

Transition to a new structure of political and military-political relations in Europe must clearly also change conceptual points of view with respect to the aims and essence of measures for consolidating trust.

All their significance notwithstanding, the Vienna agreements on this score essentially reflect more the interests of security and tranquility of the opposing military-political alliances, the product of a bipolar Europe that no longer exists.

The concept of "a system of transparency and cooperation in the military sphere," and not "measures of trust and security," would be more in keeping with the scope and scale of conventional armed force reductions envisaged by the CFE Treaty and—we hope—agreements that are to come, as well as with the new political and psychological climate which is being formed. Therefore, one of the chief aims of future negotiations could be to turn the region of applicability into a "unified security zone."

This will require the establishment of appropriate institutions in which all CSCE participating states play a role in determining policy with respect to the military-political aspects of European security. Evidently, discussion should take place on the creation of a permanent organ (a European Security Council of sorts), invested with broad powers—based possibly upon a Center for Conflict Avoidance in which the present Warsaw Pact and NATO military structures would "dissolve." In the long-range scheme, a common European, multinational armed forces could be created under its aegis to resolve matters dealing with the struggle against international terrorism, the drug trade, operations to avert or settle regional or local conflicts, etc. But here I am looking into the next century...

Deputies Visit Poland, Discuss Troop Withdrawal

PM1001161691 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondents Colonel A. Belousov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Bugay from the Northern Group of Forces under the rubric "Direct Line": "Let Us Not Repeat our Mistakes"]

[Text] The arrival of the people's deputies in Legnica coincided with the Polish side ceasing the day before to supply the Northern Group of Forces' formations and units with food. As Colonel General V. Dubynin, commander of the group of forces, explained, the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity did not provide the Polish intermediary firm "Marko" with payment for the food in good time, giving as its reason difficulties with hard currency. The men will not go hungry: Canned

foods will come to the rescue. But this episode demonstrates that a lack of coordination of various departments' activities, when called on to carry out a common task, has a negative effect on the provision of normal living conditions for the troops abroad.

The commander spoke anxiously at the military council about the forthcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. How will it go? The mass media are coming out strongly for the quickest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from the republic, before the end of the current year. Furthermore, the Polish side insists that our units' transit from Germany across the Republic of Poland take place after the Northern Group of Forces' withdrawal. Incidentally, the Soviet side has already been refused passage for some 30 trains carrying a motorized infantry division which is ready to leave Germany for home. According to military specialists, if the demands of the Polish side in these matters are fulfilled, we will suffer great losses. Therefore, until the Western Group of Forces' units and formations are withdrawn, it is not expedient to talk about withdrawing the Northern Group of Forces. We must not repeat the mistakes we made in signing agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Will this opinion be taken into account when signing the Treaty on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops From Poland? Will not the signing of the document drawn up for this be a "Pyrrhic victory"? After all, as the Polish press attests, it is reckoned that a profit of some \$10 million will be made here from the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces alone.

Does this treaty stipulate the payment of compensation for the buildings and installations erected by Soviet people during their stay on Polish soil? Experience tells us that at the moment no mechanism has been devised to hand over such facilities to the Polish state organs of power or to self-government organs. Thus as a result of the redeployment and withdrawal of units from the small camp at Swidnica, some 375 apartments have become free, which the Northern Group of Forces command has been ready to hand over to the Polish side since September of last year. Alas.... After visiting Swidnica, the group of deputies satisfied itself that the Soviet side is suffering great losses through maintaining and guarding these unoccupied buildings.

Meetings of people's deputies, headed by S. Golovin, B. Vare, and V. Niyazmatov, with officers and warrant officers of other garrisons took place on 7 January. Also legislators led by L. Sharin, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, met with Legnica Voivod A. Glapinski, Sejm deputies, and Polish senators.

Reports on Troop Withdrawal From Germany Continue

Restructuring Former Bases

LD3001142991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0904 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Report by correspondent Osokin, from the "Television News Service" program]

[Excerpts] In Germany one can encounter the word *perestroika* but it has assumed a special meaning there. The Germans are discussing plans for the restructuring of military bases, including the Soviet sites which are to become free following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Many bases of this kind have been built on German soil. There are especially many of them in Brandenburg land, where, it has transpired, 300,000 tonnes of ammunition used to be stationed. That is almost one-third of the total amount stored in Germany. [passage omitted]

So now various sites will change hands. In East Germany the authorities are already creating commissions engaged in tackling issues concerning conversion, that is, the restoration of lands as they used to be before the military bases were built there. But certain problems have suddenly arisen.

In Brandenburg they complain that the Government of the united Germany recently suspended implementation of the conversion project. In some places the West Germans took up after the unification the army sites which formerly belonged to the GDR, having patently demonstrated the desire to appropriate them. It is surprising how similar the generals in all countries are. They clearly dislike the word conversion.

Transport Through CSFR Planned

LD2501001991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] The information agencies draw attention to Bonn's proposal to the government of Czechoslovakia to pay compensation for the transportation through its territory of echelons of Soviet troops leaving Germany. This step follows Warsaw's refusal to grant the USSR the right of transit for its troops through its territory until the Soviet Union sets the date for withdrawing troops stationed in Poland.

Withdrawal Planned by Sea

PM2202122391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent's report: "Troop Withdrawal By Sea"]

[Text] Berlin, 20 February—The plan for the Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany will be adopted 5 March. FRG Government official Major General Hartmut Voertsch reported at a Potsdam news conference Tuesday.

In the 1991-1993 period, he said, it is planned to withdraw 30 percent of the personnel and equipment each year. It is planned that 150,000 servicemen and their family members will leave Germany in 1991 along with 30,000 pieces of military hardware, including tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft.

The federal government is allocating 1 billion marks to cover the transportation costs associated with the Soviet troop withdrawal through the end of 1994.

Concerning the position adopted by the Polish side on Soviet transit shipments, H. Voertsch noted that the Soviet troop withdrawal will be carried out by sea.

Warsaw Pact Commander Views Problems

91UM04114 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 23 Feb 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with General of the Army P.G. Lushev on his pre-Army and Navy Day tour by A. Orlov; place not given: "We Have Honor"]

[Excerpts] The 18-year-old soldier was standing next to a general of the army for the first time. The boy was flustered. His gaze was fixed continuously on the big star on the shoulder boards. And the general was asking what his name was, where he hailed from, how long he had been serving and why he was without gloves in a fair February frost. The soldier justified himself and said something or other, pointing to an armored personnel carrier nearby.

The Rostock seaport "rumbled" and "sighed" all around. The arm of a gantry crane loomed over a Soviet transport ship. Equipment, accessories, and supplies and munitions were being loaded. Motorized infantrymen were preparing to embark for home—the Union.

"Good, but don't be embarrassed, son," the general smiled. "You are a soldier. Prepare the equipment for the journey well.... I do not promise a quick rendezvous with your own home but you'll be returning to the Motherland very soon...."

General of the Army P.G. Lushev, hero of the Soviet Union, first deputy USSR defense minister and commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, was at this time visiting many garrisons of the Western Group of Forces. The most varied issues were tackled here. One could only wonder how many things could be accommodated in just three days.

He got down to work religiously, with a kind of peasant thoroughness. He did not let slip an opportunity to strike up a conversation with a person even on a chance meeting. He did not wait for someone to address him. He would himself enter the men's mess halls, the officer's quarters, the motor pools, and stores and call on servicemen's families.... Even in just a matter of hours in the seaport he had time not only to discuss in detail the progress of the shipment of cargo with the captain of the Soviet ship, meet with representatives of the military transport communications service, and ascertain the position of the port's board of directors regarding a possible increase in the equipment-loading tariffs, but also to have a comprehensive discussion in the "duty room" with the leader of the team of German long-shoremen. He even inquired about minor details: what

was holding up the work, could the handling of the freight be speeded up, how could things be organized more economically?

This tour of the Western Group of Forces took place right on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day. It was there that our interview began—on problems of the withdrawal of the forces, of the Army, or the attitude toward it in society.

[Orlov] Petr Georgiyevich, I have been watching you work and have at times, I confess, been puzzled: a multitude of concerns, and the first deputy defense minister is going into why a soldier does not have gloves. Or inquiring whether the daughter of an officer will take her finals here, in the group of forces....

[Lushev] Yes, to my great regret, I managed to get done on the trip far from all that I had intended. The people have a tremendous amount of work here, and one cannot be everywhere at once. We are withdrawing from our groups of forces—within a compressed timeframe—thousands of pieces of equipment and taking away hundreds of thousands of tons of accessories and supplies. It is hard to compare this operation with any other. With that involving, say, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. There has altogether been nothing on this scale since the war. And there are no trifling matters in this work either. All this means people's fate, that of military and nonmilitary personnel. And, consequently, their morale and civic feelings.

Take if only the question of servicemen's families in the new locations. It is being resolved with great difficulty as yet. The Defense Ministry now has a clear idea of how much in the way of houses, quarters, schools, kindergarten, stores, and such has to be built to establish a more or less tolerable life for people. Merely common action is needed. This problem has been discussed repeatedly. The extremely limited possibilities of our military construction organizations are particularly worrying. Another aspect of the difficulties is the shortfall in the supply of construction materials by the civilian departments. As far, however, as the local soviets and assistance on their part is concerned, nor are many local authorities in any hurry to comply with the corresponding decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers.

We have had to balance in the groups of forces what of the construction materials available here we may take with us. The problems are, as you can see, woven into a single ball. So far it is the military itself which is dealing with them, in the main. An all-state program connected with the withdrawal of our forces from East Europe is needed.

And concerning these meetings and conversations with people.... How can we manage without them? There is more in each meeting than can be accommodated in a single report. Life cannot be fit into a report....

[Orlov] You have mentioned people's morale and civic feelings. There is a particular atmosphere here, in the

groups of forces, most likely. We are leaving, quitting East Europe. Like retreating, seemingly. This could be psychologically distressing.

[Lushev] What is distressing, I believe, is not that we are leaving. We ultimately did not intend to remain here forever. Times change, the world changes. But, despite all these changes, our Army has no reason to wear sackcloth and ashes. It is not to blame for the fact that it is leaving. The Army has, I believe, accomplished its historic mission, accomplished it with honor. True, it is being sent off without flowers and will be met without music.... But the Soviet military abroad, and in the country itself, does not have the feeling that we are leaving as the vanquished. You yourself have most likely had a chance to see this.

[Orlov] The general's words reminded me of an episode which I happened to witness in Stendal, at a military base from which a motorized infantry unit was being withdrawn. I got into conversation with some young officers. And the talk got around to the route by which their unit would leave for home. The road first ran north of the FRG—to the ports of Rostock and Mukran. There they were to be loaded onto transport ships and ferries and from there by sea to Kaliningrad, Klaypeda, and Leningrad. From there they would make for the military district where they were to be stationed.

So, a roundabout route. It is by this route—with many transfers—that the Western Group of Forces is being withdrawn today. Although it is a stone's throw to the Soviet border by land, the troops are forced to make a detour of an extra 1,000 km. The reason for this situation is the position of Poland, whose government has imposed a ban on the transit through its territory of personnel and equipment of the Western Group of Forces. The official position of our neighbors is such: Not one Soviet military train from Germany will travel its railroad until an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet Army units from Polish territory has been reached.

"In '45 our Army did not come west as an aggressor," one of those with whom I was speaking at the Stendal Garrison said. "The peoples of Europe have not forgotten. I believe, how many of our soldiers gave their lives for their liberation from fascism. Certain politicians have forgotten or are trying to forget this. We will find a way out of the situation, of course...."

I could not help but understand these officers. Their unit was formed at the time of the Great Patriotic War. It crossed half of Europe to Berlin. And one of its regiments, which is today also returning home, stormed the Reichstag in victorious '45. This is remembered, not forgotten....

"Yes, we cannot forget these pages of history," General of the Army Lushev said. "Just as the glory of our most valiant guards and decorated units cannot be lost either."

[Orlov] The Army is today experiencing difficult times. Its fate excites everyone, it would seem. But excites them differently. Some see it as the defender of our borders and note its devotion to its constitutional duty. Others see it as a reactionary state institution....

[Lushev] For me this is a very painful subject also. I am myself, after all, of the generation of those whose youth coincided with the war. And the Army was the personification of patriotism and a readiness to give one's life for the liberation of one's native land from the aggressors. It was with this that we went westward and believed and do not now doubt that we trod this path as liberators. In the postwar years our Army and Navy were the country's pride. This is preserved among the people now also. We recall the Chernobyl disaster. Who was there in the first, most difficult days? Or peoples' rescue following the earthquake in Armenia? Nor did the Army lose its honor in Afghanistan....

The attitude toward the Armed Forces today is, I would say, a "litmus test" by which it is possible to judge how a person perceives such concepts as duty, patriotism, and service to one's fatherland. There are very many who would like to play the "army card," but the Armed Forces will remain true to their constitutional duty. They are being attacked for this also. Defamation of the Army is, I believe, a futile undertaking. The people are opposed to this. They are already protesting it. It does not need to be explained to ordinary people to what end which forces are accusing the Army of all sins. Lenin's words, which, it would seem, the radicals have adopted, incidentally: Any class, aspiring to domination, cannot achieve this domination other than by having demoralized the army... are well known.

[Orlov] A minor detail. I set myself the goal during this time in Germany of tracking in the FRG's mass media what the attitude is toward the Soviet Army here. Biased or not? It was interesting to compare whose journalists—ours or others—were finding more shortcomings in the Soviet Armed Forces. I can share the result: I came across no malevolent attacks on the Western Group of Forces or the USSR Armed Forces in general in any articles. Except for one. It did the rounds of many publications. Beneath an expose article on the "mass violations of human rights in the so-called Western Group of Forces" was the name of Lyamin. Yes, a compatriot of ours! A "defender of human rights lawyer from Moscow," as he introduced himself. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent accredited with the Western Group of Forces whom I know later told me: until this "lawyer-cum-defender" makes visits to the FRG from Russia, the German press has no reason to reproach the "Russian Army." [passage omitted]

[Orlov] It would be incomprehensible if in conversation with you we failed to mention the Warsaw Pact. You, as commander of its Joint Armed Forces, did much to strengthen this alliance of friendly armies. But the

Warsaw Pact's military structures are, apparently, living out their final days. What are your feelings in this connection?

[Lushev] We should not, most likely, be speaking about feelings. A decision was made at the Moscow meeting last year of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on the transformation of this alliance from a military-political into a political-military alliance. Provision was made in this connection for a reconsideration of the missions and functions of its military structures and their reorganization. Now, however, representatives of a number of participants in the alliance are advocating the speediest disbandment of these structures. It has already been announced that there will be a special meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at foreign and defense minister level on 25 February in Budapest. It is planned to sign there a document terminating the military agreements concluded within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

I would like to mention that in the 35-plus years of its existence the Warsaw Pact has made an appreciable contribution to strengthening peace in Europe. It is appropriate to recall that all the positive processes occurring today on the European continent are connected with it. Including the steps pertaining to the creation of a collective security system—they were initiated precisely by the Warsaw Pact.

As far as the military aspect is concerned, the cooperation of the Warsaw Pact participants in the military sphere enabled them to create armed forces furnished with the requisite arms and equipment and also to master in full modern forms and methods of conducting combat operations. Each state undoubtedly has a right to decide questions of its security independently. It may be recalled that France, which left NATO's military organization, once went this route. But to do this it had to switch just about fully to furnishing its Armed Forces with weapons of its own manufacture. There is hardly any East European state which is today capable of tackling these questions in this way.

So it seems to me that common sense remains common sense. Further relations in the military sphere among the East European countries should, I believe, switch to the sphere of bilateral relations. The experience of our cooperation accumulated in the Joint Armed Forces could come in useful here. I intend to speak, incidentally, at the special Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest: I shall thank my military colleagues from the armies of the East European countries for the path which we have worthily trod together....

[Orlov] I will return once again to the meetings during our tour. I spoke with the most diverse people. Including Germans, the majority of whom approve of both Germany's unification and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces. Gratitude to the USSR was invariably expressed in the conversations in this connection. Opinions were not divided in the discussions on another

matter either: The USSR and Germany should no longer have historical contradictions. On the contrary, cooperation and common concern for the European home are essential. And this is what I heard also: uneasiness at the presence today in West Germany of American forces. East Germans expressed the concern: Will not the U.S. Army want to lay claim to deployment and development in the eastern areas?

"We are opposed to the American military presence, particularly when Soviet soldiers are leaving for home," 50-year-old worker Klaus Heege, told me. "It is time that we all started to live differently...."

In fact, it was about this that the discussion with the first deputy defense minister continued. I sought his view: What would the world be like in terms of military-political alliances? The more so in that NATO is persistently speaking about itself as a "stabilizing factor" and "guarantor of peace" in Europe....

[Lushev] I believe it appropriate to recall today that the Soviet Union was originally opposed to the creation of military blocs. And the Warsaw Pact was only signed six years after NATO was formed. This was a retaliatory measure. Article 11 of the Warsaw Pact points out, incidentally, that it will cease to have effect the day an all-European collective security treaty comes into force. The West also, it is believed, aspires to a system of collective security. It is clear from statements of the NATO leadership and the decisions being adopted at its meetings that in the situation taking shape in Europe NATO has to explain the purpose of its continued existence. Whence the proposition concerning the guarantor of peace and stability on the European continent. Much is being said also about the need to preserve a "counterweight to the USSR's military potential" and about the danger of coming civil war in the Union. This is the overall picture. Measures aimed at upgrading the NATO military structures are also under way today under these covers....

In addition, it is no secret that the United States has always regarded Russia and the USSR as its geopolitical rival. And it is not inappropriate for us to recall this when it is a question of our country's defense capability. And the events in the Persian Gulf also show that the accomplishment of the tasks of preservation of peace by political means alone is, alas, not always possible today.

[Orlov] Petr Georgiyevich, judging from the editorial mailbag, people are excited by one further question: how to preserve what has been invested in the groups of forces?

[Lushev] We are trying to keep all material losses as few as possible. The military is no less concerned about this than the workers in our country. Everything possible will be saved: Some things have been sold for foreign currency, but much is already being taken out and returned to the country. All this is being specially monitored. There is one further point I would like to make. On how we comply with the terms of the agreement on the

withdrawal of the forces we will be judged as to how serious a partner we are today. And we must pull our forces out of Europe, as befits us, in organized fashion.

[Orlov] A military base near Malvinkel [name as transliterated]. It was already half-empty when we drove up here. Equipment had gone, and the removal of accessories and supplies was being completed. But there were still people here.

A stairwell partitioned off by scaffolding. A few men were fiddling about with a radiator.

"What's the point? You are leaving, after all...." a warrant officer carrying an acetylene torch asked.

He said jokingly:

"So the Germans don't freeze. But, seriously, we will sell the building. We built it with our own hands, after all. And we should, in any case, leave in style...."

And there suddenly came to me something I had almost forgotten....

At the start of the 1980's the author of these lines was in Vietnam, visiting the locations from which not that long before American soldiers had departed. In Cam Ranh Bay, where there had previously been an American base, I noticed among the luxuriant green vegetation giant fuel tanks. Their sides resembled a sieve. My Vietnamese interpreter told me that the American military had not had time to dismantle these tanks and had before departure "done a job" on them with heavy-caliber machine guns.

Well, everyone arrives and departs in his own way....

"And the final question, Petr Georgiyevich. A great deal is being reassessed in our life currently. Much is being revised in the Army also. What, for all that, are its abiding spiritual values?"

[Lushev] It may seem pretentious, but what was for a long time beneath a bushel, as it were, is now coming to be revived in the Army, it seems to me. The main thing for a military man was, is, and always will be honor. And the purpose of his life was, is, and will be service of the Fatherland.

[Orlov] When I took my leave of the general, I congratulated him on behalf of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers on the impending holiday.

[Lushev] I also congratulate the newspaper's readers, today's fighting men, veterans of the Armed Forces and all who feel kinship with the Army and with our common holiday. Good feelings for all of them on this day and mental equilibrium for the future....

More Cash Wanted

*LD2402142191 Berlin ADN in German 1355 GMT
24 Feb 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Soviet Union wants more money in addition to the financial aid of 1 billion Deutschmarks promised by Bonn for the withdrawal of the Red Army from Germany. The AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE (Monday edition) reports that this was made clear by the spokesman of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces, Colonel Dmitriy Timashkov. The demand was explained with reference to the higher cost allegedly incurred as a result of Warsaw's refusal to permit the transportation of about 550,000 Soviet troops through Poland.

Timashkov also hinted at a desire for more German money for military housing construction in the Soviet Union. The 7.8 billion marks promised by Finance Minister Waigel are also sufficient for the construction of 36,000 homes. However, 55,000 are needed for the returning soldiers and their families.

The spokesman told the paper that the Soviet troops refuse to accept responsibility for environmental damage to the routes used by them in Germany. The authorities of the former GDR never imposed any conditions on the Red Army in that area. Therefore, any demands for eliminating possible environmental damage are considered "unjustified." However, the Soviet commanders have been instructed to adhere to the considerably more stringent FRG environmental regulations.

(The article was prereleased to ADN)

East Europeans' Attitude on Troop Withdrawal Viewed

*91UM0337A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel V. Markushin: "From Love to Hatred? What Is Troubling About the Positions of Some East European Neighbors"]

[Text] I observed this episode on the subway: An agile, sharp-tongued woman berated a man who accidentally brushed her with a briefcase for the entire car to hear. The man did not know what to do about it, and meekly put up with this aggression. If a fellow "without qualms" had been in his position, the woman would have delivered her monologue in her mind, without opening her mouth.

Unfortunately, things like this do not happen only at the level of street contacts. Be that as it may, I found the subway scene reminiscent of some of our East European neighbors not being overly discreet in the treatment of their yesterday's "elder brother." This is how it turns out: For as long as they felt the pressure, they smiled, and as soon as they tasted freedom they stopped saying "hello."

Of course, not everything is unambiguous in this matter. Some people might say: You are to blame for this yourselves, you should not have lorded it over them. Now they cannot do it at all if they do not overdo it. Or: The people have nothing to do with it, it is the leaders who hold sway—one kind groveled, and the other kind are being unceremonious. Still, on the whole one gets the impression that we have fallen out of favor with some of our neighbors.

At present, the spotlight is on the Baltic area, and it is talked about a lot. They express concern, they are indignant, they appeal to wisdom, integrity, and conscience. Some do it exclusively by reason of solidarity because they live a world away. Others do it because they can physically feel their proximity to the events. It appears that this latter group should not be in a hurry to join the campaign of concern and condemnation but rather grasp the essence of things, sort them out, and ultimately coolly determine what their interests are. To my mind, this is precisely what is lacking.

For example, the ministers of foreign affairs of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland gathered in Budapest and stated that "an attempt to reverse the process of transition to democracy and a rule-of-law state by force" threatens all-European stability. What does this statement mean with regard to the Lithuanian events? In essence, that they call on Moscow not to respond to the actions of those who, in contravention of all laws, attempt to split the populace into pedigree Balts and second-class Slavs. Meanwhile, in Poland, for example, the rejection of Lithuanian nationalism is expressed in very definite forms. In the opinion of none other than Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Skubiszewski, "something wrong is going on" in Lithuania that utterly does not suit Poland, and this republic needs a broader view devoid of nationalism.

The events in the Soviet Baltic area, and not just there, are used to inflate the topic of potential threat posed by the Soviet Union. They talk about the possible closure of oil pipelines, the forthcoming stream of refugees, and even infiltration by armed groups.

Inventions get mixed in with forecasts. Thus, quoting Deputy of the CSFR Federal Assembly P. Kulan, the mass media reported an alleged attempt by an armed group of 50 men to break through to Czechoslovak territory.

Transparent hints are dropped about a military threat and the need to strengthen defense in all sectors. Proposals to sign nonaggression pacts are, perhaps, the only thing lacking.

Meanwhile, there are things that need to be seriously pondered. Weakening activities of the Warsaw Treaty have already created a perceptible vacuum in the security system. Yet, some insist on canceling the treaty as soon as possible. Joint constructive efforts by the USSR and its neighbors in the area of security are all the more necessary given that all-European security structures are

not yet really "operational." Nobody intends to solve this problem for us. These may be bilateral, trilateral, and more-lateral agreements among partners with absolutely equal rights who have decided to cooperate in a new manner. However, the aspiration to isolate the Soviet Union from this process, which is what certain circles attempt to do, is absolutely impermissible. This is a short-sighted policy which, incidentally, is not supported by sober-minded figures. In conjunction with this, I would like to refer to a quite recent statement by Minister of Defense of Hungary L. Fur who believes good-neighborly relations with the USSR, including in the military sphere, to be vital and promising.

Long-term vision is very necessary at precisely this moment, when difficulties are emerging in the relationship of yesterday's brethren. We cannot allow the renewal that is under way to impoverish us. I am not trying to simplify the problem associated with the completion of Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. There are many troubles, and they are exacerbated by our internal shortcomings. However, problems will not diminish if hostility towards our soldiers continues to be fueled in the host countries, if they are treated as a "demoralized force," if attempts are made to "win them over by propaganda," as the Party of Freedom, which is close to the Polish president, has called for.

We are leaving. While leaving, we understand that this is dictated by the new situation and newly perceived interests. We see that the withdrawal of troops should ultimately reinforce the mutual sympathy of our peoples. This makes it all the more unpleasant to encounter at present an undisguised mercenary approach that bolsters the propaganda fuss. The issue of transit of the units of the Western Group of Forces through Poland has suddenly appeared and grown in scope. Warsaw does not agree to the Western Group of Forces using Polish roads before the last Soviet soldier leaves Poland proper. Of course, nobody is calling into doubt the sovereign rights of the Poles but there ought to be an understanding. After all, the Soviet Army did not advance toward Berlin by ferry.

However, in Poland many people understand that points will hardly be won by complicating relations with the USSR. The weekly POLITYKA asks: "Who will win by virtue of this?" The weekly goes on to respond itself: "Unfortunately, it will not be us... We may insist on our point, everything else notwithstanding. However, a situation may then develop whereby the irritated Germans will facilitate the evacuation of Soviet troops by sea and we will remain isolated on land—not for the first time."

The issue of transit is also inflated in Czechoslovakia. The Czech Minister of Internal Affairs T. Sokol believes that units of the Western Group of Forces may suddenly "linger on" in Czechoslovakia if they happen to return home through this country. It is said that there is a chance that they may discontinue transit and set up camp in that country for an indefinite period of time;

there are no guarantees. President V. Havel who views transit as "a potential threat" spoke in approximately the same vein.

I would not venture to judge the sincerity of the apprehensions of Czechoslovakia's leaders, but I will quote the words of Minister of Defense L. Dobrovsky from his interview to the newspaper RUDE PRAVO which, to my mind, indicate the desire to collect dividends rather than apprehension. In particular, the minister said that if an official request is made by the FRG with regard to transit after the combat units of the Central Group of Forces leave the CSFR in February, "there will be a good opportunity to treat this favorably."

As they put it in our country: It is very difficult...but possible.

I began my notes with an analogy that, perhaps, some people may not appreciate; they may say that the sense of measure was not heeded. I am not going to justify myself. However, I will refer to a view that comes up in one letter from our readers after another. This is what they write: We should not have "given away" the GDR, we should not be "relinquishing" Eastern Europe—they are not going to reckon with us.

I do not share this opinion. Nonetheless, I believe that our renewal merits understanding and tolerance on the part of our neighbors rather than suspicion. Certainly, it is not worthwhile to behave as if preparations for moving to another continent were being completed. This is precisely the most surprising point because there is no miraculous force of nature that would abolish our being neighbors—we will live side by side for centuries to come. In view of this, what need is there to posture, preach, and exacerbate the atmosphere, which is getting denser to begin with, on any pretext?

Troop Withdrawal From CSFR Progress Examined

CGF Commander Interviewed

91WC0064A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91
Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Colonel-General E. Vorobyev, Central Group of Forces commander, by PRAVDA correspondent A. Krushinskiy; date not given: "Operation 'Pull-out' Is Going According to Plan"]

[Text] Prague—On 26 February 1990, an agreement was signed on the withdrawal of the Central Forces Group [CGF] from the territory of Czechoslovakia. Implementing the Soviet-Czech agreement has become a key aspect in the rebuilding of bilateral relations on a qualitatively new basis.

In slightly less than a year—as of 5 February—nearly 60,000 of the 73,500 men stationed have returned to their homeland. Equipment is being withdrawn at an even faster rate: 1,191 tanks (97.6 percent), 1,164

weapons and mortars (95.6 percent), 2,332 infantry vehicles and armored troop carriers (93 percent), and all 223 military planes and helicopters have been sent back to the Soviet Union. Securing Operation "Pullout" entails a number of new, specific tasks of an economic, diplomatic, and propaganda nature.

Colonel-General E. Vorobyev, the CGF commander, talks about this with our own PRAVDA correspondent A. Krushinskiy:

[Correspondent] Eduard Arkadyevich, in Czechoslovakia it is being noted with satisfaction that the Soviet side is faithfully shouldering its obligations: the withdrawal of troops is coming about in accordance with the agreed upon schedules, even slightly ahead of schedule. But isn't this schedule too harsh? They say the American army took four years to pull just two divisions out of South Korea.

[Vorobyev] The technical withdrawal is well in hand: there is no delay in customs examination for the mobile complement or the containers. As for the problems, they have to do above all with restationing troops, especially the families of servicemen. Implementation of the special programs spoken of on the governmental level, unfortunately, is not yet having its effect. This is cause for concern to people.

[Correspondent] The Czech side does not seem to be against facilitating a resolution of this problem. Is that right?

[Vorobyev] Back at the start of the pullout campaign, the president of Czechoslovakia, V. Havel, announced the readiness of the Czech side to provide us with standardized housing for 100,000 people. Negotiations began. At first we did not like the fact that an inadmissibly high percentage of the proposed construction used formaldehyde as a filler. Together we found an acceptable alternative, but then everything rested on issues of payment. Our side proposes using for this purpose funds received from the sale of Soviet property (especially residential communities) located here, in Czechoslovakia. Right now a joint Czech-Soviet commission is working to appraise this property and sell it, and we have opened an account at the Czech State Bank. The account is blocked, however, until the loss inflicted on Czechoslovakia by the Soviets since troops were brought in in 1968 is evaluated.

[Correspondent] On the basis of what criteria is this evaluation being made?

[Vorobyev] Where there is flammable fuels storage, by filling stations, at points of troop accumulation (at airports, for example), the Czech side is doing drilling. Based on the information received this way, the cost of restoring to an ecologically clean state will be determined in conjunction with our specialists. So that it will be possible to talk about total losses only toward the end of 1991 or the beginning of 1992. And since to a significant extent we received the property of military settlements

from the Czech side without a statement as to its ecological condition, yet another problem will have to be solved: in what proportion to share the loss inflicted by and before us.

[Correspondent] Despite the irreproachable implementation of the schedule for troop withdrawal, one encounters many articles on the Soviet Army in the Czech press that are, to put it mildly, not objective. In particular, for some reason excessive attention is focused on our soldier-defectors.

[Vorobyev] Over the entire period of troop withdrawal fewer than ten people have been away without leave—a drop in the ocean. Something else concerns me, though. Unlike the practice that has formed since the agreement on legal norms was signed in 1983, instead of handing these people back to us, they have started to put them into refugee camps. Typical is the instance with Zaripov and Naumov, who snuck into a Czech store and were caught red-handed by the local organs of law and order, after which they found themselves with the status of "political refugee." When their parents, who came to Czechoslovakia, obtained a meeting with their sons through the consulate, they immediately repudiated their declaration, admitting that they had been pushed into it by Czech representatives. "On the run" right now is Private Kuzevanov, who has already received a residence permit here, according to reports. He is being hidden somewhere, and they aren't giving us an opportunity to meet with him. But after all, there are such concepts as constitutional duty and military oath, which each soldier has ratified with his own signature.

But these kinds of facts are more the exception than the rule. As the artillery division left Rozhnyava and the last aviation division left Bozhi-Dar, where I had the opportunity to be present, the atmosphere was one of mutual good will. On the whole the conditions for this troop withdrawal have been quite satisfactory. This has been facilitated by good relations with the parliamentary commission observing the withdrawal of our troops, with the administration seeing to the withdrawal of Czech army troops, with the Czech government representatives on these issues, and through them with the local organs of power. The situation at the points of Soviet troop stationing has been and remains fine.

Figures Cited

LD0602190191 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
1600 GMT 6 Feb 91

[Text] News agencies are paying attention to a Prague meeting of governmental representatives supervising the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. It has been reported at the meeting that 59,519 Soviet servicemen and 31,397 members of officers' families had left the territory of the CSFR by 5 February. Thirty rocket launchers, 1,091 tanks, and other military equipment have been withdrawn. The governmental representatives agreed that the aim of the second stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops has been completely fulfilled.

CGF Commander Gives Details

LD0202232591 *Moscow World Service in English*
1810 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Commentary by military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia has entered its third conclusive stage. Our military observer, Colonel Vadim Solovyev, has written this commentary:

Last February, the first units of the 75,000-men-strong Soviet military contingent deployed in Czechoslovakia left for home. Following them, military trains began transporting troops from Hungary, and, at the end of last year, from Germany. The commander of the Central Group of Forces [CGF], Czechoslovakia, General Eduard Vorobyev, was asked to comment on the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, and here are the details:

The air regiment of the last combat unit of the Central Group's aviation force, said Gen. Eduard Vorobyev, has been withdrawn. The pullout of units of the last militarized infantry division out of the garrison stationed mainly in North Czechia is proceeding in accordance with schedule. Fifty percent of the division personnel has already left for new places of dislocation. All in all, 90 percent of combat units, 78 percent of the personnel, and 90 percent of the equipment of the Central Group of Forces have been withdrawn. The total withdrawal is planned for the end of February. Following the pullout of units, the Soviet Command plans to concentrate attention on the restoration of the environment in the places where Soviet troops were deployed. This will be done with the help of rear formations. The Soviet Command believes that the demands of the Czechoslovak side will be fully met.

The situation is much more complicated at home, where army units are arriving. Over the past year it is become more difficult to accommodate the families of the arriving servicemen. About 200,000 families have no housing of their own. Steps taken toward the solution of the housing situation have failed to keep up with the troops' withdrawal pace.

Those details were contributed by the commander of the Central Group of Forces, Gen. Eduard Vorobyev.

CSFR Minister's Remarks Scored

PM3101142591 *Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 26 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Colonel V. Markushin "Rejoinder": "Trial Balloon or Something Else?"]

[Text] I shall start straightaway with the comment made by the Czechoslovak minister of interior. He maintains: "Demoralized Soviet servicemen are a destabilizing element. The Soviet troops on our territory are able to make full use of certain opportunities to manipulate the civilian population, and this includes using weapons. There is no guarantee that the Soviet military units being withdrawn from Germany will not remain in Czechoslovakia."

What is this, an honest mistake? A trial balloon designed to clarify the seriousness of the Soviet side's intentions to use Czechoslovak transportation arteries in withdrawing units of the Western Group of Forces? Or something else?

In any case, I know it is not the first. At ministerial level such mistakes are not made. I shall not make guesses. I shall permit myself merely to have serious doubts as to whether the Czechoslovak minister's words reflect the true picture. Information from the Central Group of Forces comes to us regularly and in sufficient quantity. Not everything, it goes without saying, is progressing smoothly out there, but there again the situation is not at all simple. But the withdrawal of troops is taking place exactly on schedule. Incidentally, it is taking place with due regard for the interests of the Czechoslovak side. Despite the fact that much still needs to be done in our country to normalize life and activity for the arriving troops.

In this situation the Soviet servicemen of the Central Group of Forces are obviously in need of moral support. Instead of this they are being called a demoralized force which allegedly poses a threat to the Czechoslovak population. The charge is undeserved and offends the dignity of the Soviet soldiers. I am convinced that very many people in the CSFR will agree with me. Most of all those who understand what side the changes in their country came from.

Deputies Meet on Withdrawals

LD1301123291

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 12 January, in its "Vremya" newscast, carries a three-minute report by Sergey Andreyev on the Soviet troop withdrawal from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic [CSFR]. The announcer begins the report by noting that "Soviet troops will leave Czechoslovakia by 30 June this year. The 168 military townlets, some 3,000 buildings, and other facilities have been built by us in the republic. Their total values is estimated to be approximately 1,600 billion rubles [as heard]."

Andreyev then introduces a video showing such buildings, regretting that they are not in the USSR, where the troops will be moving. "Members of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet commission on issues of defense and security, and deputies of

the Supreme Soviets of the republics have been here in Milovice, the biggest garrison of the central group of troops, and to other units.

"The two days in Czechoslovakia were all meetings with military men, diplomats, and fellow members of legislature. The conversations were by no means easy or pleasant. The members of the commission spoke about difficulties, about the great material expenditures arising from the withdrawal of the troops. The response is figures of losses on the introduction and stay of the military units. Ecological losses are cited, and it is stressed that this was an occupation supporting the previous regime and stagnation in the country. The Supreme Soviet deputies would like to solve the financial questions as quickly as possible, in other words to sell to Czechoslovakia everything built by the Army during those years, but they object that a lot of what has been put up is not in accordance with Czechoslovak norms and can only be sold at low prices. But, the money is badly needed; new houses have to be built. Sixty-three percent of the 19,000 families leaving Czechoslovakia have no permanent housing in the Soviet Union.

"Actually, sympathetic points of view were expressed, too, during these conversations. There were moments of understanding and simple human unity. The Czechoslovak MP's expressed genuine sympathy over the recent tragedy of the tank explosion. There was a very warm meeting with Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the Federal Assembly. Both sides expressed satisfaction at the fact that the withdrawal of the troops is going strictly in accordance with the timetable. The Czechoslovak politicians stressed several times that they did not consider the Soviet soldiers guilty of the events of 1968. Those who made the decisions at that time can no longer be called to account. It is a bit too late.

"But I would like to mention another kind of guilt: For 20 years, while the troops were here, nobody imagined that they would one day have to go home, that it would be necessary to build houses for them in normal conditions.

Norway Protests Bomber Deployment in Kola

LD1302122691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 13 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Norway has accused the Soviet Union of deploying on the Kola peninsula additional bombers, called Backfires in the West. This has been done despite an official statement on reductions in this region, added (Gunner Angeltweit), minister of defense of Norway.

Envoy on Need for New Structures at CFE Talks

PM2002115791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Feb 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent S. Tosunyan on interview with O.A. Grinevskiy, chief Soviet delegate to the CFE talks: "Creating a Working Structure: New Round of Vienna Talks"]

[Text] Vienna—A new stage of the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] talks has begun in Vienna's Hofburg Palace.

As is well known, a treaty prepared by the participants in the Vienna talks—delegations from the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries—was signed at the summit meeting in Paris 19 November last year. However, a number of issues were not covered by the Paris Treaty—in particular, troop personnel, airborne inspections, and stabilization measures. These were included on the agenda for the current round. Your correspondent asked O.A. Grinevskiy, head of the USSR delegation, to talk about the negotiations which have just started.

"We have resumed our work, relying on the firm foundation of the CFE Treaty signed in Paris," the Soviet diplomat said. "It would be naive to believe that we will face no difficulties or that they will miraculously disappear after the signing of the Paris document. If we thought so there would hardly be any need to set up a joint consultative group. It is intended to resolve any problems that emerge and to relieve the negotiating parties themselves of this duty.

"However, at the first plenary session we found on the negotiating table questions which should have been handled by the joint consultative group. Differing interpretations of one of the treaty's provisions have recently come to light. The Soviet representatives in the group are prepared to constructively seek ways to overcome these difficulties. But exploiting these difficulties with a view to slowing the current talks would mean shouldering a great responsibility. Those who intend to turn the Vienna forum into a source for whipping up tension in Europe should above all think seriously about the consequences of such actions. I am convinced that this does not accord with the interests of any of the participating states. That is why we are proposing that the talks should not be weighed down with unconstructive polemics or groundless linkages.

"During the talks the Soviet delegation intends to strive to adopt measures to restrict armed forces numbers within the limits of their zone of application, and to move toward the elaboration and coordination of a range of effective and verifiable stabilization measures. The coordination of airborne inspection measures will also play an important part in our work. In this respect the question arises of whether these procedures should be seen in close conjunction with the problems of an international 'open skies' conference.

"These are not new issues, considerable work was done on them when the Paris Treaty was being drawn up. During the last round, as is well known, concrete proposals were made—specifically, by the representatives of the United States, Britain, Canada, the FRG, and other states. So we have things to work on. The question now is to create a new working structure. Clearly, it may be a question of three groups, which we are prepared to set up."

In conclusion, O.A. Grinevskiy said: "The Soviet delegation considers that work at the current stage of the talks will be just as constructive as it was at the previous stage. For our part, we will do everything in our power to maintain the Vienna forum's good reputation."

USSR Blamed for 'Tank Attack' on CFE

PM2702124791 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7,
19-25 Feb 91 p 11

[Galina Sidorova article: "Tossed Tanks"]

[Text] We keep on getting things tossed our way. According to what the president says, it's mostly ideas that are tossed our way by the democrats. The conservatives though toss us something more material, to wit paratroopers and patrols. The top brass specializes in tanks.

As I see it, in the next few days the policy of new thinking will come in for one more ordeal. The sore thumb in Soviet-West relations as regards security, or rather Soviet relations with the 21 West and East European states plus the US and Canada is treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE], in particular those 800 tanks that the Soviet military have extricated from the mandated cuts by giving them a fresh coat of paint and transferring them to the Navy.

Yet what do a mere 800 tanks signify against the backdrop the crisis mauling the country, the war in the Gulf or, for that matter, the other issues in Soviet-West relations.

This magazine noted earlier that the tank attack against the treaty started long before it was signed, when 15,000 tanks were transferred beyond the Urals. Our partners watched this operation with concern but tolerated it, showing understanding of our difficulties at home and the vicissitudes of the political struggle.

At the time of the Shevardnadze-Baker talks on the eve of the Paris summit, at which the 22 heads of state were to sign the said treaty, those "naval" tanks to wit the repainted ones, almost surfaced. The military were determined to cling to them as part of the Soviet marines arsenal. But then, as far as we may judge, the president had to intervene. Because when at a meeting of the working group the Americans wondered what the tanks rumour spelled, they were told that the problem was nonexistent. The chief US delegate at the conventional arms talks, R. James Woolsey, was given the appropriate

assurances. I can well imagine his amazement on seeing a several digit figure down in the lists that the parties exchanged when the treaty was signed, and his feelings upon learning that the negotiated mandate appeared to have no bearing upon the Navy. There were also other surprises in store for our negotiating partners. The Soviet armaments data reflected rather intent than actual facts. The number of installations subject to control was likewise greatly reduced against that negotiated earlier.

In other words, this card trick caused Soviet diplomats to blush and military experts to grin as they saw it as a success. To avoid a row and prevent the signing from being called off, as the heads of state concerned were already in Paris, the parties to the treaty reached a gentleman's agreement to iron out the controversial aspects and refer the clarified data to the joint advisory commission by mid-February following which ratification would begin.

However, what followed was a series of arguments that the Soviet military trotted out to shore up their actions. Compatriots are told that this is essential to ensure national security, that the advantageous agreement concluded is due exclusively to top-brass sagacity. Our MPs are told of the dexterity with which the cards were shuffled. On the other hand, partners in the talks are told that the said manipulations are lawful.

To sum up, the transfer beyond the Urals from the European part of the USSR of 60,000 units of heavy ordnance is no violation of the treaty, as this was done before it was signed. However, it does betray intent, specifically of concealing large quantities of arms from reduction. Even if we take on trust what the military say to the effect that some amount of this weaponry is to be converted, while more will self-destruct in the open air.

Another reason has been devised to explain the Soviet reduction in the number of installations slated for inspection. This is that the personnel and weaponry the Soviet armed forces are presumably being modified in accordance with the adequate-for-defence doctrine. This means that the weaponry slated for inspection by the treaty is being withdrawn from some units to which it had been attached earlier, which is why these units will no longer be on the inspection list. One frankly finds it hard to imagine gunners without artillery or motorized infantry transported by jeeps and equipped with Kalashnikovs. Is that a strategic ruse too? Because the treaty specifies which units are subject to inspection and given the desire arms subject to reduction can be transferred to an installation not subject to control.

The military are as proud as peacocks. They have discovered juridical loopholes. But when such malpractices are added up, we get not simply the treaty's violation, but its complete emasculation.

But could these manoeuvres be for some supreme national security interest?

Let me first note that thereby we simply create a precedent, a way of getting round the treaty. Suppose similar numbers of "naval" tanks are attached to the coast guards of the twenty or so other states? The USSR would then find itself faced by multiple superiority in such weaponry.

I greatly doubt that, given the continued Soviet stance chiefly as regards tanks, the treaty in question will be ratified by 21 of the 22 states concerned. Moreover, in this situation, even its reference to parliamentary ratification would be suicidal for many national leaders. Indeed, everyone will realize that if one country, the Soviet Union in this case, has evolved ways and means of circumventing the treaty surely others could follow suit. So why sign it generally? Why waste so much energy and enormous resources on perennial negotiation?

Before the culprits are shown up years will pass. I am almost convinced that Moscow will blame the "intransigent" West for everything. Do the few extra hundreds of tanks mean so much to it?

But how can one trust a person if he says one thing and does another? How can one trust a nuclear power if it cheats and is proud of doing so?

If the treaty is not ratified, Germany's commitment to halve its armed forces become invalid.

The demise of an agreement placing so substantial a foundation under the overall edifice of European security and cooperation, under a united Europe, under normal East-West relations will impel conservatives all over the world to fault their respective governments for this "bad" treaty for their myopia in respect to Moscow. In that case the pendulum of world politics will swing to the right and Moscow will be responsible for a new round of confrontation.

Our current tank dispute is not directed, in effect, against the military. It merely reflects an ideological offensive against perestroika, one more attempt by the agonizing System to take revenge, to instill in society a siege mentality, populated by the image of internal and external foes. To which end it is tanks and only more tanks that are required.

The one and only man who can put paid, at least to the tank saga, is the President of the USSR as the Commander-in-Chief. He is the only man who can today issue the order to abandon those extra tanks and thus rescue the treaty and, in effect, the policy of the new thinking.

CSCE Forum Discusses Confidence-Building Measures

*LD2002155491 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT
20 Feb 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, February 20 (TASS)—A number of practical matters of holding negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe were discussed here today at a regular meeting of this forum in which 34 countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participate. They will exchange information on armed forces and discuss some problems of installing CSCE communications system.

The need to concentrate on working out documents—formats—was emphasised at the meeting. These documents will serve as the basis for the exchange of information on the armed forces. The participating states assumed the commitments to exchanged information on the armed forces by April 15 1991. Speakers noted that it is necessary to coordinate these documents soon as the military agencies will need time to fill in the documents.

The Soviet delegation today set out its views on the document for information exchange. It turned out that the Soviet approach largely coincides with the draft document submitted by the British delegation and with the views expressed by a number of other countries.

The decision to set up a hotline between the capitals of participating countries to transmit reports about agreed-upon confidence-building measures has become one of the tangible achievements of the talks.

It was noted at the meeting that a considerable number of specific steps had been taken by representatives of the Netherlands coordinating the project. At the same time, because of the novelty of questions tackled in the framework of this programme, the countries are a little behind the schedule. The Soviet delegation believes that it is necessary to resume as soon as possible the functioning of working groups formed at the previous talks. It believes that delays in the solution of this procedural question leads to the loss of time and slows down the negotiations' pace.

CSCE Conflict-Prevention Consultative Committee Meets

LD2602095691 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 25 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, February 25 (TASS)—A meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Conflict-Prevention Centre was held here today. It mainly discussed various technical aspects of preparing its work. The proposal to set up this permanent institution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was made at the talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. The Parisian summit of CSCE in November last decided to institute it in Vienna. Bent Resenthal, the head of the Danish delegation to the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, was appointed the centre's director. The centre is viewed as one of the most important organs of future European structures from the Atlantic to the Urals.

It was noted at the meeting that the setting up of the centre means real progress towards achieving an absolutely new quality of a political dialogue and cooperation in the interests of security. It reflects the striving of European countries and peoples to peaceful settlement of disputed questions fraught with conflicts and reflects the awareness of the fact that the security of every state is linked inseparably with the security of all other states.

Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna talks, believes that the new institution of the CSCE is to undergo the stage of its establishment. How long this period of trial until practical steps in the work of the centre will take will depend on the efforts of countries participating in CSCE towards the implementation of the charter for new Europe adopted by the Paris summit. In order to advance faster it is necessary to decide what tasks that centre tackles shortly, as well as to discuss forms and methods of its activity. Grinevskiy said.

Speaking at the meeting, John Maresca, chief of the United States delegation to the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, said that the Gulf war can largely be instructive for the new centre. He said that the common aim of all the countries participating in the centre is to prevent such conflicts from breaking out in Europe. The U.S. representative favoured the holding of a meeting of experts from CSCE countries planned for mid-April in Vienna to exchange military information.

WGF Commander Attends German Withdrawal Commission Session

Arrives in Bonn

LD2602174691 Hamburg DPA in German 1537 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Soviet Western Group [WGF], arrived in Bonn on Tuesday for a session of the commission for troop withdrawal. A meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was also planned. The second session of the joint Soviet-German commission, which was founded as a result of the troop withdrawal treaty of 12 October 1990, dealt with the supervision of the Soviet troop withdrawal. [passage omitted]

Meets With Genscher

LD2602211591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2030 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] Bonn, 26 February (TASS)—In Bonn today H.D. Genscher, FRG foreign minister, received Col. Gen. Matvey Burlakov, commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces. [WGF]

As the press service of the FRG Foreign Ministry had reported, H.D. Genscher emphasised that he wants Soviet servicemen and their families leaving Germany in conjunction with the withdrawal of Soviet Army Units

stationed on his country's territory part with Germans as friends and to retain pleasant memories of the time they have spent here.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Moiseyev Rules Out Local Soviet for Novaya Zemlya

PM2502142991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by correspondent Ivan Bentsa: "Will There Be a Soviet on Novaya Zemlya?"]

[Text] Arkhangelsk—The Defense Ministry has not backed a decision by the Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet on the advisability of creating an island soviet on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago.

The letter, signed by Chief of General Staff M. Moiseyev, says that the decision does not conform to point 3 of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Situation Prevailing in Connection With the 24 October 1990 Underground Nuclear Explosion on Novaya Zemlya." The aforementioned point is concerned not with the creation of organs of power on the archipelago, but only with the consideration of all aspects connected with their absence. The creation of an island soviet in a military structure, the reply says, would bring with it a mass of unnecessary complications in the relationship between organs of soviet power and the garrison leadership.

"It is a purely departmental viewpoint that does not consider all the realities connected with the activities of the test site," Oblast Soviet Chairman Yu. Guskov believes. "We based our decision on the fact that there are several thousand civilians working on Novaya Zemlya whose interests would be protected by a soviet. Public opinion is in favor of its creation and we will try to bring this about."

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical Troops Adjusting to Peacetime Tasks

PM2602104991 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 0330 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Report by V. Chistyakov from the Kostroma Chemical Defense Higher Military Command School; from the "Utro 120 + 30" program]

[Text] [Chistyakov] During the 25 years of the Kostroma Chemical Defense Higher Military Command School's existence many officers have graduated from here, trained for one purpose—operating in combat conditions. The training programs, teaching aids, and practical exercises were in line with this objective.

Now, in the year of its first jubilee, the school is undergoing a rebirth. Lessons are more like research work in a chemical laboratory, the potential of modern

equipment is used for different purposes, and teaching staff use words like "military threat" and "readiness to rebuff an attack" more and more rarely.

[V.I. Bukhtoyarov, chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Defense Troops Combat Training] In wartime chemical defense troops provide chemical backup for combat operations. However, experience gained from the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident, and also in the elimination of accidents involving toxic substances on railroads and at industrial enterprises, has shown that even in peacetime chemical defense troops have important and difficult tasks to carry out in eliminating the consequences of various accidents.

[Chistyakov] Is it in this connection that a reorientation of chemical defense troops, or more precisely of chemical defense schools, is taking place?

[Bukhtoyarov] Correct. Proceeding from this experience, schools are changing to new combat training plans and programs as from 1991/1992. These programs incorporate ecological and environmental protection issues. There will be many jobs for our chemical expert graduates in the national economy in peacetime too.

[Chistyakov] The new generations of graduates will be different from their predecessors; however, combat spirit and tempering will remain high on their agenda. After all, they often have to operate in extreme conditions. A comprehensive technical safety system is currently being set up in the country. Its efficiency and reliability, and consequently also our lives and our health, will depend on graduates from the Kostroma and other chemical defense schools.

Chemical Troops Chief on CW Use in Gulf War

PM2202224191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

["Topical Interview" with Colonel General S.V. Petrov, chief of Chemical Troops, by unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; date, place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "But the 'Chemical' War Has Already Begun..."]

[Text] Now that Iraq has accepted the Soviet plan for a peaceful settlement of the crisis, there is the hope that combat actions in the Persian Gulf zone will cease. However, there is a danger, a serious one at that, that the war will continue. How real, in that event, is the threat of the use of chemical weapons [CW]? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA put this question to Col. Gen. S.V. Petrov, chief of Chemical Troops.

[Petrov] Chemical weapons in the broadest sense have already been used on the territory of Iraq as a result of strikes by aircraft and missiles against facilities for the production and storage of munitions containing chemical agents.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How effective might the use of chemical agents on the battlefield be from the military viewpoint?

[Petrov] Chemical weapons are effective from the military viewpoint if they are used on a massive scale. According to the U.S. journal *CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS*, Iraq has types of chemical munitions containing mustard gas, tabun, and sarin. According to the Washington Institute of Near Eastern Politics, Iraq has artillery shells and rockets, air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles, mines, and aircraft bombs containing these chemical agents. In my view, the massive use of aircraft weapons containing chemical agents is unlikely, since the multinational force has aerial supremacy. This also applies to chemical agents delivered by missiles. Therefore, one should not expect the use of chemical weapons to bring Iraq any significant results.

Of course, the use of chemical weapons in desert conditions is bound to affect the actions of the troops. The hot climate, the absence of large quantities of water, the need to keep gas masks and protective clothing on for long periods—these are all far from easy questions. Now, we are constantly seeing on television U.S. soldiers and other multinational force soldiers in gas masks. Believe me, it is very difficult spending long periods wearing even such a modern gas mask as the U.S. M17A1, for instance. But, I repeat, the effectiveness of chemical weapons from the viewpoint of affecting combat actions would be small.

If Iraq were to strike big cities, that would be a different matter. Then losses could run into thousands. But they would be primarily civilians.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Would there be a danger to our country if such weapons were used in the war?

[Petrov] There has been information in the foreign press to the effect that nerve gas has been discovered somewhere in Saudi Arabia in very small, evidently barely perceptible concentrations. But I rather tend to think that this is not the result of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. It is more likely to be the result of the destruction of a chemical weapons dump by U.S. and allied air strikes somewhere in the immediate operational-tactical or tactical zone.

Now as for the Soviet Union and adjacent states. If major storage facilities containing 500 and more tonnes of chemical agents were destroyed, it would result in the death of the civilian population within a radius of dozens of kilometers from the storage facilities. I believe that even in cases like that people living in our southern republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenia—would not be in danger. Large mountain areas and considerable altitude variations would prevent air currents from carrying chemical agents as far as our borders in any significant concentrations.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In your view, have the U.S. and allied aircraft succeeded in destroying Iraq's stocks of chemical weapons?

[Petrov] Personally, I believe that the Americans should not have hit chemical weapons storage facilities. This provokes Iraq into using these weapons. Whether the danger of the use of chemical weapons has diminished or not can be judged from data in the U.S. press again. At the beginning of the war in the Gulf the press was filled with enthusiastic articles about allied air strikes wiping out everything: aircraft destroyed, bases destroyed. But the euphoria passed as time went on. It transpired that the results of the strikes were not that brilliant. The same can be said about chemical weapons facilities. One must assume that Husayn has kept such an important argument in war as chemical weapons well hidden.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In your view, how will the war in the Gulf affect the chemical disarmament process?

[Petrov] The events that are currently unfolding could directly influence the position of the states in the course of the talks on a complete ban on the production, development, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The point is that many countries in the so-called Third World may well decide that if they had chemical weapons people would begin to see them as a force to be reckoned with. Just as they see Iraq as a force to be reckoned with. Many could be tempted even to use this trump card—chemical weapons—in their political activity. Therefore the prospects for the signing of an all-embracing convention on banning and finally destroying chemical weapons are much worse now, in my opinion, than before the war in the Persian Gulf.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula Recommended

SK1902042491 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 13 Feb 91

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] A report released by the ROK-U.S. relations committee indicates that it is possible to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK without causing a loss to the security of the ROK. This committee is known as an (?expert) organ which gives (?advice) to the Washington and Seoul administrations. A station commentator indicates that the question of nuclear weapons has been a source of tension on the Korean peninsula for a long time.

It is natural for Pyongyang to regard U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK as a threat to its security. On the other hand, Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo have distrusted the DPRK, which has not allowed experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency into its nuclear facilities. It has been reported that Pyongyang is ready to allow an

international inspection team into its nuclear facilities if U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from the peninsula. The DPRK has also held that the Korean peninsula should be turned into a nuclear-free zone.

Those who participated in writing the above report stated that this being the situation, for the ROK, declaring that there exist no nuclear weapons in its territory and presenting evidence showing no existence of nuclear weapons there is politically beneficial to it. If the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from the south side of the peninsula such a declaration is possible. If such a measure is taken, the military and political situation in northeast Asia will be stabilized. At the same time, Pyongyang, as well, will have grounds to declare that it is ready to discuss the question of nuclear safety with Washington.

According to foreign press reports, in the DPRK-Japan talks held last January to discuss the normalization of relations between the two countries, the DPRK side asked Tokyo to play the role of mediator for talks with Washington on the nuclear issue.

Pyongyang's proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone has won support from many countries, including the Soviet Union and China, both nuclear powers. As it has already declared, the Soviet Union is willing to guarantee denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with other nuclear powers.

As the report of the ROK-U.S. relations committee properly indicated, Washington and Seoul have begun to accept the assertion that the Korean peninsula should be free from nuclear weapons. Of course, this is still nothing but experts' opinions. The problem lies in whether or not Washington and Seoul will officially accept the (?report).

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

PRAVDA, Japanese Paper Host Regional Security Talks

91UF03704 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Jan 91 Second Edition p 6

[Report by Yu. Vdovin and B. Orekhov on PRAVDA-ASAHI roundtable: "Trust and Once Again Trust"]

[Text] As already reported, a roundtable on problems of disarmament and security in the Asian-Pacific region [APR] and questions of Soviet-Japanese relations was held on 15 January in the PRAVDA editorial office. The following took part in the discussion on the Soviet side: academician I.T. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chief editor of PRAVDA; academician A.N. Yakovlev, people's deputy of the USSR; A.N. Panov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Pacific and Southeast Asian Countries Desk; K.O. Sarkisov, leader of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute Center for Japanese Studies; and V.V. Ovchinnikov, political observer of PRAVDA; on the Japanese

side: Y. Kono, prominent figure of the governing Liberal Democratic Party and member of legislature; N. Matsunaga, former ambassador to the United States and Japanese foreign minister adviser; professor N. Shimotomai, Sovietologist at Tokyo's Hosen University; and M. Hirose, observer of the newspaper ASAHI.

The roundtable was conducted by I.T. Frolov and Y. Kono.

We offer readers material from the discussion.

I. Frolov: I am pleased to welcome here, at PRAVDA, our dear guests. A joint roundtable of the newspapers ASAHI and PRAVDA will be conducted today. This action will, I am sure, serve as new impetus to the development of relations between our two newspapers in the interests of a strengthening of Soviet-Japanese relations as a whole. It acquires even greater significance on the threshold of the visit to Japan of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. I believe that today's discussion will be our contribution both to a strengthening of friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples and at the same time to the preparation of this visit. I regard the coming visit as a historic act. This will be the first trip to Japan by a leader of ours of such a high level. Important decisions, we assume, will undoubtedly be adopted during the visit, which will mark a qualitatively new stage in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations.

The subject that we have taken for discussion is very important. It is the problem of disarmament and security in the Asian-Pacific region and also Soviet-Japanese relations specifically.

Changes are occurring in the Asian-Pacific region that, as everyone knows, are of global significance. It may be said that in many respects a kind of shift, so to say, of certain nerve centers of world politics to the APR, whose role is growing increasingly, is taking place. Our country neighbors many countries of the region and, across the Pacific, the United States also. We are greatly interested in such processes as disarmament and strengthening of security taking place as effectively as possible here. We all remember M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, which determined clearly the directions of our policy in the Asian-Pacific region and in the sphere of Soviet-Japanese relations. From the interview that President M.S. Gorbachev recently granted the newspaper ASAHI you have many things on which to base a judgment. A virtually precise date of the visit to Japan was given also, which is very important. It seems to me that we also should keep in mind the questions broached in this interview in our discussion.

When I speak of the Asian-Pacific region and the Pacific Ocean, I recall words of the great philosopher and writer Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen, the Russian revolutionary democrat. As he said once, back in the last century—and few people pay any attention to these words of his—he

believed that in the future the Pacific would be approximately the same as the Mediterranean is for Europe and that this region would altogether become a center of civilization. In fact, the Pacific links many intensively developing countries. We are on one shore, the United States is on the other. Yet the development of Soviet-American relations is of tremendous significance in the modern world. Thus the Asian-Pacific direction of policy is interfaced with all others. This is why the building here of a new policy in accordance with the new political thinking is so important.

When, however, we speak of Soviet-Japanese relations, we mean not simply relations but, we hope, cooperation. A peace treaty, the development of further cooperation—this is what lies ahead for us; this is what, evidently, we will be discussing today also.

Y. Kono: Permit me to say a few words about problems of disarmament and security in the Asian-Pacific region. Truly, the Soviet Union is a member of the common European home and simultaneously a member of the Asian-Pacific community, which is in itself unique. Inasmuch as it is a part of the Asian-Pacific region, thought needs to be given to how to further the cause of disarmament and security there. There are two points here. The Soviet Union and the United States, as great and militarily strong powers, have for many years maintained world order. Therefore, from the viewpoint of disarmament in our region a profound dialogue between these two powers is essential. If we take the APR countries, any of them would appear small from the viewpoint of the immense military arsenal of the two great powers. It is for this reason that it is between them that dialogue is needed. Further, in order to maintain peace and security, it is essential not only to reduce arms but also to do away with the spirit of confrontation and develop the friendship of the APR countries. From this viewpoint regular conferences of the countries concerned are needed, as is dialogue.

The Soviet Union neighbors many Asian countries and cooperates today with various states of the APR, whereas earlier it developed relations primarily with China and other countries of the socialist world. It has recently been moving toward new, extensive relations with other countries, which was not the case earlier. And we support this direction of Soviet foreign policy.

As far, however, as problems of security in the APR are concerned, it is of a nature somewhat different from that in Europe. There are in Europe the Warsaw Pact and NATO, between which confrontation was predominant for many years. But, nonetheless, the structure of security in Europe was stable, and negotiating was easier for the parties. In the Asian-Pacific region things are more complex.

N. Matsunaga: It is very pleasing that PRAVDA and ASAHI are conducting such a unique roundtable. Being invited to it is for me a great honor. Speaking of the problem of disarmament and security in the APR, I will

not repeat what has been mentioned already by Deputy Y. Kono. I would like to express some thoughts of my own. The world as a whole is now changing in connection with the fact that East-West relations are changing and that a search for a new path toward global cooperation, whose trend is being observed most noticeably on the European Continent, is under way. But I believe that this search will bear fruit in an Asian direction also.

For a strengthening of security in the APR an improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations is primarily essential. Political stabilization of the situation in our region, for which special efforts should be made, is essential also. In addition, we should advance the cause of economic cooperation of Asian countries, which are located within a sphere of economic prosperity. Relations are now being established between the Soviet Union and South Korea. This is a big step toward a strengthening of stability on the Korean peninsula. But there is the problem of a normalization of the situation in Cambodia, a solution of which must be achieved as quickly as possible. The common efforts of the concerned countries of our region are essential for this. As far as the problem of security is concerned, a big part in its solution should be played by Japan and the Soviet Union and also the United States and China. These four countries should develop among themselves relations and cooperation and ensure dialogue on problems of disarmament and security in the region. We await the development of a serious dialogue on problems of disarmament in the region between the two powers—the USSR and United States.

A. Panov: I have listened very closely to all that has been said by esteemed messieurs Kono and Matsunaga. I have to say that if things go on like this, there will be nothing for us to discuss because I am practically in agreement with the thoughts that they have expressed. It seems to me that this is very symbolic—both that we are discussing this topic and what has already been said here today. Most likely, this could not have been imagined even a few years ago. When the Soviet Union put forward the Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk program, it was treated very skeptically in many countries, Japan included. But we are now actually discussing many of the proposals that were a part of this program. Why has this happened? Primarily because the strategic situation in the world is changing and the processes that are occurring in Soviet-American relations in Europe have begun to influence the Asian-Pacific region also. After all, the USSR and the United States have recognized that they are not adversaries either in Europe or in Asia. A considerable improvement is in evidence in the relations of the Soviet Union and China also.

The main reason for the lag of the APR behind world processes is, in my opinion, the fact that there is no mechanism—regional or subregional—in the region for the discussion both of questions of security and regional problems. This could lead to negative aspects. Voices are being heard there even now to the effect that the process of an improvement in Soviet-American relations is a positive process and that a significant reduction in the

Soviet and American military presence in the region is possible; but might this not afford a number of regional powers an opportunity to fill the vacuum with their own Armed Forces? Japan, China, and India are being named increasingly often in this connection. Such evaluations are, in turn, leading toward a trend toward an increase in military potential on the part of a number of countries of the region. Not so much large as medium-sized and small countries, what is more. On the other hand, processes of a search for bilateral and multilateral military coalitions are beginning also. This could lead to the commencement of the formation of some military blocs. Therefore the task of establishing a negotiating mechanism in the region is extraordinarily important, and it could, in my view, be tackled in two ways. The task of creating an overall colloquium for the region undoubtedly remains. An ever increasing number of states in the region are beginning to show an interest in this. The first meeting of foreign ministers of countries of the region took place during the 45th session of the UN General Assembly. It was held on the initiative of the foreign ministers of Japan and Indonesia. There have been other initiatives also—Australian and Canadian. There is the idea of commencing the process to improve relations between the countries of Indochina and between ASEAN countries and a proposal concerning discussion of the situation in the East China Sea.

M. Hirose: I would like to frankly express my dissatisfaction in connection with the fact that the reduction in Soviet Armed Forces is proceeding very inadequately in the Far East. In some areas the Soviet Union is undertaking unilateral disarmament. This applies to Europe in particular. That is, there the Soviet Union is acting very decisively. But as far as the APR is concerned, no such steps are to be observed. To speak of the Japanese or Chinese Armed Forces, I do not believe that they represent a threat to the Soviet Union. But from Japan's perspective, the Soviet Army is undoubtedly a serious threat to it. This applies particularly to the Soviet nuclear forces concentrated around Vladivostok. The same may be said about the Soviet Union's naval and air forces in the Far East.

ASAHI is constantly writing about the fact that the Japanese Government also needs to reduce its military spending. The National Defense Agency is opposed to this, referring to the fact that whereas an easing of the political climate is under way in Europe, this is not to be seen in the Far East and Asia. It would be desirable for the Soviet president to raise the question of creating a security system in the APR in the course of his visit to Japan.

N. Matsunaga: Japan's military policy is, generally, widely known and is being pursued under the terms of the country's peaceful constitution. Japan proclaimed renunciation forever of the creation of an army, and this was, in fact, an expression of the wishes of the whole Japanese people. In any event, as I believe, Japan's military policy amounts to the creation of the minimum forces necessary for warding off possible aggression. This

is by no means an aggressive military policy based on offense. I believe that the APR countries are beginning to understand this also. Japan must in no event become a great military power. I believe that given the Japanese-American Security Treaty, on which Japan relies and in accordance with which it pursues its military policy, the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty would by no means be in conflict.

V. Ovchinnikov: I am very pleased that my Japanese colleagues share our aspiration to a discussion of the problems of security and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region on a multilateral basis, with the participation of all the states concerned. I agree also with the list of factors necessary for this.

I would like to express a few thoughts in connection with Mr. Hirose's speech. He says that the Soviet Union is decisively reducing its Armed Forces in Europe, but is unwilling to act similarly in the Far East. Until recently the United States, Japan, and the NATO countries were declaring that the Soviet Union had in Europe tremendous superiority to NATO and the Western countries in conventional arms and ground forces. That this was compensated by the superiority of the United States' naval and air forces in the Asian-Pacific region. The Soviet Union has now agreed, in accordance with the Paris accords, to an equalization of its preponderance. Mr. Hirose's arguments thereby merely emphasize what Moscow has been saying repeatedly: That there should be no off-limits in the disarmament process and that this process should be all-embracing both geographically and in the sense of envelopment of all types of arms and Armed Forces. That is, after the Soviet Union has destroyed far more of its tanks, guns and armored personnel carriers in Europe than other countries, the question of the start of Soviet-American negotiations on naval arms will be even more pertinent. Without this there can be no really general security. We agree with Mr. Hirose that the Japanese could be concerned in this connection, and we will endeavor to ensure that negotiations on naval forces be held between Moscow and Washington and that the naval and air presence of the USSR and the United States on the Asian-Pacific region scale be brought into balance.

As far, however, as Japan's anxiety apropos the Soviet nuclear potential is concerned, I would like to remind you that the Soviet Union has announced assurances of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against Japan if the latter undertakes to abide by its three nonnuclear principles. This brings us to the important question of the use of Europe's experience, which shows that the formulation and implementation of confidence-building measures is really possible only on a multilateral basis given the observance of certain principles, that of consensus, in particular.

It seems to me that it is from such confidence-building measures—in the sphere of ecology, the fight against international terrorism, and security on sea and air

routes—that we could become accustomed to international discussion of problems of the security and cooperation of the Asian-Pacific region.

It is often said that the Helsinki outline cannot be transferred to Asian soil. We may speak, probably, not of the Helsinki experience for Asia but of breathing life by making use of the Helsinki example into the Bandung principles born of Asian civilization. In this sense our Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives may be compared not with a Western painting, where each detail is carefully drawn, but an oriental painting, in the traditions of the Zen school, when only the main outlines are given and many empty places are left for everyone—conjecturing—to contribute to the picture something of his own.

N. Shimotomai: It seems to me that there is, for all that, some difference in the attitude toward nuclear weapons among Japanese and among Soviet people. The Japanese represent the population of a country that was the first to suffer from nuclear weapons, and for this reason their attitude toward them is entirely different. There are in Japan people who believe that since there is no agreement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons, they could, consequently, be used at any moment. It is essential, therefore, to keep in mind a Soviet-American agreement on nuclear disarmament. Much will depend on it.

K. Sarkisov: The idea of creating the structure of Asian security is, generally, not an end in itself. It is a question of creating some supranational structures that would help us solve our problems in relations with one another, ensure peace and security, and tackle—and this is what is most important—socioeconomic problems. Because without their solution peace and stability in the APR are hardly possible.

I understand how difficult it is for Japan to conduct a dialogue with us on military problems, proceeding from the specifics of Japan's Armed Forces and the existence of the Japanese-American Security Treaty. But I cannot understand why the Japanese side is not reacting all that readily to our proposals concerning the establishment of direct relations between the military departments. It is obvious to all that the Soviet Union is interested in political stability in the region, proceeding from the new political thinking. Japan—a principal "donor" in the region—is a country that renders others considerable economic assistance and thereby helps them tackle socioeconomic problems. The Soviet Union retains political and military influence. Consequently, there could be some interfaces for us here, and we could somewhere or other find a common language.

A. Yakovlev: It would certainly be right to confirm the positive nature of the approaches that we have heard here. At the same time, however, we most likely need—and my experience points in this direction—to seek points of contact on the difficult and complex issues now lest they impede us in the future. I have met frequently with representatives of Japan of late—politicians and

businessmen and public representatives. It would seem that the nuances and subtleties are clear, by and large, but the more one talks with Japanese representatives, going into some questions in greater depth, the more complex and incomprehensible, I would say, they become. To come to the point, it is clear that the organization of international relations in the APR is at a lower level than in Europe. To me personally it is not entirely clear why. We have become accustomed to saying that everything depends on objective factors, objective circumstances, and the concerns that have actually taken shape, that is, on a sum total of factors. But viewed from this standpoint, the Asian-Pacific region has, I believe, all the objective prerequisites for the development there of processes akin to European processes, with their own emphases, singularities, and problems characteristic of this region, of course. In addition, there could, in my view, be even more grounds for such a process in this region at this time. Rather, there could be fewer difficulties.

In the past five years the Soviet Union has settled relations with such a great power as China, which, of course, has played, could not have failed to have played and will continue to play an ever increasing role—both economic and political—in this region. There has been a significant reduction in forces on both sides of the border, and we are continuing negotiations in this sphere. During the top-level meeting, incidentally, at which I was present, the Chinese did not once say that we represented or now represent for them a military threat. Nor, I believe, does the Japanese side have reason to believe that we represent for them some military threat. Confirmation of this, at least, is the fact that many years have elapsed since the war, and I cannot call to mind an instance of even a simple exacerbation of the military situation, let alone a major one.

Our forces have been withdrawn from Mongolia, and there remain of them there a number that represents not the slightest threat to anyone. Relations with South Korea, which had always been a certain irritant, have been settled. We are establishing relations with Thailand, with Burma, with the Philippines, with Australia, and with Indonesia. Of course, there are problems here, but we are experiencing nothing that goes beyond the framework of customary normal diplomatic life. With Japan itself, if understood in point of essence, relations are normal and mutually respectful. Recently they have become active to such an extent, I would say, that neither side has had the time to digest its partner's proposals. The Japanese side knows full well what we want. We have a clear idea of what the Japanese want. It could only be a cause for regret were all kinds of important proposals pertaining to an interregional settlement or bilateral relations and their expansion to be hedged about with conditions in some way. We should, most likely, develop our relations without any "ifs." Simply develop them. The very development would show us the fairness or unfairness, possibility or impossibility and probability or futility of this solution or the other that is or could be an obstacle in the way of the development of relations.

Some of our Japanese colleagues have assured us now that Japan's policy is of a defensive nature: defense and only defense, nothing more. I believe that you are trying to persuade us of this to no purpose. We believe this to be the case. I, for example, do not allow that Japan will start to pursue a policy of aggression and war against the Soviet Union. But I would like with the same insistence to ask that you believe us also that our military policy contains not one iota of aggression or aggressive designs against Japan. For this reason all talk about a threat still bears, I believe, the imprint of the past propaganda-dogmatic mood.

I believe that bilateral relations need to be developed regardless of everything. I am even getting the impression that appreciable changes in intentions have occurred in your business world in this respect. The Soviet Union has been visited recently, according to my calculations, by approximately 15 serious, respected and, I would say, high-ranking groups of business representatives. I already know of perfectly specific proposals of the Japanese side, I repeat, perfectly specific. Whereas six months or even a year ago talks were being held on a very general level, Japanese business is now talking to us in specific language. I consider this a very serious change. Territorially, we have been condemned to good relations, to millennial existence together. We should be displaying historical responsibility to our future life and be equal to this responsibility in order, on account of some lack of agreement or something else, not to drive the relations of the two great peoples to the point of impasse and not drop out of the world process, when interests and values common to all mankind are beginning more and more to gain the ascendancy.

N. Matsunaga: Japanese-Soviet relations will be of tremendous significance for the whole world community. Indeed, the APR will be a broad arena for international cooperation in the future. This region has tremendous potential for prosperity. The more so in that we can see its highly developed economic potential even now. Such a powerful factor as stable cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union is essential for its continued growth. Our countries should be discussing this topic constantly. In this sense I place big hopes in the development of our bilateral relations and take an optimistic view. I would like us in the course of President M. Gorbachev's visit to Japan to hear words confirming this optimistic trend.

A. Panov: What Mr. Matsunaga said was very constructive, particularly as concerns Soviet-Japanese bilateral relations. I also believe that it is time for us to take our bilateral relations into the top international league, so to speak. As yet, unfortunately, the negotiations that we have held have represented, in the main, an exchange of opinions on international problems and an exchange of expositions of position. There have been no attempts to somehow bring these positions closer together and act with some joint steps

in the international arena. Finally, in September, at the negotiations at foreign minister level, we succeeded for the first time in presenting a common foreign policy action. This was a joint statement in connection with the events in the Persian Gulf. Both parties recognized that this was a statement important and useful to both sides. I believe that it was heard in the international arena and made its contribution to international politics. I believe that we have an opportunity to act jointly on a whole number of other problems, in respect to the Asian-Pacific region particularly. Mention has already been made here of the Korean problems. Without interfering in the internal affairs of the Korean states and their mutual relations, we could contribute to the creation of propitious external conditions for a lessening of tension on the Korean peninsula. The same applies to the problem of a Cambodia settlement.

The second aspect that Mr. Matsunaga mentioned is a peace treaty between our states. A situation has taken shape now where the peace treaty working groups that have been created at the level of the two states' foreign ministries and that have already held six rounds of meetings have the best and most information on this issue. I have taken part in the work of these groups. Both sides have performed a tremendous amount of work on study of the historical, legal, political, and even emotional aspects of the problem. It would most likely be useful to publish all this material at some time. But it is clear even now that the problem is extraordinarily complex and can have no simple solution. For each argument of one side the other immediately finds a counterargument. It seems to me that we need first of all—academician A.N. Yakovlev spoke about this also—to move toward the development of our relations with a radical change therein, in all areas, what is more. In the political sphere, for example, and this would be one area. A second area—the parties' economic relations—requires a radical change also. There are many problems here, and everyone recognizes that all forms of our economic relations that have existed up to the present are exhausted to a considerable extent. We need to more vigorously seek new forms of economic interaction. Finally, a very important question—trust in the military sphere. Unfortunately, in Japan the very word "trust," in the military sphere particularly, is unpopular when it comes to Soviet-Japanese relations. But I am convinced that we need to commence contacts in the military sphere also. Because we could simply say endlessly that one side is apprehensive of the military activity of the other. We need with the aid of a mechanism of military contacts to remove these apprehensions.

A. Panov's speech evoked a lively response among the participants in the discussion. The most varied viewpoints and approaches to a solution of the problems preventing as yet the full-blooded development of Soviet-Japanese relations were presented and specific

proposals on this score were put forward in the course of the exchange of opinions. The problem of the so-called "northern territories," in which connection the most diverse opinions and views—from diametrically opposite to moderate-compromise—were expressed, was also broached, *inter alia*.

I. Frolov: A roundtable is a roundtable, it remains an expression of the opinions of different people, these including, for example, the last question, which has been discussed so heatedly here, and there could, possibly, be different approaches here. I do not believe that our mission is to provide anyone with some recommendations. We are expressing our opinion and speaking frankly, and this is very important. We will recount the discussion in our newspapers. I hope that we will continue our meetings and our discussions. The negotiating processes will continue also, as will the development of our relations and the development of the objective positive trends that have already been observed in our relations. This is what is most important.

Y. Kono: As the second chairman, I also have the right to sum up briefly. Japan and the Soviet Union have had many differences in the past. These differences have been brought about both by the difference in social system and form of government and other factors. But, it transpires, the two countries also have much in common and much that is kindred, and we should not forget this. Proceeding from this, it is very important that we seek mutual understanding on the basis of this which we have in common and all that links and unites us.

PRAVDA Urges CSCE-Type Process for Asia

*PM2602124191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Feb 91 Second Edition p 5*

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov "View From Moscow": "From Vladivostok To San Francisco"]

[Text] Vienna in February proved to be unlike Paris in November. Remember the grand obsequies for the Cold War last fall, when the leaders of 34 states signed in the French capital a Charter for a New Europe and a Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. Three months on, talks have resumed in Vienna aimed at limiting the number of personnel, elaborating extra stability measures, and agreeing on the procedure for aerial inspections.

But the current atmosphere in Vienna is most unlike the euphoria of Paris in November. The United States and other NATO members have sharply criticized the Soviet Union. It is accused, in the first place, of moving beyond the Urals a large quantity of tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns, and aircraft that are subject to cuts. Second, of including several combined-arms divisions in the naval forces which, on U.S. insistence, are not affected by the Paris treaty.

I do not want to perform the role of prosecutor or advocate in this connection. Certainly the cause of the

West's concern must be removed. But if we think about the essential causes of the complications rather than the symptoms, the obvious conclusion is that disarmament can only be really effective if it becomes worldwide, covering all regions of the planet and all categories of modern weapons.

Can the Soviet Union join a European Community represented by only one-third of its territory? Is it not time to expand the framework of the Helsinki process? (Not "from the Atlantic to the Urals," but "from Vladivostok to San Francisco") Is it not time to bring naval armaments into the negotiations, without which the discussion of security problems in the Asia-Pacific region is futile? If these questions had been promptly solved there would have been no need to move combat equipment beyond the Urals or incorporate combined-arms units in the navy.

The USSR has long proposed using the example and experience of Europe to improve the situation in Asia. In its view, the peace-loving communities formed on these two continents would in time merge, resulting in a single security system throughout the Eurasian space. The Soviet initiatives put forward in 1986 in Vladivostok are geared to precisely this in the long term.

The USSR urged a joint quest for ways of building confidence in the Asia-Pacific region and proposed a comprehensive action program in five areas. Let me remind you of them: settling regional conflicts, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the region, restricting naval activities and military presence generally in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, radically reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia, and embarking on the elaboration of confidence-building measures.

All these pointers remain topical to this day. And the Soviet Union has proved its dedication to them in practice by a series of unilateral steps, among other things. As is known, it has reduced armed forces in the Asian part of the country by 200,000 and significantly reduced their nuclear potential. In particular, garrisons are being reduced along the border with China and the withdrawal of troops from Mongolia and evacuation of facilities from Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay are being completed.

Like Vladivostok, San Francisco was an important milestone in the restructuring of Soviet foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific sphere. There was a sensational meeting there last summer between the presidents of the USSR and South Korea. It paved the way for the complete normalization of Moscow-Seoul relations and made a breach in the iron curtain that divided the Far East during the Cold War years. Only six months later the heads of the two states signed a declaration in the Kremlin to the effect that they "champion the ideas of turning Asia and the Pacific into a region of peace and constructive cooperation through a process of bilateral and multilateral consultations."

For many years U.S.-Soviet confrontation was the prime cause of tension in the Asia-Pacific region. But the heads of the two powers' foreign policy departments officially stated in Irkutsk that Washington and Moscow no longer regard one another as military opponents either in Europe, or in Asia. They expressed a readiness to consult with one another and to cooperate with China, Japan, Canada, India, Pakistan, and the ASEAN countries in order to contribute to the formation of processes that have a common regional perspective.

The obstacles to regional integration have finally disappeared, you might think—particularly as the thirst for it has already been realized in practice. I am referring to the Asia-Pacific economic council, which includes the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and also the members of ASEAN (Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei). Soon they will meet in Seoul to add China and its two "wayward children," Taiwan and Hong Kong, to the list. At the council's previous session in Singapore the Australian and Canadian representatives unequivocally called for the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, that is, the start of a "CSCA process" by analogy with the "CSCE process." So a prototype negotiating mechanism already exists in the region. What is preventing it from being fully activated, with the participation of all interested states?

Japan and the United States remain opposed to a collective discussion of security and cooperation problems in the Asia-Pacific region. Since it lays claim to the "northern territories," Tokyo fears anything along the lines of the Helsinki Final Act, which consolidated postwar borders. First let Moscow give up the islands, then we will be able to have a joint discussion of regional security problems—that is the essence of the Japanese stance. The idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is also obstinately rejected by the United States, although since the official statements in Irkutsk it is more difficult for it to justify this.

Confrontation between the two superpowers in Asia, the Hong Kong weekly *FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW* notes, is essentially a reflection of the situation in Europe. The vast superiority of U.S. and Japanese naval forces in the northern Pacific made sense in the context of a global strategy designed to offset the superiority of Soviet ground forces in Europe. But now that the Warsaw Pact is no longer a threat to NATO, the journal concludes, this concept is an anachronism.

Washington, however, stubbornly refuses to enter into talks with Moscow about naval armaments, saying that the United States is a naval power, whereas the USSR is a land power. (This argument, in itself groundless, prompts the question: Is it logical, then, to strive for parity with the USSR on land while seeking to preserve U.S. superiority at sea?) According to the new version, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will serve not so much to protect against an unlikely "Soviet threat" as to provide a counterweight to the further growth of Chinese political influence and Japanese military might. No one else can be the "stabilizer," they say, so the main elements of the U.S. Asian strategy—forward-based forces, foreign bases, bilateral military agreements—will remain.

But the course of events since the funeral of the Cold War—the arguments in Vienna and the battles on the Arabian peninsula—shows that there must be no prohibited areas and "sacred cows" in the matter of disarmament. The war in the Persian Gulf, the Japanese paper *ASAHI* notes, must be a lesson for the Asia-Pacific region. It reminds us of the need to reach agreement on confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region, which in this respect is lagging behind Europe, and immediately embark on the creation of a security structure in the region.

So let the "Vladivostok to San Francisco" formula be put into practice. And in a double sense: both as an expanded zone of the all-European process and as the Asia-Pacific region merged with it.

CANADA

Defense Department Said To 'Dabble in' CW Production

91WC0074A Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*
in English 12 Feb 91 pp A1, A8

[Article by Miro Cernetig: "Canada Dabbles in Nerve Gas"]

[Text] CFB Suffield, Alta—There is no refrigerator like it anywhere else in Canada.

The white table-top cooler, normally used to store milk or yesterday's meatloaf, instead holds Canada's home-grown cache of chemical weapons [CW], a half-dozen glass vials containing a small, but lethal, sampling of the poison gases most experts expect to be unleashed during the war in the Persian Gulf.

"That's Tabun, that's Sarin and that's VX," says Peter Lockwood, a Department of National Defence scientist, who wears latex gloves as he points out the clear liquids, a drop of which would be enough to kill.

"This here is Soman," he adds as he brings the gas out for inspection, holding the fragile vial above the laboratory's hard tile floor.

"You would need tonnes of this to fight a war. Although, you could kill a lot of people with this if they stood in line for you to administer it.

Although most Canadians are unaware of it, government scientists like Mr Lockwood who work at the Defence Research Establishment Suffield, a series of laboratories on CFB Suffield, are creating new and potential nerve agents to research means of defending allied soldiers against the invisible gases.

One floor down in the same complex, located on the rolling prairie 54 kilometres northwest of Medicine Hat, scientists in another laboratory are experimenting with virulent diseases, such as bubonic plague, and are trying to use genetic engineering to come up with new vaccines.

Contrary to what some critics of the program have charged, the centre does not have enough of the chemicals to produce weapons, according to John Moldon, who heads the research establishment.

"We're talking about what you would find in a bottle of nose drops or ear drops... There's nothing in weapons quantities," he says.

Like the United States, Canada has not officially renounced the right to use chemicals as a retaliatory weapon. It is, however, a signatory to the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the first-use, development and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Ottawa signed the treaty in 1925, a decade after 6,000 Canadian and French troops became the casualties of the world's first gas attack at Ypres.

In 1937, however, apparently without consultation with parliament or cabinet, the Canadian military began a top-secret chemical and biological weapons research program. Today, the program is described as strictly defensive in scope.

Scientists at the Suffield laboratory stress that although they experiment with deadly diseases inside the controlled laboratory, they do not genetically alter the bacterial pathogens in the hope of creating a supergerm for use against an enemy. The only genetic engineering carried out involves manipulation of bacteria that may serve as new vaccines.

But while creating a weapon may not be the intent of the research, experts say it could sometimes be the result. Government scientists will sometimes synthesize potential new nerve gases and other toxic agents and then carry out animal tests. The results of those tests, carried out on tissue samples, rodents and, occasionally, monkeys, are shared with the United States and Britain under a memorandum of understanding among the three governments, Mr Muldon says.

"We have never developed or made a nerve agent here that someone took and made into a weapon," Mr Lockwood says.

But some experts suggest that such international sharing of information on potential nerve gases could open up the possibility of other countries, such as the United States, which has chemical weapons, using raw Canadian research to carry out offensive work.

John Bryden, author of *DEADLY ALLIES*, a book about Canada's biological and chemical warfare research program, says that when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, most information can be used for either defensive or offensive purposes, depending on the intent of the knowledge holder.

"The research is cooperative," Mr Bryden says. "Each country takes a part of the research that may seem quite innocent. But when you put it all together, you may have a weapon that's quite lethal."

If, for example, Canadian researchers develop a fool-proof antidote for nerve gas, that would serve as a formidable defence against a gas attack. If, however, an army decided to instruct its troops to use the antidote before they launched a gas attack, the same antidote would provide an offensive advantage.

"Any time you develop something that gives your troops protection against a potential weapon, you give your troops an advantage," Mr Bryden says.

The fact that government scientists dabble with such potential killers has been a public relations nightmare for the Defence Department, of which the research establishment is a branch.

People have labelled the Suffield base a camp of death and charged that the 60 government scientists are making secret chemical and biological weapons.

The scientists at Suffield say they are simply doing their best to keep up with a Pandora's box of deadly chemical and biological weapons that enemies could use against Canada and its allies. In fact, their work has resulted in a variety of ways in which Canada's forces can fight the invisible enemies, including:

- HI-6, considered the world's best antidote for most nerve gases. Each Canadian soldier has been issued three plastic cartridges that can be self-injected if a soldier becomes contaminated.
- A skin lotion that can neutralize nerve gas should the gas penetrate a soldier's protective gear.
- Two remote early-warning systems to detect the presence of biological or chemical agents in the air.

Curbs on Sales of 'High-Tech', 'Mass-Destruction' Arms Sought

91WC0075A Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL
in English 9 Feb 91 p A8

[Article by Ross Howard and Hugh Winsor: "PM Seeks Summit To Limit Arms Sales"]

[Text] Ottawa—Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called for a United Nations summit yesterday to limit the sales of high-technology arms and weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Mulroney, in a speech to the Confederation Club, also called for a coordinated effort to rebuild the Persian Gulf region after the war ends. He said Canada will also help develop and implement a postwar environmental-recovery plan.

Meanwhile, Ottawa, is sending equipment for rescuing wildlife trapped in oil spills, assembling oil booms and skimmers for shipment to the region, and sending an expert to co-ordinate the oil cleanup in the southern gulf area.

On Tuesday, United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar will receive a proposal from Mr Mulroney for a conference of leaders to condemn the use and sale of weapons of mass destruction and to accelerate treaties to eliminate such weapons.

The proposals stem from concern by the Canadian government that a plan be developed to ensure postwar peace in the Middle East.

Earlier this week, speaking to a Commons Committee, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark proposed a regional economic development bank, or similar institution, which would attempt to distribute wealth now held unevenly by a few Arab countries.

Mr Clark has also offered Canada's expertise in arms-control verification in any international attempt to stem the flow of weaponry into the Middle East after the war ends.

In his speech to the Progressive Conservative-sponsored club yesterday, the prime minister said "no plan for regional security can hope to succeed in the absence of progress on the Arab-Israeli dispute," and he cited UN resolutions calling upon Israel to withdraw from the West Bank.

Mr Mulroney made a passing reference to the Marshall Plan, created after the Second World War to help European economic recovery, but the Middle East plan relies more heavily on funds from within the region.

Canada's plan apparently does not entail large financial aid to Iraq, or money from outside the region to Kuwait, because it is presumed that "Iraq's oil revenues, freed from the burden of wasteful arms purchases, should be able to finance its own reconstruction effort," Mr Mulroney said.

Kuwait's reconstruction may require Canadian expertise, he said, but "we assume this effort will be financed largely by Kuwait" and other Arab states.

Mr Mulroney was vague about most details of the Canadian initiatives, all of which depend upon resolution of the war with an "unconditional withdrawal" of Iraq from Kuwait.

However, installation of a peacekeeping force between Iraq and Kuwait, made up primarily of troops from Arab, Muslim and Nordic nations, is included in the Canadian proposals.

The government took extensive steps yesterday to give its proposals for the postwar Middle East the trappings of a major initiative. Ambassadors from all of the countries in the gulf coalition were invited to attend Mr Mulroney's speech, and senior External Affairs officials offered reporters a special briefing.

There was also a concerted effort made to link the proposals to Canada's traditional interests at the United Nations and its experience in UN-sponsored peacekeeping activities, a perpetuation of the country's international role as a "helpful fixer."

Interviewed after Mr Mulroney's speech, Egypt's ambassador to Canada, Mohamed Hussein Elsafty, said he thought many of the Canadian points were "interesting," especially the proposal for a summit conference on controlling weapons of mass destruction.

But a European ambassador said many of the proposals for postwar reconstruction were being discussed by other countries.

An External Affairs official conceded that Ottawa has a selling job on its hands. As part of that selling job, Marc

Perron, the assistant deputy minister for Africa and the Middle East, will visit countries in the Middle East region next week.

Government's Failure To Back Achieve Nuclear Test Ban Criticized

91WC0063A Toronto THE TORONTO STAR
in English 28 Jan 91 p A16

[Text] External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has strong beliefs about the horrors of the arms trade.

"Arms cost billions, they distort economies; they make unstable regions more unstable; they ensure that conflict becomes more bloody when it occurs," he told an Ottawa meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations.

Unfortunately, Clark's beliefs aren't always translated into action. At a United Nations conference on nuclear-weapons testing, Canada couldn't even bring itself to vote in favor of a future conference, let alone argue vociferously for a complete ban on tests of nuclear arms.

The United States is adamantly opposed to a comprehensive ban, mainly because it's developing new weapons it wants to test for its Star Wars program. So the conference was doomed to failure, both the U.S. and Britain threatened a veto if the proposed amendment came to a vote.

Taking its cue from the U.S., Canada initially opposed even holding a conference until it became clear the meeting was going ahead despite the opposition. Making a virtue of necessity, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Finland then presented thoughtful and persuasive arguments that a complete ban on testing can be verified and so policed.

The arguments couldn't budge the U.S. So rather than risk a veto, the conference never called for a vote, sparing Canada the embarrassment of following Washington while voting against it.

Failure to achieve a comprehensive ban has two serious consequences.

One is that, without a ban, more new weapons are sure to be added to the world's nuclear arsenal, if not by the superpowers then by adventurers like Saddam Hussein.

The second consequence is the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don't yet have them. Third World nations like India and Pakistan argue that as long as some Western nations have the weapons and can keep on developing new ones, they can't be asked to eschew them.

If the countries that now have nuclear arms—the U.S. foremost among them—agreed to stop testing the Third World argument would have less force.

DENMARK

Disputes Over CFE 'Peace Dividend'

91EN0273A Copenhagen WEEKENDAVISEN
in Danish 1 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Michael Kristiansen: "The Dove of Peace Has Flown Away"—first paragraph is WEEKENDAVISEN introduction]

[Excerpts] War and Peace. The agreement on the Danish defense and security policy may soon appear as an optical illusion. The government wants Denmark to play a more active military role. The Social Democratic Party wants to reap the dividend of peace.

The first bomb over Iraq was also a bomb under the agreement on the Danish defense and security policy. [passage omitted]

Money will probably be the last thing that the Armed Forces will be given more of.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen tells WEEKENDAVISEN: "The political decisions of the next six months will become extremely decisive for Denmark's position in Europe and in the world. And it is clear that there will be problems within the Folketing. We are faced with a new world picture. But, at the same time, the soaring euphoria over events is probably abating. Denmark will have to stop thinking in the same old terms and become considerably more involved in the relevant forums where the decisions are made."

The minister of foreign affairs does not least have in mind the West European Union [WEU], a forum consisting of most of the West European countries, but in which Denmark only has observer status.

Collision Course on WEU

The West European Union is by many experts regarded as the coming forum for the European defense and security policy. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen says that, in the Gulf war as well, the West European Union has shown its strength in the coordination of the European efforts.

The Social Democratic Party has so far shown no interest at all in a Danish entry into the West European Union. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Knud Enggaard says: "The Danish Armed Forces will, to a larger extent, have to join multinational forces. The future belongs to them. We shall, of course, have to retain a territorial defense, but we shall, at the same time, have to expand the cooperation that we already have with the German Armed Forces. It was a mental leap to send off the Olfert Fischer. Apparently, Denmark is getting ready to engage us more clearly, and we shall continue the mental and political development toward a larger active Danish contribution."

Hans Haekkerup (Social Democratic Party) [defense policy spokesman] does not flatly reject Enggaard's wishes: "Further involvement depends on additional training, and thus on additional resources. I do not rule out the possibility, but there are obvious economic limitations."

Dividend Problems

The discussion has thus reverted to finances, and the so-called "peace dividend" that is released on account of detente and the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreements between the superpowers.

The Social Democratic Party has stipulated that once the CFE agreement has been ratified, the parties to the defense agreement will have to discuss the possible economic profit. In other words: the amount of cutbacks within the Danish Armed Forces.

The Social Democratic Party has already proposed defense cuts of 300 million kroner during the election campaign and under this year's budget. In answer to the question whether the development in the Baltic states has caused the Social Democratic Party to consider the cuts once more, [Social Democratic security policy spokesman] Ritt Bjerregaard says: "No. There is no reason to hold back. On the contrary, we have to use the 'peace dividend' to help stabilize the situation within the Soviet Union. I do not regard the developments in the Baltic states as a military threat, but as a threat of instability within the Soviet Union. And if we do not help, we risk being left with a refugee problem which we have no possibility of tackling." Ritt Bjerregaard predicts a confrontation between the government and the Social Democratic Party on this point. She assumes that the government will take funds from the aid to developing countries to finance the aid to the East [European] countries, whereas the Social Democratic Party wants retrenchments within the defense budget.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen takes a much cooler view of the "peace dividend."

"Some people probably forget that a dividend is something that only comes once the actions have been concluded. And the dividend usually never becomes as large as expected."

The government and the Social Democratic Party may thus expect quite a few disputes when the future strategy for the Danish defense and security policy will have to be arranged.

"However, I hope that there will still be good forces within the Social Democratic Party that, after all, wish well for the Armed Forces." Defense Minister Knud Enggaard states with regard to the coming months.

"If the foreign minister wants to run egoistic solo races on account of opinion poll figures, he will realize that

there is no majority within the Folketing. But the government may, of course, then fall on that matter," Hans Haekkerup says.

The parties, however, agree that the EC cannot, for the time being, be used as the uniting organ for a European defense and security policy. [passage omitted]

GERMANY

Report Names Firms Involved With Iraqi Arms

Government Investigations Detailed

91GE0150A Bonn DIE WELT in German
11 Feb 91 p 6

[Article by "mik": "Saddam Husayn's German Business Partners: The Confidential Preliminary Report of Investigations on Suspicion of Illegal Arms Exports"]

[Text] German public prosecutors, customs officials, and tax examiners are investigating 44 enterprises on suspicion of illegal arms exports to Iraq. That is the result of a confidential preliminary report, compiled on the orders of the federal government, on the state of the investigations. It is at the disposal of DIE WELT. According to the report, the scrutiny of the investigating authorities has led to the initiation of at least four criminal proceedings. In 30 cases, the officials reached no conclusions on illegal business practices.

The paper is the German response to a list by U.S. Senator Jesse A. Helms. Even two years ago, the conservative politician blustered in the foreign affairs committee of the U.S. Senate: If the Bonn government had read page one of the NEW YORK TIMES of 30 March 1984, it would have known that the German firm, Karl Kolb, was building a poison-gas factory in Iraq. Helms verbatim at that time: "If the German foreign minister did not know that, he needs a blind man's cane. He did not want to know it."

Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Husayn's troops, Helms handed his President, George Bush, a list compiled from publicly accessible sources ("Saddam Husayn's Foreign Legion") of 132 suppliers to Iraq—62 of them from the FRG. Early in January Helms, through diplomatic channels, provided the Bonn government with an updated version.

On the basis of this list and documentation from the Simon Wiesenthal Center ("The Poison Gas Connection"), German security authorities compiled for the federal government the findings on contributions by Germans to the Iraqi armaments program. It turned out to be very difficult to prove violations of existing law against the enterprises listed as business partners of Iraq. Even worse: In at least two cases, the legal position lagged behind the existing situation. Export regulations

were tightened when it became known that some special vehicles, for instance, up to then did not fall under the embargo.

Even in the case of the Karl Kolb connection, matters are proceeding only slowly. The prosecutors' investigation took seven years, and it will take several more weeks until it is decided whether initiation of main proceedings will be applied for.

The borderline between legal and illegal transactions is obviously unclear—the investigators are moving on very difficult ground. They are focusing on three groups: First, it is relatively easy to ascertain participants in large projects, for on the basis of the necessary know-how only a handful of first-class industries come into consideration. Those, however, frequently send medium-sized subsidiaries or companies controlled by subsidiaries into the field, or deliver supplies via foreign partners. Second, also easily ascertained is the small group of unscrupulous specialists who do not flinch from doing business involving biological and chemical weapons. Third and last, the investigators are trying to shed some light on the semidarkness surrounding the group of mercantile agents who arranged Husayn's business deals.

1. No Findings

ABB Asca Brown Boveri AG, Mannheim—Electrical engineering (sales: 6.1 billion German marks [DM]; 34,100 employees). Allegation: Electrical equipment for smelting furnace in gun factory. Status of the case: "Review by Main Finance Administration in Karlsruhe showed only exports of general electrical equipment exempt from licensing. In addition, delivery of smelting furnaces exempt from licensing."

AEG AG, Berlin and Frankfurt/Main—Electrical engineering (sales: DM12.2 billion; 89,600 employees). Majority shareholder is Daimler-Benz (approximately 80 percent), the rest are scattered holdings. Allegation: Production plant for weapons and ammunition. Status of the case: "Customs Criminal Institute has no findings relevant to Iraq. On the basis of SPIEGEL data, correlation to concrete facts of the case not possible. (Probably domestic ancillary supplies to the actual exporter.)"

Aviatec, Neuss—Subsidiary of Rheinmetall. Allegation: Subcontractor for chemical weapons factory SAAD 16. Status of the case: "Domestic ancillary supplies to Gildemeister."

Blohm Maschinenbau GmbH, Hamburg—Production and marketing of grinding machines. The parent company (100 percent) is Koerber AG (engineering; sales: DM1.1 billion; 6,400 employees), Hamburg. Allegation: Computer-directed grinding installation for missile research establishment. Status of the case: "Land Office of Criminal Investigation in Darmstadt found no indications of illegal exports."

CBV Blumhardt Fahrzeuge GmbH & Co. KG, Wuppertal—High-capacity cars, low-weight platforms and

dumping wagons, chassis for containers and superstructures (sales: DM45 million; 220 employees). Allegation: special transporters for tanks. Status of the case: "Semi-trailers were exempt from licensing; obligation to obtain a permit is being introduced."

Daimler-Benz AG, Stuttgart-Untertuerkheim—largest German industrial enterprise (sales: DM76.3 billion; 339,000 employees); owners: Deutsche Bank (28.28 percent), Mercedes-Automobil-Holding (25.23 percent), the emirate of Kuwait (14), and 300,000 individual shareholders. In correlation with the blocks of Mercedes-Benz AG, Stuttgart, AEG AG, Berlin and Frankfurt/Main, as well as Deutsche Aerospace AG, Munich, Aerospace (aeronautics and space technology, driving gears, defense technology and medical technology, 63,000 employees) are, among others, the holdings of AEG Luft- und Raumfahrt, Dornier, MTU Motoren-und Turbinen-Union as well as MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH. Allegation: armored vehicles. Status of the case: "Examination by Main Finance Administration in Stuttgart established only exports exempted from licensing."

Degussa AG, Frankfurt/Main—precious metals (sales: DM14.4 billion; 32,400 employees in the corporation); parent company of Leybold AG, Hanau. Major shareholder (with 37 percent) of Degussa is GfC Gesellschaft fuer Chemiewerte mbH, Duesseldorf (Henkel family, Dresdner Bank, Muenchner Rueckversicherung), 40,000 free shareholders. Allegation: Equipment for chemical weapons factory. Status of the case: "Customs Criminal Institute has no findings relevant to Iraq. Clear correlation to facts and circumstances on the basis of DER SPIEGEL data not possible. (Domestic ancillary deliveries to other exporter?)"

Deutsche BP AG, Hamburg—mineral oil (sales: DM11.9 billion; 5,500 employees). Allegation: "Military equipment." Status of the case: "Customs Criminal Institute has no findings relevant to Iraq."

W.C. Heraeus GmbH, Hanau—production of semifinished and finished goods of nonferrous metal (sales: DM4.6 billion; 9,100 employees). Allegation: tube-shaped furnace for biological weapons. Status of the case: "Domestic delivery of a tube furnace to Labsco."

Infraplan. Allegation: installations for the preparation of chemical production. Status of the case: "The Cologne Customs Investigation Office has no findings."

Iveco Magirus AG, Ulm—medium-sized and heavy trucks (sales: DM2.5 billion; 6,800 employees). Allegation: carrier vehicles for mobile toxicological laboratories. Status of the case: "Exports of eight vehicles with laboratory installations by the Rhein-Bayern firm was carried out with negative certificate."

KWU—division of Siemens AG, Munich, until business year 1986/87 Kraftwerk Union AG, Muehlheim a.d. Ruhr. Allegation: nuclear technologies. Status of the

case: "There supposedly were negotiations with Iraqi authorities between 1978 and 1980. No contract was concluded."

Labsco Laboratory Supply Company GmbH & Co. KG, Friedberg—planning and delivery of laboratories and laboratory equipment, primarily overseas—Near East, Far East, Africa (sales 1988: DM8.7 million; 14 employees). Allegation: various biological equipment. Status of the case: "Examination under foreign trade law (AWP) did not result in indications of unauthorized exports."

Lasco Umformtechnik GmbH, Coburg—machine tools (sales 1988: DM53 million, 250 employees), subsidiary of Langenstein & Schemann GmbH, Coburg. Allegation: forging presses for artillery shells. Status of the case: "Prosecutor's office in Hof terminated investigation, because it concerned universal equipment exempt from licensing."

Leifeld & Co. (Leico), Ahlen/Westphalia—tool and machine factory (1988: 470 employees); sold by Matuschka group to Westfalenbank. Allegation: drive jets for rockets, engineering services. Status of the case: "Main Finance Administration in Muenster did not discover unauthorized exports."

MAN-Roland Druckmaschinen AG, Offenbach—97.81 percent owned by MAN AG, Munich. Allegation: transport equipment. Status of the case: "MAN-Roland produces diecasting machines. Probably mistaken for the Roland antitank missile, which was delivered to Iraq by the MBB joint enterprise. Euromissile."

MAN-Technologie AG, Munich—subsidiary of MAN AG, Munich. Allegation: nuclear technology. Status of the case: "Only domestic ancillary delivery to H + H."

Marposs GmbH, Fellbach/Krefeld—electronic measuring instruments for machine tools (190 employees). Allegation: production plant for weapons and ammunition. Status of the case: "Ancillary delivery to H + H. Customs Criminal Institute and Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf noted no violation of foreign-trade law regulations."

Matuschka Gruppe, Munich—financial services (staff of 400), the Leico firm was sold meanwhile, see under Leico. Allegation: Leico. Status of the case: "Mentioned only as owners of Leico."

MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH, Ottobrunn—development, production, and sale of products of aviation and space technology, defense technology, naval technology, of machine, vehicle and equipment engineering, electrical and electronics technology; for example, helicopters, Tornado jet fighters, Ariane missiles, Airbus, the Hot and Milan antitank systems, the Roland defense system against low-flying aircraft (sales: DM6.3 billion; 37,400 employees); compare Daimler-Benz. Allegation: technology for the FAE (Fuel Air explosive); subcontract for the chemical weapons factory SAAD 16; attack helicopters; participation in

Euromissile, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France; Hot and Roland systems; electronics and test equipment for Condor 2 missiles; laboratory equipment. Status of the case: "FAE-bomb delivery of project studies to AGY was exempt from licensing according to the prosecutors of the Land Court Munich II, since they were not manufacturing records. As to SAAD 16, Condor, electronics, and tests for Condor 2, laboratory equipment—the prosecution of the Land Court Munich II has not initiated formal investigations due to lack of sufficient indications of illegal exports (domestic transactions with Consen subsidiary, PGB). Helicopters—so far, no unauthorized exports were found."

Heinrich Mueller Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Pforzheim—founded in 1906, ordinary capital DM400,000; 80 employees. Allegation: technical improvement of the Scud B missile. Status of the case: "The exports carried out were exempt from licensing. Meanwhile the injection nozzle now requires an export license."

Plato-Kuehn (Josef Kuehn), Neustadt am Ruebenberge. Allegation: toxins. Status of the case: "Delivery of the small quantities of toxins (but not the fungi producing them) was exempt from licensing."

Schirmer-Plate-Siempelkamp, Krefeld. Allegation: production plant for weapons and ammunition. Status of the case: "Reviewed by Main Finance Administration in Duesseldorf: the exports were exempt from licensing."

Schmidt, Kranz & Co. GmbH, Velbert—mining equipment, load suspension devices, pumps, and compressors, suction and dust removal (200 employees). Allegation: computer-assisted device for material testing. Status of the case: "Ancillary delivery to H + H for pressure testing device, which in turn was exempt from licensing."

Siemens AG, Berlin/Munich—third-largest German industrial enterprise (sales 1989: DM61.1 billion, 365,000 employees, 538,000 shareholders), electrical products. Allegation: parent company of Interatom GmbH in Bergisch Gladbach (nuclear technology), computer guidance system for gun factory, echo-free space for missile research. Status of the case: "According to the Customs Criminal Institute, there are no findings relevant to Iraq. On the basis of DER SPIEGEL data they cannot be correlated to a concrete state of affairs. (Probably they were normal domestic ancillary deliveries to other firms, which were exporters.)"

Sigma Chemie, Oberhaching. Allegation: chemical-biological raw materials. Status of the case: "It could never be ascertained whether delivery actually took place. Furthermore, because of the extremely small quantities of toxins (not the fungi producing them!) they would have been exempt from licensing."

TUeV—Technischer Ueberwachungsverein, Saarland. Allegation: material surveys for Saarstahl and Export-Union. Status of the case: "Only prepared material surveys."

WTB Walter-Thosti-Boswau Bau-AG, Augsburg—construction industry (group sales: DM1.6 billion; 7,800 employees). Allegation: construction of four factories for nerve gas. Status of the case: "The Customs Investigation Office investigated in connection with PBG. The construction services were exempt from licensing."

Wegmann & Co. GmbH, Kassel—tank turrets, mobile launcher systems, gun mounts, retooling and improving combat effectiveness, training, logistical support, equipment and construction components (sales 1987: DM874 million; 4,800 employees in group). Allegation: traction engine for rocket ramp. Status of the case: "Main Finance Administration in Frankfurt has not found violations of foreign trade law."

Ed. Zueblin AG, Stuttgart—construction business (sales: DM1.2 billion; 6,800 employees). Allegation: construction of steel mill in gun factory. Status of the case: "The Customs Criminal Institute has no findings relevant to Iraq. But might also be included in the investigations of the Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and the Bochum prosecution with regard to Taji."

2. Ongoing Investigations

Anlagen Bau Contor/Beaujean Consulting Engineers, Stutensee near Karlsruhe. Allegation: purchase of high-capacity propulsions for rockets. Status of the case: "Investigations underway by Karlsruhe prosecutors."

Buderus AG, Wetzlar—foundry (sales: DM2.7 billion; 14,200 employees), major shareholder is Feldmuehle Nobel AG, Duesseldorf (98 percent); also see Dynamit Nobel. Allegation: foundry technology for gun factory. Status of the case: "Included in the investigations of the Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and the Bochum prosecution concerning Taji."

Dango und Diententhal Maschinenbau GmbH, Siegen—sales: DM40 million. Allegation: equipment to work smelttable materials. Status of the case: "Included in the investigations of the Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and the Bochum prosecution concerning Taji."

Wolfgang Denzel. Allegation: radar, radio and navigation equipment for helicopters. Status of the case: "Prosecutor's office in Stuttgart is investigating."

Dynamit Nobel AG, Troisdorf—explosives (sales: DM 1.1 billion; 7,000 employees), a subsidiary of Feldmuehle Nobel AG, Duesseldorf, also see Buderus. Allegation: production plant for weapons and ammunition. Status of the case: "Bonn prosecutors are investigating."

Export-Union Duesseldorf GmbH, Duesseldorf—steel export (sales: DM70 million; 20 employees). Allegation: metal for the manufacture of components for gas centrifugal machines for uranium enrichment. Status of the case: "Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf is investigating."

Faun AG, Lauf, headquarters: Nuernberg—commercial vehicles, defense technology. Allegation: transport vehicles for tanks. Status of the case: "Main Finance Administration in Nuernberg is investigating."

Ferrostaal AG, Essen—international trade with iron and steel, industrial plants, equipment, forges, infrastructure projects (sales: DM4.3 billion; 745 employees); sole shareholder is MAN AG, Munich. Allegation: general contractor for the construction of a gun factory. Universal forge. Status of the case: "Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and Bochum prosecutors are investigating (Project Taji)."

Graeser GmbH, Fischbachthal/Hesse—partner is Ramzi Al Khatib. Allegation: business arrangement for a plant, to construct a gun factory. Status of the case: "Arrangement of business deals, investigations still ongoing."

Havert Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, Neu-Isenburg—Consult Project Engineering. Allegation: technical improvement of Scud missiles. Status of the case: "Main Finance Administration in Frankfurt is investigating. The enterprise was searched on 15 January 1991, records confiscated."

Heberger Bau GmbH, Schifferstadt—construction business (sales 1988: DM104 million; 471 employees), branch office: Heberger Bau GmbH, Baghdad, Iraq. Allegation: building for chemical weapons factories. Status of the case: "Customs Criminal Institute is investigating in connection with Taji. (Probably only construction activity exempt from licensing)."

H + H Metalform GmbH, Drensteinfurt/Muensterland. Allegation: computer-based installation for scrutiny of material and hardening process of gun barrels and grenade cases, rocket bodies, machines for the production of gas, and ultra-centrifuges required for uranium enrichment and rocket casings. Status of the case: "The Customs Criminal Institute and Main Finance Administration in Muenster are investigating. The Federal Office for Industry oversees reliability."

Hochtief AG, Essen—second-largest German construction enterprise (sales: DM5.5 billion; 26,400 employees). Allegation: construction of the foundation of a gun factory. Status of the case: "Included in the investigations of the customs investigating office in Duesseldorf and the Bochum prosecution regarding Taji."

I.B.I., Frankfurt/Main. Allegation: construction service for chemical weapons factory. Status of the case: "Cannot be pursued further, since the owner (Barboudi) went abroad and has meanwhile been murdered."

Integral/Sauerinformatic/ICME, Neumuenster. Allegation: computer programs. Status of the case: "Included in the investigations by the prosecution at the Land court in Bielefeld regarding Gildemeister."

Interatom GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach—planning, building and putting into operation of, among other things, breeder reactors, high-temperature reactors and

research reactors; uranium enrichment plants; superconductor magnets (sales: DM422 million; 1,570 employees), subsidiary of Siemens AG, Munich. Allegation: nuclear technology. Status of the case: "Investigations underway. Under pressure by the federal government, Interatom has terminated training program for Iraqis and will not deliver shop for building pipelines."

Inwako GmbH, Bonn—import and export. Allegation: technical improvement of Scud B missile, magnets for plant for uranium enrichment. Status of the case: "Prosecutor's office in Bonn is investigating."

Kavo. Allegation: electrical components for nuclear weapons factory. Status of the case: "Customs Criminal Institute charged with investigation."

Kloekner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH, Duisburg—independent engineering consulting (sales 1988: DM613 million; 630 employees), subsidiaries, among other places, in Teheran, Iran, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; partner is the Handelshaus Kloekner & Co. AG, Duisburg. Allegation: compressors and machine parts, steel production for gun factory. Status of the case: "Ancillary delivery to Ferrostaal (Taji); Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and Bochum prosecutors are investigating."

Loybold AG, Hanau (no longer included in latest list)—vacuum technology, coating installations (sales: DM1 billion; 5,400 employees), sole shareholder is Degussa AG, Frankfurt; compare there. Allegation: three casting installations for gun factory. Status of the case: "according to DER SPIEGEL of 6 August 1990, delivery of three resmelting installations for Taji (also, see Ferrostaal); according to DER SPIEGEL of 13 August 1990, delivery of auto-frettagage installation of the firm of Schmidt, Kranz & Co. with export license."

LOI Essen Industrieofenanlagen GmbH, Essen—furnaces, rapid heating and cooling installations, inert gas installations (sales: DM160 million; 520 employees), parent company: Ruhrgas AG, Essen. Allegation: smelting furnaces for gun production. Status of the case: "Included in the investigations of the Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and Bochum prosecution regarding Taji."

Mannesmann Demag AG, Duisburg—machine and plant construction (sales: DM4.1 billion; 19,800 employees), subsidiary of Mannesmann AG, Duesseldorf, compare Mannesmann Demag Huettentechnik. Allegation: production plant for weapons and ammunition. Status of the case: "Ancillary delivery to Ferrostaal (Taji project). Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and Bochum prosecutors are investigating."

Mannesmann Demag-Huettentechnik, Duisburg—blast-furnace installations; branch operation of Mannesmann Demag AG, Duisburg, a 100-percent subsidiary of Mannesmann AG (sales: DM22.3 billion; 121,000 employees), Duesseldorf. Allegation: casting equipment for gun factory. Status of the case: "Included in the

investigations of Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and Bochum prosecution regarding Taji."

Maschinenfabrik Ravensburg AG, Ravensburg—machine tools (sales 1988: DM36 million; 195 employees). Allegation: machine tools. Status of the case: "Ancillary delivery to Ferrostaal (Taji); Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf is investigating."

MBB-Transtecnica, Taufkirchen—enterprise of the Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH, Ottobrunn; also see Daimler-Benz AG. Allegation: calibration instruments for rocket research. Status of the case: "Investigations by prosecutors at the Land Court Munich II still continue in connection with the criminal proceedings against the Consen subsidiary, PBG."

Philips GmbH, systems and special technology division, Bremen—equipment, installations, and systems in the fields of optronics, position finding, communications, and data processing for defense technology and civilian use. Belongs to Philips corporation, Eindhoven, Netherlands. Allegation: night sight equipment. Status of the case: "Main Finance Administration in Bremen is investigating."

Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau GmbH & Co. KG, Kaufbeuren—business manager: Anton Eyerle (mentioned separately by Helms), special vehicles of all types, beverages, laboratory, workshop, ambulance and radio vehicles (sales: DM25 million; 50 employees). Allegation: mobile toxicological laboratory. Status of the case: "Main Finance Administration in Munich has not found unauthorized exports. There were ancillary domestic deliveries to Iveco-Magirus Deutz. Main Finance Administration in Munich continues investigations."

Saarstahl AG, Voelklingen—iron and steel (sales: DM2.5 billion; 9,300 employees). Allegation: metal for production of gas centrifuge components for uranium enrichment. Status of the case: "See Export-Union."

SMS Hasenclever GmbH, Duesseldorf—machines and complete installations for the forging and metal extruder industry (sales: DM164 million; 455 employees), subsidiary of SMS Schloemann-Siemag AG, Duesseldorf, which is owned with parity votes by MAN AG, Munich, and Siemag Weiss Stiftung & Co. KG. Allegation: forging press for gun factory. Status of the case: "Included in investigations by the Customs Investigation Office in Duesseldorf and Bochum prosecution regarding Taji."

TBT Tiefbohrtechnik GmbH, Dettingen (no longer included in the new Helms list)—machine tools and tools (sales: DM81 million; 510 employees), shareholders are SIG Schweizerische Industrie-Gesellschaft, Neuhausen, Switzerland, and Gildemeister AG, Dettingen (see there). Allegation: drilling equipment for gun factory. Status of the case: "Included in investigations by Bochum prosecution of the Taji complex, as well as investigations by Bonn prosecution in the Inwako proceedings."

Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik GmbH, Duesseldorf—planning, delivery and construction of industrial plants of all types ready for use (sales: DM440 million; 547 employees). Allegation: plant for the production of arms and ammunition in Taji. Status of the case: "Investigations underway at the Bochum prosecutor's office."

3. Deliveries via Foreign Countries

Asea Brown Boveri AG, Mannheim—90 percent of shares owned by ABB Asea Brown Boveri AG, Zurich, Switzerland. Allegation: Electrical equipment for smelting furnaces in gun factory. Status of the case: "Smelting furnaces which possibly require license were delivered by the Swiss ABB."

Dornier GmbH, Friedrichshafen—space and defense technology, business management in the hands of Daimler-Benz subsidiary, Aerospace AG. Allegation: codevelopment of the "Alphajet" ground-attack aircraft. Status of the case: "Cooperation partner in 'Alphajet'. Was exported from France."

MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH, Ottobrunn—aeronautics and space enterprise (sales: DM 6.3 billion) of the Daimler-Benz subsidiary Deutsche Aerospace AG. Allegation: partner in Euromissile (50 percent). Status of the case: "Euromissile, Hot/Roland—German-French cooperation. Exports came from France."

4. Criminal Proceedings Initiated

Gildenmeister Projecta GmbH, Bielefeld—industrial plants, linked enterprise (100 percent) of the Gildemeister AG (lathes, guidance systems, sounding borers; corporate sales: DM552 million; 1,910 employees). Bielefeld, see TBT Tiefborteknik. Allegation: general contractor for chemical weapons factory SAAD 16 and missile programs; computer programs. Status of the case: "Criminal proceedings initiated by Bielefeld prosecutors."

GPA (Wiesenthal Center list). Status of the case: "Consen subsidiary, subject matter of the criminal proceedings against Consen subsidiary PBG at Land Court Munich II."

PBG Project Betreuungs GmbH-Bohlen Industrie GmbH, Essen: Managing holding company for affiliated companies for the production of chemicals, explosives, powder. Parent company of the Consen group. Allegation: rocket technology. Status of the case: "Office of the Prosecutor Munich II has initiated criminal proceedings against responsible parties."

Rotexchemie International Handels-GmbH & Co., Hamburg—pharmaceutical specialties and chemical raw materials (sales: DM100 million; 40 employees). Allegation: sodium cyanide needed for hydrogen cyanide and tabun. Status of the case: "Criminal proceedings underway by Hamburg prosecutors. The merchandise

was returned to Belgium. Belgium meanwhile has introduced obligation to obtain a permit for all chemicals on the lists of the Australian Group. Incidentally, merchandise was clearly destined for Iran only."

5. The Karl Kolb Connection

Karl Kolb GmbH & Co. KG, Dreieich-Buchsschlag—Scientific Technical Supplies. Export of scientific equipment, new installation of laboratories abroad, technical offices/sales branches, among other places in Baghdad, Iraq, Kuwait, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (sales 1988: DM33 million; 62 employees). The six limited partners want to dissolve the Kolb firm by year's end. The reason is purported to be a large drop in orders which has already led to a staff reduction to 22 employees. Allegation: chemical weapons factory, laboratory equipment for material tests, equipment for biological agents. Status of the case: "Criminal proceedings against responsible parties underway at Darmstadt Land Court."

Ludwig Hammer. Allegation: equipment for armament factory. Status of the case: "See criminal proceedings against responsible parties of the Karl Kolb enterprise et al. at Darmstadt Land Court."

Pilot Plant (in liquidation), Dreieich. Allegation: chemical weapons factory. Status of the case: "Subsidiary of Karl Kolb. Criminal proceedings against responsible parties underway at Darmstadt Land Court."

Preussag AG, Hannover—conglomerate merged with Salzgitter AG. Allegation: building for chemical weapons factory. Status of the case: "Investigations by public prosecutor/criminal proceedings underway at the office of the prosecutor in Darmstadt in connection with the Karl Kolb complex."

Quast. Allegation: corrosion-proof alloys. Status of the case: "Was subcontractor of Pilot Plant (domestic business deals)."

Rhema-Laborteknik. Allegation: inhalation chambers for chemical weapons research establishment. Status of the case: "See Karl Kolb (ancillary delivery)."

Uni-Path GmbH (formerly Oixid GmbH), Wesel—wholesaler. Allegation: bacteriological nutrient mediums. Status of the case: "Ancillary supplies to W.E.T."

W.E.T. Water Engineering Trading GmbH, Hamburg. Allegation: chemical substances for the manufacture of nerve gas. Status of the case: "Darmstadt prosecutors have initiated criminal proceedings (Karl Kolb complex)."

Carl Zeiss, Heidenheim (Brenz)—microscopy, medical-optical equipment, measurement technology, optometrics (sales: DM1.3 billion; 8,300 employees), individual enterprise owned by the Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung. Allegation: equipment for chemical weapons factory. Status of the case: "Was ancillary supplier of Karl Kolb."

6. Status of the Case: "?"

Eltro GmbH, Heidelberg—company for radiation technology, optronic equipment, heat image screens, missile guidance, mine sweeping system (sales 1988: DM71.5 million; 477 employees); partners are Telefunken System Technik GmbH, Ulm, and Hughes Aircraft Company, Culver City, California. Allegation: rocket guidance systems. Status of the case: "Rocket guidance systems."

Georg Fischer AG, Schaffhausen—mechanical engineering (sales: DM2.8 billion). Allegation: equipment for gun factory. Status of the case: "It is a Swiss enterprise in Schaffhausen; ancillary deliveries to Taji."

Industrie-Werke Karlsruhe Augsburg AG, Karlsruhe—regulating technology, welding engineering, defense technology, packaging, trade and services (sales: DM1.4 billion; 6,800 employees). Allegation: machine tools. Status of the case: "?"

Mannesmann-Rexroth—one of the more than 250 subsidiaries and associated companies of the Mannesmann corporation at home and abroad. Allegation: gun components. Status of the case: "This concerns the Belgian Mannesmann subsidiary, G.L. Rexroth NV SA. Transit of parts which the firm intended to deliver for the 'big gun' were held up in Frankfurt."

Mauserwerke Oberndorf GmbH, Oberndorf—machine tools, measurement technology, weapons systems (1,450 employees), an enterprise of the Diehl group, Nuernberg. Allegation: equipment for rocket research. Status of the case: "?"

Nickel GmbH. Allegation: airconditioning technology for rocket factory. Status of the case: "?"

Promex Explorations GmbH. Allegation: rocket technology. Status of the case: "?"

Schaerer Werkzeugmaschinen. Allegation: lathes for the production of artillery shells. Status of the case: "?"

Stalco Industrieanlagen. Allegation: arranging arms deals. Status of the case: "Firm of the Iraqi secret service, arrangement of arms deals?"

Teldix GmbH. Allegation: rocket technology. Status of the case: "?"

Waldrich Siegen Werkzeugmaschinen GmbH, Burbach. Company controlled through subsidiary of Ingersoll International Incorporated, Rockford, Illinois, United States. Allegation: machine tools for rocket factory. Status of the case: "?"

Weiss Technik. Allegation: heat and cold chambers. Status of the case: "?"

Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausruestungen GmbH, Geisenheim; industrial equipment, machine tools for special purposes, testing machines (sales 1988: DM205 million).

Allegation: universal drilling equipment for chemical weapons factory. Status of the case: "The enterprise ended its involvement."

Companies Deny Charges

91GE0156A Bonn *DIE WELT* in German
15 Feb 91 p 12

[Article by "mik": "We Are No Helpers of Saddam Husayn": On the Confidential Preliminary Report on the Investigation for Suspicion of Illegal Arms Exports"]

[Text] The interim report to the Federal Government on the investigations by German authorities of those suspected of illegal arms exports to Iraq, published verbatim by *DIE WELT* ("Saddam Husayn's German Business Partners," *DIE WELT*, 11 February) met with a lively response. Several radio and television stations aired contributions. Daily newspapers published excerpts. Managers of companies mentioned on the list of U.S. Senator Helms sent comments to *DIE WELT*. In the following, the replies by the companies are printed in their exact wording.

Dynamit Nobel AG, Troisdorf: "The list also mentions our company, accusing Dynamit Nobel of having delivered a production plant for arms and ammunition. The Office of the Public Prosecutor in Bonn is said to be investigating. Concerning that, it may be stated that Dynamit Nobel did not deliver any production plant for arms and ammunition to Iraq, and also did not in any other way participate in building such a plant. It also is not correct that the office of the Public Prosecutor in Bonn is conducting investigations of it."

Eltro GmbH Gesellschaft fuer Strahlungstechnik, Heidelberg: "You write that Eltro GmbH in Heidelberg is suspected of having had business dealings with Saddam Husayn. That accusation is false. Investigations by the public prosecutor into that were halted on 6 February."

On 6 February the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Heidelberg informed Eltro: "Regarding preliminary proceedings for violation of the Military Weapons Control Law and the Foreign Trade Law. Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, the investigation pending in the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Heidelberg was dropped as of today in accordance with Article 70, Section 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure."

Gildemeister Projecta GmbH, Bielefeld: "1. Gildemeister Projecta delivered and installed laboratory and workshop facilities for universal applications for the SAAD 16 project. That project does not involve an industrial plant, but rather laboratories and workshops, comparable to facilities at universities, technical educational establishments, and testing institutes, that is to say, facilities which are not specifically built for military purposes. The equipment delivered is not suitable for the development or production of NBC [Nuclear Biological Chemical] weapons. Development know-how was not included in the framework of the order. Half of the order

value was for buildings and infrastructure. The project had a total value of approximately 400 million German marks [DM] and not, as alleged in the press, DM1.6 billion.

"2. In April 1989 the Office of the Public Prosecutor initiated an investigation of employees of Gildemeister Projecta GmbH on suspicion of having violated the Foreign Trade Law. In August 1990 the following position taken by the Bielefeld Public Prosecutor's Office was published in the WESTFALEN BLATT: 'Essentially, according to Senior Public Prosecutor Jost Schmiedeskamp, the investigation is concentrating on a single employee (not mentioned by name) of the Bielefeld company. He is suspected of having negligently delivered computer equipment—not guns and equipment for the production of poison gas—to Iraq.'

"3. Regarding the present state of the investigation, we enclose an article from the NEUE WESTFAELISCHE referring to the SPIEGEL article of 4 February 1991: 'Concerning a charge against managers of Gildemeister Projecta GmbH in Bielefeld for having built a military research center in Iraq, according to SPIEGEL, a controversy has developed between the Federal Government and the Public Prosecutor's Office, which is handling the preliminary proceedings. After two years of investigation into the company's role in the DM1.5-billion plant at Mosul, the criminal prosecutors wanted to bring charges in only two instances, in which the company did not have the required permits. Bonn's objection that Gildemeister obtained permits in five additional instances based on misrepresentation was rejected by the prosecuting attorneys, according to SPIEGEL. The control authorities are said to have been informed of the attempts to deceive them but nevertheless gave their consent.'"

Heinrich Mueller Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Pforzheim: "The Heinrich Mueller Maschinenfabrik GmbH, with its headquarters in Pforzheim, is the victim of confusion with another company with a similar name. The injection nozzles allegedly delivered by it—as press inquiries have found—were in fact (and without the need for a permit) delivered by the Heinrich Mueller GmbH company, 8508 Wendelstein, a company which has nothing to do with the Pforzheim firm and its owners.

"The Heinrich Mueller Maschinenfabrik located in Pforzheim delivered neither know-how, nor injection nozzles, nor any other parts to Iraq, which in any way contributed to the technical improvement of the Scud B missile or to Iraq's arms industry."

The PFORZHEIMER ZEITUNG reports: "This is not the first time that the Heinrich Mueller Maschinenfabrik in Pforzheim is mentioned. And now it fears for its reputation, because it is confused with the Heinrich Mueller GmbH in Wendelstein." And it continues: "The PFORZHEIMER ZEITUNG has made inquiries of the police ('no knowledge') and the Chamber of Industry and Trade. The managing director of the Chamber of

Industry and Trade, Alfred Breuer, indicated that there was nothing against the company."

Teldix GmbH, Heidelberg/Robert Bosch GmbH, Stuttgart: "The preliminary investigation of Teldix GmbH, Heidelberg, which belongs to the Bosch Group, in connection with alleged arms deliveries to Iraq has—as the Public Prosecutor's Office in Heidelberg announced last week—been closed. A corresponding charge from a private party turned out to be unfounded. It has not been possible to prove Teldix guilty either of violations of the Military Weapons Control Law or the Foreign Trade Law. From the outset Teldix rejected the accusation as inaccurate."

Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik GmbH, Duesseldorf: "The accusation found in your list, that Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik should have built a plant for the production of arms and ammunition in Taji, is false—and equally false is the 'information' that the Public Prosecutor's Office in Bochum is currently investigating Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik. A call from your editors to the Public Prosecutor's Office could have resulted in clarification of that and could have spared us false suspicions."

Carl Zeiss, Oberkochen: "Accusations in connection with arms exports to Iraq and the production of chemical weapons have on occasion been publicly directed against the Carl Zeiss company recently. Carl Zeiss has been unjustly attacked and emphatically rejects the accusations.

"The Oberkochen company gets about 50 percent of its turnover from exports. Before the UN embargo was imposed, the company delivered medical-optical equipment, microscopes, measuring instruments, and equipment for industrial quality assurance to Iraq—just as to many other countries in the world. In the 1980's Carl Zeiss built two telescopes for an astronomical observatory in Iraq. Since the embargo was imposed on 7 August 1990, the company has not delivered anything more to Iraq. All previous deliveries were—as is the normal way of handling contracts at Zeiss—examined for potential permit requirements. Carl Zeiss has never delivered defense technology or arms-relevant products to Iraq and also did not contribute to the production of chemical weapons.

"Carl Zeiss strongly objects to being represented as an arms supplier to Iraq. The company has not violated the export laws. Since the embargo there have been no more deliveries to Iraq."

Eastern Laender Officials View Soviet Withdrawal

Pullout from Mecklenburg 'Slower Than Expected'

AU1902154791 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
13 Feb 91 p 8

["D.G./hrk." report: "Schwerin: Soviet Withdrawal Slower Than Expected"]

[Excerpts] Schwerin/Berlin—The withdrawal of Soviet troops, which has been agreed on in a treaty between Bonn and Moscow, is starting more slowly than expected in Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, it was pointed out by Hans-Joachim Kahlendrusch, parliamentary state secretary in the minister president's office. At the order of the head of government, the Christian Democratic Union politician is heading the newly formed German-Soviet "Troop Withdrawal" working group. Kahlendrusch said that about 40,000 soldiers of the Soviet Army are stationed in Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, to whom a major number of civilian employees have to be added. The Soviet Army is operating 127 military facilities there.

According to the state secretary, the troop withdrawal will have a moderate scope this year. Kahlendrusch said that nine units with about 1,100 soldiers and 600 civilians from the Ribnitz-Damgarten area are expected to return to the Soviet Union. The ship transports of soldiers—also from the other new laender—go via Rostock and the ferry port of Mukran on Ruegen Island to Leningrad. However, it has been said that in Leningrad there is no appropriate unloading equipment for the modern roll-on/roll-off train ferries, which transport mainly tanks. [passage omitted]

In contrast to Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, one hears from Brandenburg that the Soviet withdrawal is "going well." With 128,300 Red Army members, exactly 36 percent of all Soviet soldiers in Germany are stationed in old Prussia. The office of Helmut Domke, Minister President Manfred Stolpe's representative for liaison with the Soviet forces, has released further figures: The Soviet Army is operating about 320 military facilities. In that way, about 1,200 square km of ground have been seized since 1945. The ammunition depots alone contain about 300,000 tonnes of grenades and projectiles—from "Kalashnikov" magazines to high-tech missile launchers.

Withdrawal Arrangements Explained

LD1902175991 Hamburg DPA in German 1618 GMT
19 Feb 91

[Text] Potsdam (DPA)—The Soviet forces in eastern Germany should leave the land capitals first. So said the commissioners of the new laender for Soviet forces in Potsdam on Tuesday. As the Bonn commissioner for the Soviet troop withdrawal, Maj. Gen. Hartmut Voertsch, said after the meeting, the wishes of the laender will be put to the Soviet side soon.

According to Voertsch, the troop withdrawal will not take place via Polish soil, but by ship through the Baltic ports of Mukran and Rostock. Poland's refusal was seen by the Federal Government as a bilateral, Polish-Soviet problem. Bonn made sufficient advance contributions, in addition to the payment of a billion [currency not specified] in withdrawal costs.

Of the 545,000 soldiers, relatives and civilian employees of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, around a third—mainly from Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringen—were to be withdrawn in 1991.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Plan Until 1994 Detailed

AU2302222191 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
20 Feb 91 p 2

["kde" report: "Plan for Withdrawal Examined"]

[Text] Potsdam—This year 150,000 Soviet Army members will leave Germany. The withdrawal is concentrated primarily on Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. This was announced by Major General Foertsch, FRG Government representative for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the former GDR, to the press in Potsdam.

In 1991 a total of 30,000 pieces of large equipment, such as combat tanks, armored personnel carriers, cannons, and combat helicopters, will also be returned to the Soviet Union. According to Foertsch, at the moment 546,000 Soviet Army members, civilian employees, and family members are on German territory. The FRG Government now has an overall plan for the withdrawal until 1994, which is currently being examined and is to be confirmed on 5 March. According to this plan, a reduction of troops by 30 percent each is envisaged for this year and the next two years. General Foertsch reported that the FRG Government will provide 1 billion German marks for transportation by 1994.

Foertsch said that Poland's refusal to permit the transit of Soviet troops is a bilateral problem between the two countries involved. Foertsch affirmed the desire of the FRG Government for a decent and dignified withdrawal. In addition, the government is in favor of having the FRG finance Ministry release the now free premises as quickly as possible in order to use them for residential purposes and for industrial settlements.

SPD Official Urges Arms Restrictions on Mideast

AU2302210491 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
21 Feb 91 p 4

[Interview with Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group, by Brigitta Richter; place and date not given: "How Can a Stable Peace Order Be Ensured in the Middle East?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Richter] Latest reports from Iraq about the intention to withdraw from Kuwait under certain conditions might indicate a reassessment of Iraqi policy. If the German foreign minister does not have a model for solving the conflict—does the SPD or you have one?

[Voigt] Only if the withdrawal from Kuwait really begins, will the Allied armed forces be able to cease

fighting. Afterwards, the most difficult question arises, namely how a stable peace order can be ensured. The end of the fighting in the Gulf region must not lay the foundation for new fighting. This includes that not only must Iraq withdraw from Kuwait but that the Arab states also conclude treaties and agreements among themselves which are effective and credible in case of aggression by a third party. It would be neither good nor desirable nor stabilizing if land-based troops of non-Arab and non-Islamic states were to be stationed in the region for the long term. In addition, checks on nonpossession and nonproduction of nuclear and chemical weapons in the region would be necessary.

[Richter] Who should verify this, in your view?

[Voigt] I can imagine that the idea of nuclear- and chemical-weapons-free zones and corridors, which has been criticized by many, in particular by the Americans when it was applied to Europe, can be accepted also by the Americans for the region of the Near and Middle East. In addition, it would be conceivable to use international organs, UN authorities, or a group of Arab states for verification. In the Western European Union (WEU—military alliance of nine European states—the editors) there exists regional arms control, which, for instance, has verified the nonproduction of chemical weapons in the FRG. This practice could be taken over. There must be stricter control of arms exports to this region, at least of long-range missile technology. Thus, the issue is not only the question of possessing, producing, and using nuclear and chemical weapons, but also certain conventional weapons technologies.

[Richter] This sounds very like a dictate by the North to the South....

[Voigt] I believe that the interest in banning the above-mentioned weapons is an interest of the Arab states themselves. Therefore, there is a chance for regional arms control.

[Richter] Thus, we have arrived at the often discussed "CSCE" in the Middle East?

[Voigt] Simply transferring the CSCE model, which has been tested in Europe, to the Middle East will not work. [passage omitted]

Government Denies Conditions Set for CFE Ratification

LD2202223391 Hamburg DPA in German 2110 GMT
22 Feb 91

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—On Friday evening the Federal Government denied a report in the daily DIE WELT (Saturday edition) that Bonn, in agreement with its NATO partners, will refuse to put the Paris Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) up for ratification until the Soviet Union meets certain conditions. [passage omitted]

A Foreign Office spokesman in Bonn said that the Federal Government is preparing the ratification of the treaty with the expectation that any problems still outstanding can be solved at a joint discussion in Vienna. The formal ratification procedure has not yet been launched since "a number of technical and intergovernmental legal questions" still have to be solved, such as the law on inspections in the non-military area. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh discussed this problem in Madrid on 21 February.

Bundeswehr: Soviet Withdrawal 'On Schedule'

LD2502175791 Hamburg DPA in German 1608 GMT
25 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Berlin/Hamburg (DPA)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Germany is on schedule according to the Bundeswehr. Despite difficulties in the movement of the soldiers and their equipment through Poland, the withdrawal could be completed on time by the end of 1994. Major General Werner von Scheven, the deputy commander of the Bundeswehr East Command, told the press in Hamburg on Monday.

On Sunday there was another meeting of the German-Soviet working group on the preparation and coordination of the Soviet withdrawal in Strausberg near Berlin. According to a Bonn Defense Ministry statement today, all those involved agreed to the withdrawal plan put forward by the Soviets for 1991. The overall withdrawal plan is to be dealt with finally in March. The plan for 1991 envisages the return of up to 100,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks and artillery pieces, up to 3,000 other armored vehicles, and some 100 fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister on Bundeswehr Cuts, Soviet Pullout

LD2602121391 Hamburg DPA in German 1007 GMT
26 Feb 91

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Decisions about the locations of the future reduced Bundeswehr will have been made by July, according to Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg. The reduction of the armed forces from the present 500,000 to 370,000 troops in four years is to go hand in hand with fundamental reforms in the command structures. Stoltenberg told journalists in Bonn today. The minister also called for continued arms control negotiations, even in the face of the Soviet Union's recent change in attitude. [passage omitted]

Stoltenberg expressed his optimism about the withdrawal of Soviet troops within the specified time from the territory of the former GDR. All the indications are that the relevant treaties will be ratified by the Soviet parliament. In contrast, the Soviet Union still has to remove obstacles to ensure the continuation of the Vienna arms control negotiations, the minister stressed. For instance, a correction of the transfer of 57,000

weapon systems to behind the Urals as well as the transfer of three divisions of ground forces is expected.

Bonn wants a speedy clarification in order to start followup negotiations, Stoltenberg said. That involves above all the specification of upper limits for the ground forces and an emphasis on the armed forces' defensive nature. In addition Bonn believes that a mandate to start negotiations about nuclear short- and medium-range missiles can be given. However, the objective is not a zero solution, but a reduction, Stoltenberg stressed.

Genscher Comments on European Peace Order

LD2702093791 Berlin ADN in German 0048 GMT
27 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—The FRG foreign minister believes there is no change in the goal of creating a European peace order through cooperation and consolidating the disarmament process. In Wednesday's BERLINER ZEITUNG, however, Hans-Dietrich Genscher does point out that new problems have arisen following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. "We are anxious not to continue the old thinking of reciprocal arms buildups; in principle we want every development, every step taken to serve the security of all," he said. "I do not want the Soviet Union to feel at a disadvantage. That could lead to the wrong internal developments there." [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Weaknesses in Export Control System Viewed

91EN0283A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30
Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Arild M. Jonassen: "Weak Norwegian Control"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] The efforts of the Norwegian authorities to control sensitive and strategic goods following the Kongsberg Weapons Factory [KV] scandal have become steadily weaker. Customs control chiefs are seeking more control assignments from the Foreign Ministry.

The Foreign Ministry's press spokesman, Bjorn Blokhuis, confirms that there has been a certain reduction in control, but says that some of the explanation lies in a liberalization of regulations in light of the East-West thaw.

"There recently was a meeting where, among other things, it was discussed how resources in the customs service can be best possibly used. Customs personnel may now get more control assignments. Norway has signed an agreement on license obligations for exports of rockets and associated technology in order to limit the risk of a spread of nuclear weapons. The list of licensed chemicals that can be used for production of chemical weapons is long," says Blokhuis, and notes that there is not a thaw everywhere in the world.

Right now, the Gulf war has revived stricter control of the export of sensitive goods, not the least via third countries that might conceivably cooperate with Iraq. All exports to Kuwait and Iraq were halted with the UN sanctions last year.

Control of goods restricted by COCOM [NATO Coordinating Committee] and of other strategic goods was strongly upgraded in 1988, following revelation of the Kongsberg Weapons Factory's illegal sales to the Soviet Union. Not least, the strong American reactions were an important incentive. The authorities established 11 new positions, six of which are in the customs service, allocated to the Customs Directorate and the customs district offices in Drammen, Oslo, and at Fornebu.

All strategic goods must be exported via the three customs stations and customs sources indicate to AFTENPOSTEN that sharpened control has had an "educational effect" on Norwegian exporters. Some shippers have suffered a blow because they were exporting licensed goods for customers in defiance of the rules.

Few Foreign Ministry Assignments

But the control assignments for sensitive goods that the Foreign Ministry is giving via the Customs Directorate are so few that they do not employ customs personnel full time. They are being assigned instead to general export control and, in Oslo, also in the hunt for liquor and narcotics smugglers.

AFTENPOSTEN has been advised that about 20 control assignments are supposed to have come from the Foreign Ministry in 1990, in addition to the control assignments that naturally follow from the licenses that are issued.

Thor Michalsen, the control chief at the customs district office in Drammen, says that their COCOM man has met great understanding within industry for this control activity and that he has traveled around to both shippers and exporters and informed them of the rules.

"But we had expected more control assignments from central authorities. It is so remarkable that we have pointed out the situation. We have been informed that the ministry will change the routines and give us more assignments," says Michalsen.

Control Chief Oddvar Saether of the customs district office at Fornebu says that in 1990 they had not received a single control assignment from the Foreign Ministry via the customs directorate such as they received both in 1988 and 1989.

"At a meeting in May last year with the newly named branch chief of the [pertinent] Foreign Ministry office, it was pointed out that we had a good deal of idle capacity. We have nonetheless not received any more assignments from there. But we are, of course, carrying out inspections on our own initiative, both of outgoing travellers and of packages," he says.

Number of Licenses

The Foreign Ministry branch for export and import regulation issued 10,674 licenses in 1989 and 8,726 licenses last year for weapons, ammunition, military equipment, high-technology products, chemicals, and other goods. The customs service's control depends upon how sensitive the individual shipments are, with a division into three groups.

Nineteen licenses were issued in 1989 in the most sensitive goods group and five such licenses in 1990. In such cases, the customs service is to be notified five days in advance by the exporter. A customs officer will then travel out to the concern, be present during the packing, and follow the shipment until it is sent out of the country.

Eide: NATO Force Cut Will Impact Security

91EN0284A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
5 Feb 91 p 16

[Article by Olav Trygve Storvik: "Fewer NATO Forces Ready for Action in Norway"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Norway must prepare itself that fewer NATO forces stand ready to move into action in the north if a crisis arises. This was warned by the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Vigleik Eide, in the Oslo Military Society yesterday.

At the same time, Eide cautioned that the Kola bases' significance for the Soviet Union will be even more important in the future and that Norway will have an even more exposed geographic position than it has today.

In his address, among other things, Eide said:

"For Norway, changes in the security policy landscape and the future of NATO have great significance. To assert that it probably won't become easier to assess total risk and determine the necessary defense capability does not seem to be a very daring statement."

Reduced Help

Owing to the future reduced forces level, it can be more difficult to get the allied national forces earmarked for Norway, and whether NATO's future forces structure will preserve the capability of providing adequate suitable reinforcements is unclear. Both air and ground forces will be in short supply, at the same time as it must be assumed that allied naval forces also will be reduced.

Little Likelihood

"The feasibility of Soviet force reductions on the Kola peninsula and in the Leningrad Military District should be explored and can not be excluded, but the importance this area has for the Soviet Union promises that, in the future as well, such reductions hardly are likely. On the

contrary, an eventual setback in the Baltic can increase the significance of the Kola peninsula. A reduction in Norwegian military capacity can therefore turn out to be risky both for Norway and for NATO," warned the chairman of NATO's Military Committee.

He opined that those special problems of the northern region he had emphasized will not become less by the alliance in the future perhaps focusing more of its attention on the southern region's requirements and problems.

He opined therefore that Norway will scarcely be able to avoid the difficult problem that it is to define a minimum level for the strength and structure of the defense forces.

Below such a level, defense efforts become ineffective, and it will require a long time and large resources to build them up again when the requirement increases. With his special position, Eide did not wish to say anything about how today's Norwegian defense stands in relation to such a "minimum level," but did express the hope that the debate about such an existential question might be both deep and objective.

Eide also predicted changes in the NATO command structure as a result of the new strategic situation. It is known that some time ago a far-reaching change of the Northern Command at Kolsas was discussed, something that led to a sharp reaction from the Norwegian Government. About this effort Eide said:

Adjustment

"On the military side, work on revising the command structure is proceeding on various levels. The three supreme commanders are evaluating necessary adjustments for their areas and the military committee is functioning as a steering group for overall, aggregate assessments. The result will not necessarily be revolutionary, but changes may be recommended in several areas. The European Command's organization will probably be thoroughly debated because the solution is influenced by the future European development within the alliance. I see, however, no grounds for exaggerated apprehension that there will not continue to exist an adequate chain of command for the Northern Command's areas."

SPAIN

Gonzalez Seeks Mediterranean Security Conference

LD2102000291 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
2300 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Excerpts] Today the Spanish capital became the European capital of diplomacy. It is the venue for the meeting of the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe, which will include a solemn ceremony, that of Czechoslovakia's incorporation. In order to attend this meeting,

which will take place tomorrow morning, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Bessmertnykh arrived in Madrid and tonight had dinner in private with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez as Alfonso Sanchez reports:

[Sanchez] [passage omitted] Besides Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who is attending the meeting as an observer and then will stay on for an official visit, several foreign ministers from the member countries had dinner tonight at the Moncloa Palace at the invitation of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. During the toast Gonzalez expressed his desire for peace and said that he is in favor of promoting a conference on security in the Mediterranean:

[Begin Gonzalez recording] We trust that when the Gulf conflict is over the basis can be laid for it [the conference], and the Mediterranean may once again form the nexus of union which it has been historically, not only between countries, but also between cultures and civilizations. [end recording] [passage omitted]

UNITED KINGDOM

Caicos Firm's Role in Iraqi Missile Development Detailed

91WP0068A Vienna PROFIL in German 4 Feb 91 p 52

[Article by Alan George: "A Respectable Business"]

[Text] "We have never tried to hide the fact that we are doing business with Iraq," says William Pellew-Harvey. Nevertheless, the British national sitting in the office of his lawyer in the elegant St. James section of London, is the subject of intensive inquiries by the American and other Western intelligence services. For two years, up to the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent UN sanctions, he was the middleman in a series of transactions in which Italian and other European firms made deliveries to Saddam Husayn's arms factories.

Pellew-Harvey admits that his firm had engaged in direct competition with some of the since unmasked Iraqi front firms, such as Italy's Euromac, whose English sister firm tried last year to deliver nuclear bomb triggers to Iraq. In January Qasim 'Abbas, the Iraqi boss of Euromac, was deported to Italy.

British national Pellew-Harvey is the owner of Bonaventure Europe (BE), a firm registered in the Caicos Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean. He operates his business out of a Geneva office; his domicile is Monaco. Geneva is the site of the office of Bonaventure Services (BS), which, according to Pellew-Harvey, is merely a management organization, "not involved in our trade and banking activities."

Since his first visit to Iraq in May 1988, shortly before the armistice with Iran, Pellew-Harvey has signed contracts worth about 110 million schillings in Baghdad. His principal customers were the state-owned enterprises

Hutayn and Qadisiyah, the country's most important artillery ammunition and firearms manufacturers.

While Pellew-Harvey basically admits the existence of these trade connections, he is quite reticent about their details. PROFIL's inquiries showed that his deals included Italian, Swiss, German, French, and British manufacturers; the product was intended for Saddam's missile development program.

In Italy some of the Bonaventure contracts were processed by the small business firm, Italian Technology and Innovations (ITI), located in Villa Carcina near Brescia. Its offices were used by independent businessman Paolo Maraviglia, who ordered, among other things, Benelli mechanical presses, valued at 2 million schillings, for Qadisiyah. Two Torino firms, Dea and Sapri, delivered measuring instruments and welding equipment to Geneva, fully aware of the fact that their final destination was Iraq. A Sapri spokesman declared that they "pretty much knew that up to 98 percent of what the Iraqi government wanted went to arms manufacturers."

Maraviglia also served as middleman for a \$1.5 million contract between Milan's MMBI and Bonaventure for supplying the equipment for five machine tool centers. "The precise destination was never revealed," says a company spokesman. It became known only when MMBI's parent company, Maho, located in Pfronten, Bavaria, organized the deployment of technicians to install the machinery.

Another German Bonaventure partner, Tiefbohrtechnik [deep drilling technology] of Dettingen, delivered drilling machines to Geneva in 1989. Bonaventure had purchased machinery from the Baltec Company of Pfaffikon near Zurich as early as 1988. At that time the real customer, Qadisiyah, became known only when a technician was sent there. When he found out that it was an arms manufacturer, he returned home without finishing his assignment.

In addition to metal processing machinery, Bonaventure also procured for Iraq testing instrumentation suitable for use in developing ballistic missiles. Pellew-Harvey strongly denies having visited Iraq's Sa'ad-16-Complex near Mossul, where Iraqi missile development took place prior to U.S. bombing attacks. "I know the place only from newspaper stories," he says.

Early last year Bonaventure purchased from the Paris firm, Acutronic, a centrifuge, with a diameter of 120 cm, which was installed at Baghdad University. Acutronic describes its use as "testing of electric components." Pellew-Harvey says that it can be used also to test ammunition fuzes. He had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase inertial guidance systems, as used in missiles, from Acutronic's Swiss subsidiary.

During his interview Pellew-Harvey indicated that his biggest deal with Iraq—which was canceled by the UN sanctions—involved two industrial X-ray installations for the Hutayn ammunition plant. One, worth 11 million schillings, was to come from the Varian Company in California; another, worth 2.2 million schillings, from Philips in Germany. Both firms deny having intended to make delivery; however, people at the Philips plant in Hamburg remember British systems consultant Mike Davis, who had connections with both Iraq and Bonaventure. Pellew-Harvey refers to Davis as a "close personal friend." Davis says merely that he has heard people talk about Pellew-Harvey. He confirms having

been in Iraq in 1989 to demonstrate X-ray systems, but claims that his business connections with Bonaventure never went beyond the proposal stage.

Pellew-Harvey is amazed at the great interest in his activities. Swiss officials apparently visited his Geneva office at the request of the French police. "The French had arrested someone who was in possession of one of my old business cards," says Pellew-Harvey. The Swiss had left his office in short order. According to Pellew-Harvey, there was no reason for Swiss and other countries' authorities to be concerned about Bonaventure. "We operate a respectable business."

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